

# *War and Peace in the Pacific*

*A Preliminary Report of the Eighth Conference of  
the Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime  
and Post-war Cooperation of the United  
Nations in the Pacific and the Far East*

*Mont Tremblant, Quebec  
December 4-14, 1942*

*INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT  
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS*

*129 East 52nd Street, New York—1943*

*All rights reserved*

*Copyright, 1943 by the  
International Secretariat  
Institute of Pacific Relations*

*Printed in the United States*

## PREFACE

This preliminary report of the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec from December 4 to 14, 1942, is issued in response to numerous requests that summaries of the discussions be made available as soon as possible. A fuller account based on the detailed records of the conference discussions and selections from the documents will be issued later by the Institute as *Problems of the Pacific, 1942*. The present report is based on the rapporteurs' summaries of the round tables, supplemented by two of the opening addresses and some of the statements made in the concluding plenary sessions. An annotated bibliography of the conference documents has been added together with a conference membership list.

### CONFERENCE PREPARATION AND ORGANIZATION

The Eighth Conference differed very markedly from previous meetings, not only in organization and membership but also in the international circumstances under which it met. Though the 1939 "Study Meeting" at Virginia Beach was held three months after the outbreak of the war in Europe, several important member countries of the I.P.R. (the United States, the U.S.S.R., the Philippines and the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies) were still at peace and, except in China and Japan, war had not yet begun to make its full impact felt, even upon the belligerent nations. By December 1942, however, all the countries represented were at war or under enemy occupation. That fact in itself, together with the uncertainties of transport and communication, greatly increased the difficulties of organizing such an international conference. For a long time many felt that, aside from the physical obstacles, a meeting would be quite impossible because the discussion would necessarily have to deal with matters of high policy in which many essential facts had to remain secret.

Despite these obvious risks the Institute authorities took their courage in their hands and decided on July 13, 1942, to summon the conference. A draft agenda was submitted for criticism to the National Councils or their representatives in the United States and, in the light of the criticisms received, a small preparatory conference met in September 1942 to redraft a more detailed agenda for the various round tables and decide on the general organization and program of the conference. This revised agenda served as the basis for the preparatory work of the national groups until the Program Committee met the day before the

## *Preface*

conference and set up sub-committees to prepare the more elaborate discussion outlines actually used in the round tables. The September meeting also took note of the conference documentation already in hand and arranged for the preparation or completion of other papers.

An important departure from previous I.P.R. practice was authorized in inviting persons holding government positions to participate in the discussions, though only in their personal capacities. This step was considered necessary because so many of the competent authorities in the field of Far Eastern and Pacific problems had gone into government service and because without the presence of some officials the discussions on such a topic as cooperation of the United Nations in the Pacific would inevitably be unrealistic if not actually misleading. As it turned out, the presence of the officials was of decided advantage to the conference; their presence added greatly to the seriousness and sense of responsibility in the round tables without appreciably lessening the frankness and vigor of the discussions.

In numbers and quality of membership, the conference was much better than the Institute authorities had at first dared to hope. In spite of serious travel difficulties, Australian, Chinese, Indian, British, Dutch and Fighting French members came by plane from overseas. For the first time an Indian group and a Free Thai member attended the conference and for the first time since 1927 a Korean independently participated. To the great regret of all the U.S.S.R. Council for understandable reasons found itself unable to send a group.

### THE MAIN THEME OF THE CONFERENCE

The main purpose of the conference discussions as announced in the revised agenda was to answer the following questions:

- (1) What steps can jointly or severally be taken by the United Nations (particularly those with major interests in the Pacific Area) to aid in the better prosecution of the war and in the establishment of conditions of racial, political and economic justice and welfare?
- (2) How far and by what means can the conclusions drawn from the discussions under point (1) above be made the basis of a practical program for the United Nations during and after the war?

### THE CONFERENCE PROGRAM

After an opening plenary session at which the leaders of several national groups made statements (two of which, by the British and Chinese leaders, are reproduced below), the conference membership was divided

## *Preface*

into four round table groups, each of which spent two sessions discussing the same set of introductory questions on the broad problems of United Nations cooperation. These introductory discussions were intended to give all members a common background of preparation for the more specialized round tables to follow. Each group had its rapporteur and at the close of the introductory discussions each of the four rapporteurs submitted a summary of the discussions before a plenary meeting. After correction and comment from the meeting these summaries were later mimeographed and distributed to members.<sup>1</sup>

The conference was then re-divided into five "regional" round table groups (China, Japan, India, Southeast Asia, Other United Nations), each having its own agenda. These groups met separately for three full days (six sessions), after which the conference met in plenary session to hear summaries from the five rapporteurs. Following this, the conference was again divided into four "topical" round table groups (Political-Military<sup>2</sup> problems, Military-Political problems, Economic problems, Social and Demographic problems). These groups met for two days and their rapporteurs then summarized the discussions before a plenary session.

In addition to the above round tables two special discussion groups were organized for the benefit of persons particularly interested in Soviet relations with other Pacific countries and in problems of post-war relief and rehabilitation.

The concluding meetings of the conference were plenary sessions at which an attempt was made to formulate and discuss some important specific propositions (arising out of the previous round tables) on which it seemed that further studies, possibly leading to action, might appropriately be made in the home countries of the national groups at the conference. This procedure, which resulted in some very lively and frank discussion, was a new departure for I.P.R. conferences. It should be emphasized that these propositions were in no sense "resolutions" or "recommendations" of the conference. In I.P.R. meetings neither the round tables nor the conference as a whole ever adopt any resolutions.

---

<sup>1</sup> Since these summaries were all based on a common agenda they overlapped one another somewhat. In the present report, therefore, they have been merged into one composite summary (page 20 below).

<sup>2</sup> The political and military aspects of many problems were found to be so intermixed that these hyphenated titles were chosen; the first group concentrated more on the broader political and legal matters, the second more on the technical military and strategic factors.

## Preface

*The use of such words as "agreement" and "consensus" in the summaries which follow does not indicate that these points were put to a vote or that they were formally "accepted" or "adopted" by the round tables. It was almost impossible to avoid using such words in the summaries but they must be understood to denote only each rapporteur's personal estimate of the prevailing trend of opinion in his round table. On very few points was there complete unanimity and on many points there were strong dissenting views. Although members had an opportunity in the plenary sessions to criticize the summaries, it cannot be assumed that they all exercised this right or that the revised summaries are in a form which each member would personally have endorsed without qualification.*

The conference was completely private and its discussions were not reported by the press. In accordance with previous I.P.R. practice the identity of speakers is not revealed in the reports of the discussions. The authors of the two opening addresses printed herein have, however, agreed to publication of their names. Of necessity a few omissions and editorial changes have been made in the rapporteurs' summaries as submitted to the conference. The undersigned, assisted by Mr. Bruno Lasker (who also prepared the bibliography), is responsible for the editing, selection and arrangement of the material. Neither the Institute of Pacific Relations as a whole nor any of its National Councils is responsible for statements of fact or opinion appearing in this report. All statements at the conference were made solely on the individual responsibility of the speakers.

New York  
January 29, 1943

W. L. HOLLAND  
Research Secretary

*For purposes of ready reference an index to certain important specific problems considered at the conference is printed below after the table of contents (page x).*

## CONTENTS

PREFACE .....	v
INTRODUCTION .....	1
PART I. OPENING STATEMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS .....	3
A British View of a Far Eastern Settlement, by Lord Hailey ...	4
A Chinese View of China's Position in the Post-war World, by Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze .....	16
Introductory Round Table Discussions .....	20
PART II. REGIONAL ROUND TABLE SUMMARIES.....	29
China .....	30
Japan .....	38
Southeast Asia .....	48
India .....	63
Other United Nations .....	71
PART III. TOPICAL ROUND TABLE SUMMARIES.....	81
Political-Military Problems .....	82
Military-Political Problems .....	89
Economic Problems .....	101
Social and Demographic Problems .....	105
PART IV. SOME CONCLUDING STATEMENTS.....	115
PART V. ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY AND COMPLETE LIST OF CONFERENCE PAPERS.....	129
PART VI. CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP.....	153

## INDEX TO IMPORTANT PASSAGES

*Those who do not wish to read through the whole report may find it convenient to note the following page references to some of the more important specific problems considered in the round tables.*

1. A Pacific Regional Organization (pp. 13, 56, 78, 82)
2. A Permanent United Nations Organization (pp. 94, 98)
3. A United Nations Conference (pp. 95, 99)
4. A Possible Resolution of the Indian Political Deadlock (p. 65) .
5. An International Police Force (pp. 83, 92)
6. Post-war Treatment of Japan (pp. 42, 85, 90)
7. China's Place in the United Nations' War Councils (p. 33)
8. The Future of Colonial Territories (pp. 8, 51, 55)
9. Chinese Emigration (pp. 75, 107)
10. Minimum Welfare Standards (p. 106)
11. American Willingness to Enter Into International Commitments (pp. 76, 121)
12. International Responsibilities of the Great Powers (pp. 125, 127)
13. The Atlantic Charter and the Far East (pp. 24, 117, 122)

WAR AND PEACE  
IN THE PACIFIC



## INTRODUCTION

### THE INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFERENCE

The Mont Tremblant Conference met during a momentous period of world history and at a point which future historians will probably recognize as a crucial stage of the second world war. The anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came in the middle of the conference and with it was revealed the full tragic story of American naval and air losses which so greatly contributed to Japan's lightning conquests in the Southwest Pacific during the first four months of fighting. Those conquests brought heavy blows to the United Nations, not merely in ships sunk, armies and vital war materials captured, but also in other less apparent but equally significant ways: by greatly increasing China's isolation and supply problem after the capture of Burma, by seriously affecting both the political and the economic situation in India, by complicating the Australian war effort and vastly aggravating the whole Allied shipping problem. Earlier illusions about Japan's weaknesses were rapidly shattered as the enemy showed himself to be a fierce, tough, amazingly stubborn and skillful fighter and as Japan took over the great raw material prizes of Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless the events of the last quarter of 1942 seemed to indicate a significant change in the tide of war. Japan's territorial advances had been stopped and she had suffered heavy naval, air and shipping losses. India, though still suffering from a grave internal political impasse and official repression of the Congress Party for its attempt at civil disobedience, had been spared an actual invasion. With painful slowness and in pathetically small amounts, supplies were being carried by air into Western China from India. A large American loan to China had been made partly to help in stabilizing China's fast depreciating currency and a similar British loan was being negotiated. Substantial American forces had reinforced Australia and had begun to drive the Japanese slowly from New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. After many difficulties the enormous industrial machine of the United States had been switched over substantially to an all-out war program and American troops in large numbers were going into action on several battle fronts—most notably and dramatically in North Africa. Most important of all, the Soviet Union, though a neutral in the Pacific theater of war, was still delivering by far the heaviest blows against the major Axis power and was beginning its astonishing counter-drive to expel the German armies from Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

## *Introduction*

It was too early, however, to say the tide had definitely turned. It was perhaps "slack water" or, to quote one of the Allied leaders, "the end of the beginning" but certainly not the beginning of the end. Much remained to be done, not only on the battle field and in the factories, but also in the higher planning and political organization of the war. Admittedly some great steps forward had been taken. The noble if somewhat nebulous words of the Atlantic Charter had expressed some of the nations' needs for a statement of basic war aims. In more specific terms Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement of February 1942 had pointed the way to "the betterment of worldwide economic relations." The Declaration of the United Nations in January 1942 and indeed the whole concept of the United Nations, though still far from denoting an effective executive entity, was a great achievement. Administratively, much genuine progress had been made in the joint conduct of the war through the working of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, the Munitions Assignment Board, the Raw Materials Board, and the Shipping Adjustment Board, though these were still essentially Anglo-American agencies. The Regional Commands (in Australia, South Pacific, India, China, etc.) and the various joint Canadian-American committees were other evidences of steps towards coalition warfare. The Pacific Council in Washington, its lesser counterpart in London, the Eastern Group Supply Council (of the British Commonwealth) and the Inter-American Defense Board, were illustrations of wider consultative bodies which include more countries but are lacking, however, in real executive power.

The defects in this patchwork organization, though often explainable, had been increasingly obvious and the subject of mounting criticism. From several quarters protests were beginning to be heard against an excessive Anglo-American dominance in the conduct of the war. Coupled often with pleas for increased Chinese participation in the higher war councils, there were suggestions (e.g., by the Chinese Foreign Minister and the New Zealand Minister to Washington) for the establishment of an effective Executive Council at least of the larger United Nations. In all these criticisms there was a growing realization that not only the prosecution of the war but, even more, the better preparation for peace and post-war reconstruction would be badly handicapped unless the present nominal association of the United Nations is translated into a functioning policy-making organ.

*The Editor*

*PART I.*

OPENING STATEMENTS  
AND INTRODUCTORY ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS

## A BRITISH VIEW OF A FAR EASTERN SETTLEMENT

*The following statement was made by Lord Hailey, leader of the United Kingdom group, at the opening plenary session of the conference.*

### SOME FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

The fundamental consideration on which we must proceed is that of security. It is true, of course, that the post-war settlement would mean little to many of us, unless it brought with it a new order of things for the peoples of the Pacific zone. It must bring them a higher standard of living; it must enable them to rise above a situation in which so many of them are either politically or economically dependent on the more highly organized nations of the world. It must, to use a well known phrase, give them the prospect of attaining to the "Four Freedoms." But the whole basis of the Four Freedoms is security. Without it, the promise of freedom can only be illusory.

We are not, however, concerned here with the exact form of the organization which the United Nations may adopt to secure the world at large from aggression in the future. It may obviously take a variety of forms. We are interested mainly in the requisites of security in the Pacific zone. Clearly, whatever organization may be adopted by the United Nations for world security, there must be some local agency here for serving the many civil activities ancillary to air, military, or naval provision. Communications must be maintained, a network of air bases provided, industrial facilities organized—I need not prolong the list. Again, the economic interests of the Far East demand the maintenance of open ports which, like Hongkong and Singapore, have served the interests of international transit trade.

But over and above this, security demands a cooperative effort to create in this zone those economic and social conditions which will prevent local causes of friction or conflict arising. It is local conditions of this nature which have so often proved in the past to invite intervention in a form which ultimately becomes aggressive. It must promote a status among the now dependent peoples in the zone which will give them both the incentive and the means to organize for their own defence. An effort of this character must engage the active cooperation not only of the sovereign nations interested in the zone, among which it is our hope that the United States of America will be included, but also of the peoples now dependent on European colonial powers. We recognize that to secure these conditions, we must find the means to secure an atmos-

### *A British View of a Far Eastern Settlement*

phere of good will and mutual trust which will give the nations concerned a real and vital interest in making their cooperation effective.

Proceeding on this basic assumption, I propose to take certain critical points in order to illustrate the more important dispositions which should, in my view, be made, in order to guarantee the creation and—more important still—the maintenance of a cooperative interest of this character. It will be sufficient if I select then, the post-war position of China, that of Japan, and that of the area described as Southeast Asia.

#### CHINA

Heretofore the attitude of other nations towards China has followed two contrasting policies. One was an attempt to gain exclusive economic advantages through the acquisition of territory—the policy of Czarist Russia and of Modern Japan. The other policy was that of the Open Door, which has been the dominant attitude of the United States and the United Kingdom.

How will these two policies fare in the peace settlement? The Soviet Government has disassociated itself from the policy of territorial acquisition, and its concern is now in the main limited to its interest in the autonomous republic of Outer Mongolia, and to some extent also in Sinkiang. The clarification of the position vis-à-vis the suzerainty of China in Outer Mongolia should not be difficult of settlement between the two countries concerned. Far more difficult problems will arise from the expulsion of Japan from China's territory. We may take it for granted that the full sovereignty of China over Manchuria must be restored. But Manchuria owes much of its material development to Japan. Will it be possible to devise any arrangement by which the termination of the political control of Japan will still make it possible for the industries introduced by her to operate? Again, the withdrawal of Japanese administration from Korea will leave the latter without any basis on which an autonomous government can be erected. Here we have two problems of vital importance alike to the peace of this region and the peoples of these two territories. It is difficult to see a solution to the second of them unless it can be effected by the intervention of some intermediate authority. That is a point to which I shall again subsequently refer.

Then take the problems which arise from what may be described as our present-day conception of the policy followed by the United Kingdom and the United States towards China,—the policy of the Open Door. That policy claims no territorial privileges, but it involved the main-

### *Opening Statements*

tenance of extra-territorial rights for the protection of the interests of other nationals carrying on commercial activities in China. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have agreed that the extra-territorial regime must end, and we believe that the withdrawal of these rights will be complete and without reservation.

But will this measure allow us to claim that China has achieved the position she seeks and we seek for her, in which no external interests will in the future occupy any position of privilege within her borders? It has been suggested, for instance, that the existence of a large British investment in China creates such a position, and that, unless it is liquidated in the course of the post-war settlement, a full situation of non-privilege cannot be said to exist. But so far as we can understand, British commercial interests in China have not offered any opposition to the abolition of extra-territoriality. They have on the contrary asserted that they seek nothing more than the power to arrange with China itself, and without intervention from the British Government, the terms on which they shall continue to carry on their activities within the country. If this is so, it is not in this field that any difficulty should arise—at all events as between China and the United Kingdom.

But this does not end the problem of British relations with China. Hongkong remains as an outstanding issue. The facts jump quickly enough to the eye. Hongkong has a history of one hundred years of British rule. In that period it has grown from a barren island to a prosperous center of international trade, with a population of over one and one-half millions. But 98 per cent of the population is Chinese. It is dependent for its water-supply, its means of air defense, for a large part of its industrial facilities, on a leased area which must, in any case, be ceded back in 1997. The position is exceptional. It will not be possible to regard the future of Hongkong as one to be determined by bargaining between the United Kingdom and China on the basis of old standing treaty rights. Other and wider considerations now supervene. In my view, the future of Hongkong must depend on the general settlement to be made between China and the members of the "Pacific Group," to whom I shall afterwards refer, as to the provisions of key points to be maintained for purposes of security and for the continuance of transit trade. There should be no disposition on the part of the United Kingdom to allow vested interests to stand in the way of any political disposition of Hongkong which a due discharge of its functions in this respect may indicate.

### *A British View of a Far Eastern Settlement*

There is another critical issue affecting not only Great Britain but other members of the Pacific group. It is that of emigration, and of the status to be held by Chinese emigrants domiciled in countries to which they have emigrated. That the issue is delicate is no reason for overlooking it. Restoration of peace to China will doubtless restore that upward surge of population figures which marked her pre-war history. The problem of emigration will reassert itself not only in regard to Mongolia and Manchuria, but in regard to a large number of over-seas areas, both sovereign states and dependencies. It is not only the sovereign states such as the United States and the British Dominions which have a nationalistic outlook on this question. The people of Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and the Philippines all have their nationalistic or racial outlook on it. They view, and are entitled to view, the matter with concern. Here again is a matter which it will, perhaps, be difficult to leave to individual action, and which demands the combined counsels and the guidance of some intermediate authority.

What, however, of China's own contribution to the requirements of security and to that background of common understanding which the permanence of security demands? A full and untrammelled position of sovereignty within her own borders is a postulate which all will demand for her. But the traffic cannot be only one way. She will clearly need to move with some restraint in the attitude she takes up regarding her position in Indo-China and Korea. She will have to bear her part in the provision of the key places which the needs of common security demand. A critical question will arise in particular as to the position of Formosa in this respect. Again, as regards provision of transit facilities, the position of Shanghai will be no less important than that of Hongkong. It is in these directions, it is essential that she should make her own contribution to our common purpose.

#### JAPAN

It is common ground that Japan must surrender the territory she has seized since about 1930 onwards. There is room for doubt as to the extent, if any, to which she can be allowed to exercise any of her former economic activities in Manchuria and Korea. But if we are to introduce in Japan that frame of mind which eventually will bring her into peaceful cooperation with her neighbors in the Pacific group, we must find means by which her seventy-three millions can exist without any serious reduction in their standard of living. Moreover, neither her neighbors nor the

### *Opening Statements*

rest of the world can afford to forego the consumer market which these seventy-three millions represent.

It has been pointed out in some quarters that if at the outset we leave Japan with all her internal industrial equipment unimpaired and relieved of her present burden for armament production, we shall place her in the same undeserved position of advantage as Germany held at the end of the last war. She would be free to reorganize her internal industries at the expense of other nations, thrown out of industrial gear by the war. We should, in that view, see that part of the Japanese industrial equipment is handed over to some of her neighbors and in particular to China; but when that has been done, we still have to face the problem of providing an opening for her export industries and, in particular, her light industries—not only in the East but elsewhere.

The grant of full access for her industries to the world markets would be in accord with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter as further clarified in Article 7 of the Lend-Lease Agreement. But it will involve among other things the sacrifice of the system of quotas which the British have imposed in many of their areas and the Dutch in their East Indies. It may possibly involve also the reduction of tariffs elsewhere as, for instance, in the British Dominions and the United States, tariffs which, though not in form discriminatory, nevertheless operate as a preference to the high-priced commodities of non-Oriental countries. If so, this would constitute a definite sacrifice on their part, in order to guarantee some stability to Japan's industries.

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA

I pass now to the position of the countries of Southeast Asia. They are now, except for Thailand, dependencies of European powers or of the United States. Their post-war position, therefore, not only directly involves British, French, Netherlands, and American interests in this part of Asia, but the discussion of their future opens an issue of a far more extended range. For, the Japanese aggression has also had the indirect result that the whole question of the position occupied by the colonial powers in regard to their dependencies has come under review, or indeed, under challenge. The challenge has come in its most dramatic form from American sources. Here has been the most emphatic expression of the sentiment that there is something inherently wrong in the fact that one people should be subject to the rule of another. It is wrong that the existence of control in the hands of the ruling power should

### *A British View of a Far Eastern Settlement*

enable it to claim a privileged position for its own nationals at the expense either of the people of a dependency or of those of the outside world. It is maintained in consequence that the post-war settlement must see the liberation of dependent peoples from the control exercised over them. If circumstances require that some protection and tutelage should be given them until they can stand by themselves, then it must be accompanied by a guarantee of their liberation at a determined date, and safeguarded by the supervision of some organization, international or otherwise, which will see that the protecting power performs its obligation both to the people ruled and to the civilized world at large. And it has been suggested that, unless those conditions can be secured, it will not be possible to obtain the cooperation of America in measures to maintain the security or promote the welfare of Southeast Asia.

I have purposely stated this demand in its least contentious form. If representatives of British opinion may question or indeed resent the arguments that have been used in some quarters in its support, we do not seek to question the motives which have inspired it. We are, moreover, I hope, a practical people, and able to recognize the dynamics of this situation. We recognize, that if we are to obtain the full cooperation of other members of the Pacific group in maintaining the security and advancing the standards of life in this area, we must take account of this demand. Nor can we fail to be conscious that the substance of it secures a strong response within our own circle in Asia, insistent in the case of India and of Burma, far less vocal in Malaya, and not yet heard in Borneo, yet bound in the natural order of things to be heard in due time there also.

I must permit myself one observation. We cannot allow the present-day advocates of this demand the sole prerogative of its authorship. It is all in line with our own tradition. No attack made today against the spirit of what is called Imperialism is as incisive as that provoked in England itself some forty years ago by the interlude of expansionism which marked our colonial policy during the latter part of the last century. That attack had a wide following and was adopted as a text by Lenin himself. If today stress is laid on the demand for the breakdown of trade preferences maintained in its own favor by a colonial power, let it be recalled that for nearly sixty years there was a non-preferential, non-discriminatory customs regime throughout the whole of the British Empire. Most of us feel that it would be there today if other people had not closed their doors against us. If the peoples of India and Burma or of

### *Opening Statements*

our dependencies seek today to pluck the fruit of the tree of liberty, let it be recalled that that tree was no native to their soil; it was we who planted it there.

So much I must say in justice to our past. But let us come to the present. For some time before recent events threw so much spotlight on the general issue of colonial rule, there had arisen in Britain itself some questioning as to the spirit which guided our administration of our colonial dependencies. There was no disposition among us to question the extent of the change for the better which had been effected in the condition of the more backward of those areas. As to the almost spectacular character of that change, particularly in those areas which came under our jurisdiction in the latter part of the last century, most impartial observers were prepared to agree.

But we were asking ourselves whether a new conception of our relations to them was not now required. If much had been effected, the standard of life in many areas was still far removed from what could be regarded as adequate. But could it be said, that we had yet proved to the peoples of the dependencies that we regarded them as heirs of a common citizenship with ourselves, or potential partners in our Commonwealth of Nations?

Our dependencies present a procession of peoples in which great distances separate the van from the rearguard. They came under our control over a period of over 150 years, and in a great variety of circumstances. They are marked by an immense diversity of physical and social conditions. That has involved us in an equal diversity of procedure, for policy has had to accommodate itself to circumstances. But so far as it has followed any common system, it has been guided by two principles. The first is that which we have always described to ourselves as the moral principle of trusteeship. The second is the political tradition derived alike from our own history and from our relations with the one-time colonies which are now the great Dominions, that the natural destiny of a dependent unit is independent and responsible self-government. Since questions of political status now occupy a place in the forefront of this issue, let me take this first.

It was very seldom indeed that any of those dependent units presented a basis on which any system of self-government could be erected. America found such a basis in the Philippines; but every student of colonial history acknowledges that this was an exceptional experience. We have sought, therefore, to promote a graded education in self-govern-

### *A British View of a Far Eastern Settlement*

ment by the triple process of (1) establishing institutions of local self-government, (2) the progressive substitution of natives of the country for the European element in the official administration, and (3) the creation of legislatures which at the outset are only of a consultative character but are given increasing responsibility as their capacity develops.

Those who differ from us on the general issue of colonial policy cannot, I suggest, have any quarrel with us on the tenor of the principle we have followed here. Their quarrel will be with the tempo at which we have moved, and with the absence of a guarantee as to the date at which we shall reach the end of the journey. It was somewhat similar sentiment regarding the tempo of advance which had in recent years moved those among our own domestic critics who warned us of the need of a new conception of colonial policy. They admitted, that in some of the West Indies, for instance the Bahamas, Bermuda, and Barbados, there were long established legislatures with powers which, in effect, fell very little short of that of responsible status. Ceylon has a position which in practice nearly approaches that of self-government. Burma is not reckoned in our system as a colonial dependency: this conference has before it material which will show how serious an effort has been made to equip it with self-governing institutions. But these cases illustrate what I have described as the vanguard. The rearguard has certainly lagged behind. How far is this due to a faltering in our own faith in the value of self-governing institutions? How far is it due to reluctance to surrender political control, because political control can be utilized to support economic interests? Or how far is it due to obstacles inherent in the social and political make-up of the dependencies themselves?

A glance at the documents put before this conference regarding Malaya or Borneo will show how stubborn are the obstacles which lie in the path of those who seek to quicken the tempo of self-government, or to schedule the date within which it must be achieved.

The moral concept of trusteeship is that to which we looked as a guide in setting the scale of our own obligations to the dependencies. I will not enter here on the history of that concept.<sup>1</sup> Of the practical value of the humanitarian impulse which lay behind the concept there can be no doubt. Perhaps the best proof lies in the fact that the concept itself was formally adopted as the watchword of those who framed the Mandates in 1919. But we have ourselves of recent years realized some of its limi-

---

<sup>1</sup> See U. K. Paper 1/G., *Great Britain and her Dependencies: Note on General Policy*.

### *Opening Statements*

tations. It aimed at the prevention of abuse; it did not itself give any positive and constructive direction of policy. The position of trustee and ward seemed moreover to convey implications which were of disadvantage to the ward when issues of political status were at stake.

There is now in Great Britain a general acceptance given to a new outlook on this aspect of our relations with the dependencies. Where the issue of political status arises, the ruling conception must be that of partnership. If at the outset the relationship is that of senior and junior partners, that is a situation which can and must adjust itself as the experience and capacity of the junior partner grows. When the issue is that of the interpretation to be given to our other responsibilities to the dependencies, our present-day conception bases itself on the recognition of the function which is now attached to the State in domestic politics. The doctrine of trusteeship was born in the days of individualism: the State was then conceived as holding the ring while individual enterprise and voluntary effort shaped all our social and economic activity. Today the State has become the prime agency in promoting social welfare and in safeguarding the standards of life. That idea has been projected from domestic into colonial policy. It has given us a much more dynamic view of our responsibilities in promoting the social and economic development of the colonies. We have given practical expression to this, in the Colonial Welfare Act of 1940. It was passed, be it recalled, at a period of anxieties without parallel in our domestic history. It provided a sum of £5 millions a year for expenditure on schemes for the social and economic welfare of the dependencies.

Let us be clear as to the implications of this measure. It was not a pure humanitarian effort, or a belated recognition of the needs of backward areas in our charge. It definitely links up with our new outlook on our political relations with the dependencies. We have seen that political liberties are meaningless unless they can be built up on a better foundation of social and economic progress. If we are setting our hands to a more dynamic program of social and economic advance, it is because we see in this the most effective means of quickening the tempo of political progress.

The above aspects of policy are mainly those which concern political status, and the provision of means for raising the general standard of living. But does our present conception of policy permit of the exercise of political control in order to secure any exclusive or preferential advantages for our nationals at the expense of those of other nations? Let

### *A British View of a Far Eastern Settlement*

us be clear here as to the facts. For some sixty years there was an Open Door regime throughout the British possessions. The departure from that principle soon after the last war introduced a system of preferences through the greater part of the dependencies, though there were still large areas in Africa in which the Open Door regime persisted, and certain key points, such as Aden, Hongkong, and Singapore, were still in effect open ports. At a somewhat later stage, the serious menace to certain of our trades, and notably that in textiles, created by Japanese competition, led to the introduction of the quota system, aimed almost exclusively at Japan.

As signatories of the Atlantic Charter, and the Lend-Lease Agreement, we have now bound ourselves to cooperate in the joint effort to abolish trade discriminations of this or similar character. That, as I understand it, is a far-reaching commitment extending also to the avoidance of the use of political powers in order to influence the unrestricted use of raw materials. There was, I think, only one instance throughout the British dependencies in which any discrimination was applied to the export of raw materials. The undertaking on which we have entered is, I repeat, to cooperate with other nations in the joint effort to abolish all discriminations and to promote by every means the free flow of the world's trade. There need be no reason to apprehend that the United Kingdom will not fully cooperate in that undertaking in regard to the trade of her dependencies also.

It was unavoidable that I should make this general reference to the more recent developments in our policy in regard to the dependencies. What is its practical application to the problems of dependencies in Southeast Asia? You may be prepared to admit that the policy I have described at least points in the right direction. But nothing, you may say, has been said as to guarantees regarding both the time and manner of its execution. Let me then proceed to the last stage in the argument.

#### A PACIFIC ZONE COUNCIL

I have, in dealing with certain aspects of the post-war situation of China and Japan, suggested that the issues could not suitably be left to the bilateral action of the two parties concerned. They indicated the need for the guidance and cooperative activity of what I then described as some intermediate authority. I would apply the same principle in regard to dependencies in this area.

I suggest that there should be created a Council for the Pacific Zone,

### *Opening Statements*

consisting of the representatives of the sovereign powers concerned. It would have a double function. It would, in the first place, be the local agency of whatever organization may be established by the United Nations for safeguarding the peace of Asia in common with other parts of the world. The preservation of peace demands not merely the provision of air, naval and military forces, but of a wide range of civil activities ancillary to them. These civil activities would be the direct charge of the Pacific Zone Council.

Its second function would be to secure, by joint consultation and by cooperative action, a common policy, so far as may be, in the economic development and in the tariff and customs arrangements within this zone. It would maintain a technical staff, available for advising the administrations concerned on health, agriculture, economic or cultural problems. It would be the agency through which areas unable to finance their own development would obtain the assistance required. It would receive regular reports from the different national administrations in the area, and be empowered to require information and explanation from them. It would finally—and I desire to emphasize this point—be charged with the periodic review of the progress made in the promotion of self-governing institutions in the dependencies, and in the improvement of their standard of living.

There are, of course, those who hold that the problems of this area, and in particular the problems involved in the control of the dependencies within it, cannot be solved save by the institution of some form of international administration. But how far is the control of an international organization of this character to extend? We seek here a cooperative effort that must embrace not only the dependencies but certain independent areas. Is control to extend to them also? There is another point. Direct international control is an experiment that has so far been tried out only in certain limited areas. The administration of Memel or the Saar are cases where the functions of the administration were defined in a written constitution, the interpretation of which was mainly a legal matter. It did not involve the planning of schemes of development, the devising of systems of education, the fostering of political institutions. Neither Danzig nor the New Hebrides can be quoted as evidence of the successful working of the international system.

Others, again, while not going so far as to support a scheme of full international administration, would place the dependencies under a system of mandates. With no desire to underrate the value of the manda-

*A British View of a Far Eastern Settlement*

tory system, I must point out that the principles it was established to safeguard were largely negative in character. It initiated no new policies. Its existence was compatible with the maintenance of a great diversity of administration in educational, economic or political systems; it gave no guidance as to their respective merit. Its unique value was that of publicity. But it is also this which will be the chief function of the proposed Council for the Pacific Zone.

In approaching these difficult problems, I have attempted to build up on concrete suggestions, and to aim at objectives which we may reasonably regard as within our grasp. That does not mean that we have not a high purpose and high hopes of what may be achieved for the peoples whose future we are considering. But while we keep our eyes on the heights, let us not forget the realities with which we have to deal in seeking to attain them. Many of these peoples have had an unfortunate past. Many of them are now suffering the calvary of an aggressive war. Do not let us add to that the tragedy of disillusionment.

## A CHINESE VIEW OF CHINA'S POSITION IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

*The following statement was made by Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, leader of the Chinese group, at the opening plenary session of the conference.*

In the forefront of China's expectation is the determination that she shall henceforth be completely freed from those limitations upon the full and free exercise of her sovereign rights which, in the past, have been imposed upon her by what are known as the "Unequal Treaties." These treaties, which include a great variety of agreements or alleged agreements, have been termed "unequal," because they have created rights and interests upon the part of other nations within China without reciprocal rights and interests accruing to China in those other nations. Conspicuous among these foreign rights in China are the extraterritorial or jurisdictional rights.<sup>1</sup>

During the years of military weakness, China has lost control of various portions of her territory, and it is but reasonable and just that, when the present war is victoriously ended, she should expect the return of such of her possessions as have been taken from her by force or by the threat of force.

For a century, China has been more or less exploited by stronger military powers and has suffered from constant threats of foreign aggression and invasions. It is, therefore, not surprising that China desires not only peace but security against foreign aggression which will enable her to recuperate from her tremendous losses, to develop her natural resources and to realize her cultural ideals. China may thus be counted upon at the coming Peace Conference to support all measures which will tend to create a new world order in which international relations will be governed by law and justice rather than by force and aggressive national ambitions.

China's experiences with the League of Nations have not been uniformly happy, but she is aware that the failures of the League in the field of international political relations have been due not so much to the structure of the League as to the unwillingness of its dominant members to subordinate what appeared to them to be their immediate national interests to the greater interest of world order. It is believed by China that, when the present war is over, the victorious United

---

<sup>1</sup> The United States, Great Britain, and India on January 11, 1943 signed treaties with China abolishing extraterritoriality.—*Editor*

### *A Chinese View of China's Position*

Nations will have a fuller realization than they have previously had that an international organization must be established which will have adequate authority and power for the maintenance of world peace and justice. In this connection it is pertinent to quote the following statement from the message of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek read at the meeting on the seventeenth of last month (November 17, 1942) of the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum:

There will be neither peace, nor hope, nor future for any of us unless we honestly aim at political, social and economic justice for all peoples of the world great and small. But I feel confident that we of the United Nations can achieve that aim only by starting at once to organize an international order embracing all peoples to enforce peace and justice among them. To make that start we must begin today and not tomorrow to apply these principles among ourselves even at some sacrifice to the absolute powers of our individual countries.

It will be noted that it is emphasized by the Generalissimo that it is important that plans for the establishment of this international organization be considered at once, that is, without waiting until the war is ended and the Peace Conference assembled.

China fully appreciates the close relationship which exists between political and economic conditions. Within a state this means that substantial economic equality, that is, economic democracy, should prevail both as a matter of justice and as furnishing a foundation for political democracy. Internationally, this relationship between economic and political conditions means that international economic rivalries, which necessarily lead to political strife, should, so far as possible, be prevented. This, in turn, means that international commerce should be freed from unnecessary shackles, that national currencies should be held firm and stable, that means should prevail whereby the natural products of the world will find fair distribution among the peoples of the world, and, finally, that investments by one country within the territory of another country, so long as they are not made the basis for preferential treatment or have political interests attached to them, should be made safe and reasonably profitable.

As regards this last matter, China recognizes that with the coming of peace she will find use for very large foreign capital for the national reconstruction that must be undertaken. New highways and railroads must be built, a great variety of industrial enterprises must be established and supported, and, in general, China's vast natural resources

### *Opening Statements*

must be developed. China will welcome, for these purposes, investments of foreign capital in large amounts and may be counted upon to provide security for these investments and a fair return to those who undertake them. It goes without saying that China welcomes only such investments and assistance, financial and technical, as are without political implication.

Another matter of deep concern to our people is the treatment of the many Chinese residing and doing business in foreign countries and in the various territories in the Southwestern Pacific. China is deeply solicitous for the welfare of these people, and this concern is increased because of the great and loyal support the nation has received from them for over five long years in which she has been fighting Japan. It is certain then in the post-war years to come that China will make every effort to end any discrimination in any part of the world against her nationals on account of their race. In short, while not asking for any special favors for them, China will ask that they be treated by other powers on as favorable terms as are other resident or traveling aliens. It is believed that this expectation is in conformity with the general principle of equality of treatment of all nations.

While it is true that some of these expectations are specifically those of the Chinese people and some of the problems are viewed from the Chinese standpoint, we believe that the principles are of wide application and our aspirations are also those of other nations. In other words, when we ask for these things for the Chinese people we are not unmindful of the desires and aspirations of other peoples of the world. We may debate about the precise meaning of equality and justice and we may carefully weigh in our minds what is expedient in a particular set of circumstances, but to us it seems that it would not be wise to disregard entirely the unmistakable sign of the times. Human progress and unity are at stake.

There is a widespread desire in China to see put into practice at an early date some of these ideas and ideals, inherent in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, before there is a chance for them to become cold. For example, there is a proposal<sup>2</sup> for the formation of an Executive Council of the United Nations. It is hoped that such a body will bring about greater unification and closer cooperation in the formulation of

---

<sup>2</sup> This suggestion was made by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. T. V. Soong, in his New York speech of October 10, 1942 just before he returned to China. —Editor.

*A Chinese View of China's Position*

a more effective war strategy, a clearer understanding of war aims and a more regular exchange of views in the post-war world for which we are fighting and working. It is further hoped that such a body may also help to evolve an international instrument capable of dispensing justice and enforcing law and order in the post-war world.

## INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSIONS ON UNITED NATIONS COOPERATION IN THE PACIFIC

*By decision of the Program Committee, the "regional" round tables were preceded by two days' discussion of some inclusive problems of war and peace that affect the Pacific region as a whole. All members were for this purpose assigned to four round table groups, so that every country and a diversity of known political attitudes were represented in each. This made it possible to recognize early in the proceedings those questions on which there was most feeling; and although these were again taken up later with greater attention to detail, it is easiest to follow the thought process of the conference by starting with a brief composite account of these four preliminary discussions.*

These opening discussions revealed better than any which followed the proportionate interest of members in different fields of concern. For example, though given the opportunity to function as armchair military strategists, few members were inclined to talk about the conduct of the war. But whenever the discussions shifted to questions of *political* strategy, there was lively participation.

### POLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

From many sides, the machinery of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war was criticized. Some thought it too cumbersome; others, not clearly articulated enough to deal with the many questions that are bound to arise when peoples as different as the Australians and the Chinese, the Filipinos and the Free French, endeavor to work together on tasks vital to their national survival. Some of the criticism was seen not to be well founded but to originate from the fact that the actual structure of the cooperative set-up of the United Nations had been made insufficiently known in some countries. One of the round tables therefore set to work, first of all, to secure a picture of the existing machinery; this, in brief summary, was as follows:

1. *Pacific War Council.* The members are Australia, Canada, China, the Netherlands, the Philippine Commonwealth, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was pointed out that India has a member on the Pacific War Council which sits in London but not on that which sits in Washington and which, as far as the war in the Pacific is concerned, has to all intents superseded the London body. India, however, is often consulted by the Council through its representative in Washington. It was also pointed out that the Soviet Union, while not represented on the Council, also is often consulted by it.

## *United Nations Cooperation in the Pacific*

2. *Munition Assignment Boards, Combined Production and Resources Board, Combined Shipping Allocation Board, Combined Food Board, Combined Raw Materials Board.* All these agencies were described as being especially British-American organizations. However, members of other United Nations are individually called upon when matters of specific concern to them arise.

3. *Combined Chiefs of Staff.* This body, again primarily a British-American organization, holds regular meetings in Washington. Other members of the United Nations are not directly represented but are consulted through their representatives in Washington. The operational sub-division of this body into committees corresponding to the several theaters of war, such as Southeast Pacific, Northwest Pacific, South Pacific, and Southwest Pacific, is well known.

4. *Agencies of Information.* The round table learned from those able to speak with authority that there is now an effective coordination of information between the United States and Great Britain; and that serious efforts are under way to secure the same coordination between the United States and China. Among other members of the United Nations, such coordination was thought to be as yet undeveloped.

5. *Diplomatic Channels.* The regular diplomatic channels and, among the members of the British Commonwealth, their own special Commonwealth channels were indicated as by no means negligible parts of the existing United Nations machinery for carrying on the war in the Pacific with as little friction as possible.

As this listing suggests, criticism was, for the most part, on the ground that some of the member countries are insufficiently represented in the non-military phases of the conduct of the war, and especially in the making of policies. But there was also some complaint that, apart from this, the existing agencies are insufficiently coordinated.

Naturally, Indians and Chinese were most concerned over the admitted inadequacies of the existing machinery; several of their speakers contended that the organization of the war effort is not nearly democratic enough to correspond with the concept of "equal partnership." They did not so much mind a certain degree of competition for supplies and other things between those responsible for the conduct of the war on different fronts; but the very fact that policies must be adapted to the diverse conditions that prevail in the different war theaters makes all the more compelling, they contended, an organizational structure assuring a full voice in all decisions affecting a particular region to the United Nations most directly concerned. The terms "global war" and "unified command" should be interpreted, it was suggested, as permitting of a great deal of regional devolution, with a corresponding shift in the degree to which nationals of the various member countries were to be drawn into

### *Introductory Discussions*

both the policy-making bodies and the administrative machinery. Against this view it was urged that the central strategy—political and economic as well as military—should not be cramped in its freedom of movement by further increasing the divergence, and sometimes the irreconcilability, of the demands made upon the central planning authorities from the different fields. If more power were placed into the hands of regional agencies with primarily regional responsibilities, the striking force of the central War Council might be seriously impaired.

Despite the general recognition that the unity of the war's direction must be preserved, all of the round tables arrived at concrete suggestions—which were more fully developed in later sessions—as to ways in which faults of the present apparatus might be eliminated. These suggestions related, more especially, to the improvement of lend-lease machinery, to a fuller utilization of the experience and knowledge gained in the different theaters of war, to a better coordination of information services, and to a pointing up of the joint propaganda directed at the peoples under enemy subjection. Questions of national prestige were implied rather than overtly raised; but the principal motive behind the tentative suggestions advanced was obviously a genuine desire to increase the effectiveness of the war effort and, more in particular, to produce a basis for international post-war planning that would enlist the fullest participation of all the United Nations.

#### REGIONAL MACHINERY

The discussion thus at an early stage led over from the deficiencies of the present machinery of cooperation to a consideration of ways in which it might be strengthened and enlarged so as to make it a suitable instrument to carry out the agreed war aims in the Pacific region. The need for a regional devolution of the post-war tasks—and the tasks incident to the re-occupation of areas lost to the enemy—was mentioned in the opening remarks of Indian, Chinese, and American as well as British members. Thus it was pointed out that only a few weeks earlier the Chinese Foreign Minister had proposed an Executive Council of the United Nations which, in addition to directing the war effort, would lay the groundwork for collective security after the war, and this necessarily with regional as well as global sub-divisions of authority. Indian members pointed to the beneficial effect which a local Pacific war council, situated somewhere at the western end of the Pacific, possibly in India, would have in preparing public opinion, not in India alone, for cooperation in the reconquest of lost territories and in a concerted attack

### *United Nations Cooperation in the Pacific*

on the post-war tasks. At one round table the suggestion was made that regional political councils be set up to collaborate with the military commanders and to initiate regional joint planning in civil affairs.

#### CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA

It is to be noted that the need for such regional joint effort was especially stressed in relation to information services. Generally speaking, the interchange of public information between the British and American agencies of news releases was held to be fairly satisfactory, but coordination of these services with those of China and the Soviet Union, poor. Lack of candor, in several of the countries, had led to an unhealthy and even dangerous growth of "grapevine" channels of information and rumor, which, it was said, tended to undermine public morale.

There was no quarrel with a rigorous censorship of information that might conceivably be of help to the enemy; and while some thought that the national censorship boards were unduly cautious in such matters, it was generally conceded that this was a matter of administrative discretion rather than of policy. If a uniform method of dealing with war news could not be adopted, at least the nature and extent of the respective practices in the different countries should be made better known in other countries, so as to avoid misunderstanding.

On the necessity of coordinating the propaganda emanating from United Nations there was a more emphatic consensus of opinion. But it was precisely here that practical steps appeared most difficult. How can the United Nations decide together what to say to the peoples of the Pacific until they have decided what to *do* in that region after the war? Therefore, the question was raised whether it was worth while to have any propaganda at all until the unity of the United Nations in their post-war aims had become more firmly established. Again, the larger question was left open for fuller consideration later, while some of the round tables proceeded to review a few matters upon which recommendations could perhaps be made immediately.

A common fault of war propaganda addressed to peoples in both the free and the enemy-occupied territories, it was found, is lack of expertness. Mistakes were made in the choice of language, for example, as well as of subject matter. Speakers over the radio sometimes seemed insufficiently aware of what class of the population they were addressing or gave out confused messages or messages in such vague terms as to have little meaning for the hearers. All these faults could best be eliminated, it was agreed, if the declarations of post-war policy, as

yet too vague and uncertain, sometimes even contradictory, could more often be implemented with announcements of specific plans and agreements. In the meantime, a wide diffusion of information on steps actually taken by United Nations, whether jointly or separately, in the direction of the accepted war aims might do much to give the native peoples of the East confidence in the sincerity of the announced purposes. As "propaganda" material of this sort, were mentioned the virtual recognition of Philippine independence by the Pacific Council in Washington, the recent decision by the United Kingdom and the United States to relinquish extraterritorial rights in China, the concrete proposals made by the Netherlands Government for constitutional changes in the relations between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, and indications of public sentiment for more generous tariff policies in such countries as Australia and the United States.

#### THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND THE PACIFIC

One of the first tasks for joint propaganda, however, most of the members seemed to think, was to remove all doubt that the Atlantic Charter is intended to apply to all the world. Incidentally, removal of that doubt was also seen as a necessary first step in any attempt at concerted planning for the future. From the very outset of the conference this proved to be the principal matter of contention between members from different countries. Several of the British Prime Minister's speeches had been interpreted abroad as either denying or leaving in doubt the question whether the eight points of the Charter apply to the Far East and other parts of the world as well as to Europe. On the other hand, public opinion in some of the United Nations, especially Great Britain, had become alarmed over the seeming discrepancy between the enthusiasm shown by the government and people of the United States for the first five articles of the Atlantic Charter—mainly concerned with freedom everywhere to pursue life, liberty, and happiness—and the lukewarmness of feeling for the remaining three articles which pledge the signatory powers to effective participation in the maintenance of external security. These two themes were destined to run through the conference as a sort of continuing counterpoint; and it was only much later, in the third and fourth sets of round tables, that the resolving chords were sounded.

In the meantime, the representatives of all the colonial powers present, including the Fighting French, tried to show that a full adoption of the Atlantic Charter did not mean a revolutionary break with the policies pursued in the past but merely a speeding up of tendencies long at

### *United Nations Cooperation in the Pacific*

work. Old colonial servants, instead of being filled with dismay, hailed the charter as giving added force to progressive movements of native welfare and native self-determination which for many years had been the object of the administrative services themselves. A cynic remarked that evidently the old types of colonial administration no longer paid, since no support whatever could be found in the conference for a strict adherence, after the war, to that combination of bondage and paternalism which is associated in the popular mind with imperialism—and this notwithstanding Mr. Churchill's recent seeming defense of that system. But the truer explanation of this trend of thought, it appeared, is that for the first time the colonial powers see the possibility of a world situation in which their responsibility for the protection of their possessions and for the welfare of their subjects may be shared by such strong powers as the United States and the Soviet Union, so that the risks inevitably connected with a more democratic internal regime in the dependent territories can be faced with greater confidence.

At any rate, as the discussion shifted back and forth between consideration of the liberating clauses of the Charter and those promising collective security, the demand for some sort of regional joint agency of world opinion, first voiced in a British member's opening remarks, gained in definiteness of outline. And again there was a consensus that an earnest of the intent might be given, pending further political developments, through joint actions by the Pacific countries concerned immediately upon re-occupation of the lost territories and through the mutual relations between the free countries of the region. Among such matters were agreements designed to promote "access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials . . . needed for economic prosperity," "improved labor standards, economic adjustment and social security," and also some matters implied though not explicitly mentioned in the Charter, such as provisions for relief, for improvement of health conditions, arrangements to lessen the dependence of some of the countries on markets too precarious for economic security, mutual aid in strengthening intra-regional ties of trade, and so forth.

On the political side it was held important that the intentions of the governments, especially those of the larger nations, be clarified. Some thought that it would be helpful if opinions privately expressed by conference members, speaking with some authority, as to the possibility of greatly speeding up the preparation of subject peoples for self-government were adopted by the governments of their respective countries.

## *Introductory Discussions*

### FROM WAR TO PEACE

In these ways, discussions which started out from immediate problems in wartime collaboration came to be intermixed with, and soon gave way to, discussions pre-occupied with questions of post-war collaboration. Members did not, in the introductory sessions, distinguish very clearly between the one and the other; gradually it became apparent that three or four phases of joint planning and joint action must be distinguished, though these phases necessarily overlap.

1. Next to purely military matters, including the supply of war materials, factors that influence public opinion predominate in the joint tasks for the victorious conclusion of the war.

2. While the war is still in progress, the country-by-country and island-by-island re-occupation of lost territories, whether slow or fast, must be utilized to create additional impetus for the concluding stages of the campaign of reconquest. The civil as well as the military methods of that re-occupation are of strategic importance. How to meet food deficiencies and how to deal out justice to friends and foes are questions not only of humanitarian interest but also of morale-making.

3. After the re-establishment of law and order and the introduction of the first essential measures of relief, a more thorough rehabilitation is necessary, so as to recreate normal life as early as possible, and to set going normal processes of production. Much of this rehabilitation, like much of the relief, can be planned in advance and even be made the basis of concrete claims upon the combined resources of the United Nations.

4. Different, again, from rehabilitation is reconstruction: the long-term process of reforming the existing or pre-war economic, social, and political patterns of the region in such a way as to expedite the entry of every country and of every population group into that realm of equal partnership and mutual aid which is the goal of the Atlantic Charter.

No such scheme was formally presented to the conference, but it emerged more or less automatically as the members wrestled with the remaining items on the agenda in the course of the first round of discussions. For example, there was the question of technical changes and their effect on the international relations of the region. The more the industrially more advanced countries could free themselves of their dependence on raw materials produced in tropical countries, such as rubber, the greater was the danger of disastrous economic crises in the latter. Here, then, questions of relief and rehabilitation verge on those of an early and urgent need for revolutionary changes in the whole economy. Again, the actual and expected shortages of shipping would emphasize the trend of world emancipation from a long-distance haulage of essential supplies; and unless the distribution of shipping and the increase of

### *United Nations Cooperation in the Pacific*

tonnage were planned with a view to all the interests affected, a most serious situation might arise in the politically and economically weaker areas.

Some members seemed disposed to stress the conditions to be imposed upon the defeated enemy. This concern also had aspects fitting into several of the stages of progressive planning mentioned above. Immediately upon Japan's defeat, it was suggested, whatever stores of consumable goods were to be found there, or anywhere under Japanese control, should be used jointly by the United Nations for the relief of war-caused distress in the Pacific. Some members were for dismantling Japanese-controlled industries if by that means the process of economic rehabilitation in the re-occupied areas could be assisted. Others would prevent Japan from ever again occupying a position of importance in the manufacture of exportable consumer goods.

These views, more fully discussed in later sessions, met with considerable questioning. A majority of members, however bitter they felt over the treason committed by Japan against the community of nations, did not desire a vengeance that might become the motivating force of a future Nippon Irredenta. The general feeling was rather that the defeat of Japan must be so complete as to leave no shadow of doubt in the minds of the Japanese or of any of their neighbors as to the consequences of militarism; but that, bereft of its colonies, Japan must be permitted the essential conditions of peaceful livelihood for all of its people.

The industrialization of parts of their economy, so ardently desired by almost all of the nations of the Pacific, was not to be achieved, most members agreed, by depressing the Japanese or any other nation to a pre-industrial level but rather by simultaneously raising the standards of living and the producing power of the millions of Asiatics who thus far have remained practically outside the trade in manufactured goods. Most of these countries have their incipient industries; and in the restoration and encouragement of these, members of the conference saw the first and most important task of rehabilitation. Larger plans for building up native industries must be related to more comprehensive plans of development in which international allocations of capital, of materials, of markets, and of transport play an important part. Articles four and six of the Atlantic Charter were mentioned in this connection; they were interpreted as meaning that small as well as large nations, those weak as well as those powerful, must be permitted to take part in

### *Introductory Discussions*

this planning, and that their interests must be considered as those of equals when the time comes for disposing of the combined resources of the nations in long-range schemes of reconstruction.

These ideas were advanced at first with little attempt at specific application—except perhaps on the negative side. Chinese and Indian members seemed to have a strong case in their demand for a generous acceptance by the rest of the world of their necessity to expand their industries. The consuming power of their teeming populations could not be raised fast enough with programs of agricultural improvement alone. But it was made clear by others that the common task of world statesmanship is not that of replacing either Japan or any Western nation as supplier of manufactured goods; it is that of raising the productive capacity of peoples all around, and especially that of the peoples which technically have lagged behind. This is not a matter simply of even-handed distribution. Technical innovation never comes by itself; it succeeds only when associated with more profound changes in the lives and attitudes of races and classes. The actual state of a people's culture, therefore, is an important conditioning factor in its economic development no less than in its advance to political self-determination.

In this way, the introductory sessions, having started out from what to some appeared rather general and idealistic proposals for a new world order, came back to a recognition—even by the self-styled realists—that little progress is possible in the working out of separate solutions for specific problems unless thought is given also to the close interconnections of those problems. By the inner logic of its theme of "wartime and post-war cooperation," the conference was time and again driven from a too piecemeal consideration of topics on the agenda towards a sense that every suggestion, to be practicable, must fit into a single creative process of world cooperation.

*PART II.*

REGIONAL ROUND TABLE SUMMARIES

## CHINA

The discussions in this round table centered mainly on the importance of the China front in the general strategy of the United Nations, although efforts were made to ventilate such problems as China's post-war policies in their political, economic and diplomatic aspects. The outstanding fact that was driven home was the grave military and economic position of China today and the difficulty of impressing its urgency in the proper quarters. For this latter fact the natural preoccupation of the Western powers with the menace of Nazi Germany was responsible. It was repeatedly made clear by Chinese speakers that they did not wish to advocate the merits of the China front *against* any other but rather to expound its proper position in global strategy.

### CHINA'S STRATEGIC ROLE

It was agreed that China offered the best base for counter-attack against Japan, possessing as she did a war-hardened army of three millions, and offering the possibility of securing land, air and sea bases from which blows might be struck at the very heart of Japan. It is true that other arrows might be launched against that country from Alaska and Siberia if and when the U.S.S.R. entered the Pacific war, from Australia and the islands of the South Pacific, and from North America by sea. The Russian arrow remains in the Soviet quiver because of the inevitable preoccupation of the U.S.S.R. with its western front. Yet even at present Japan feels obliged to keep her largest and best equipped forces in Manchuria, possessing there a 25 per cent superiority over Soviet forces in contrast to 50 per cent inferiority before the Nazi attack upon Russia. The strategy of attacking Japan by an island-hopping policy, such as now exhibited in the Solomons and New Guinea, found some defenders who pointed out that it wore down the Japanese navy and mercantile marine and also seriously reduced Japan's air power. But such a policy involved a costly war of attrition as American naval losses indicated, and also exposed the attacking force to the hazards involved in naval operations by night because of the air weapon and in launching carrier-borne planes against land-based ones. In that connection was cited the pessimistic estimate of a high ranking officer in the South Pacific that even a successful attack on Rabaul, with its Japanese garrison of a hundred thousand men, might take years rather than months.

What gravely reduced the effectiveness of China as a land base for operations against Japan was the loss of Burma. This closed the Burma

## *China*

Road for transporting supplies to China and made impossible the construction of an auxiliary railroad for which considerable material had been assembled. The loss of Burma also destroyed invaluable resources of aviation gasoline for American and Chinese air forces. It had an adverse psychological effect on the Chinese people who felt themselves more alone, especially after their spirits had been raised by their new partnership with the United States and the British Commonwealth. With the closing of the Burma Road along which some 10,000 tons of supplies had moved monthly, India remained the only base of British and American supplies for the China front. These supplies could only come by air and the few transport planes available carried a very small tonnage. In India itself every effort had been made for the rapid trans-shipment of supplies from overseas to China. An alternative route via Tibet and the Turk-Sib Railway had been examined, but for such a route many thousands of trucks would be necessary and of these about two-thirds would be engaged in carrying the gasoline required for the trip. Consequently the only really effective means of supplying China will be to re-open the Burma Road.

The adverse effect on the Chinese war effort of this supply situation was difficult to over-estimate. The number of American planes available in China was pitiful as Mr. Willkie recently testified. Heavy artillery and armament were lacking as were the alloys and essential raw materials for the Chinese arsenals. These arsenals were now being reduced to working less than full time. Medical supplies were also deficient. Some members argued that, granted the critical nature of the supply problem it was true that, even if planes were flown into China that country could provide neither the aviation gasoline nor the servicing. In reply Chinese speakers stated that their country would draw upon reserves of oil for such a purpose, that crude oil was available if refining equipment were secured and that the servicing of planes would be maintained somehow, even if it were necessary for repair purposes to practice a form of aviation cannibalism. However, the evidence on the problem of supply remained conflicting, as was also true in the discussions on the quality of the planes to be sent to China. In the light of the exploits of the American Volunteer Group in China under General Chennault and the vulnerability of Japanese bases in Shanghai, Nanking and Hankow, one speaker argued that nowhere could so few planes do so much damage against so many as in China.

In the light of this discussion it was felt by several that the recapture

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

of Burma should rank high in the list of military priorities, some even placing it second in importance to the North African campaign. Such a campaign had been strongly advocated by certain high American officers in China, well acquainted with the situation, and would have a bracing psychological effect on the Chinese people. Whether it should be purely a land campaign from India, despite the lack of roads, or combined with landing operations under naval protection at such ports as Rangoon or Akyab was discussed with inconclusive results.<sup>1</sup> In either case it was likely to prove a major campaign involving problems of transport that would place a severe strain upon shipping already in great demand for the North Africa, Russian and other fronts. In view of Axis naval strength one expert believed that the necessary margin of naval superiority did not exist at present for operations on the Burmese coast. Another speaker suggested that even if the campaign proved successful the supplies then made available for China might still be inconsiderable for large scale operations and could not service more than fourteen divisions. To this argument Chinese speakers replied that it depended upon the rival conceptions of standards of equipment and foodstuffs held by Western and Chinese experts. Between these there was considerable difference. Another Chinese remarked that, once China was in a position to resume offensive operations on a considerable scale, arsenals might be retaken as at Hankow and Japanese supply lines would be placed under a severe strain.

Repeatedly the round table was reminded of the danger of letting Japan make her dispositions unchecked while the Western powers disposed of unfinished business in Europe. Japan had 75 fully trained divisions, with 25 more in process of formation, and it would be foolish to expect her to remain immobile. Should she feel free to remove considerable forces from either Manchuria or China, Japan might well cut the supply routes via Fiji to New Zealand and Australia and even invade those two countries. Unless engaged at several points the Japanese army could take any Chinese city which it really desired, including perhaps Chungking. Japan's threat to India was also discussed, with an Indian speaker pointing out that a preliminary effort to stir up trouble in Bihar province had failed and that any attack on India would entail both land and sea operations with the former over difficult terrain. In this connection a speaker commented that it was on difficult terrain that

---

<sup>1</sup> General Wavell's recent drive on Akyab had not yet begun at the time of these discussions.—*Editor*.

## *China*

able commanders in the past had scored their most brilliant victories and that at no time should the capacity of Japan be under-estimated. It is important to keep Japan "off balance" so that she might not consolidate her present political or military position. It is hard to detect an appreciable difference between a waiting war and a losing one.

### CHINA'S INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS' WAR COUNCILS

One marked difficulty which prevents the China front from being seen in its true perspective is the lack of adequate machinery for coordinating the war effort on all fronts. At present China has no representation on the numerous boards in Washington for allocating raw materials, shipping and munitions. These remain of an Anglo-American character. To some officials in Washington aid to China appeared to be placed on a relief and humanitarian basis rather than for sound military reasons. Hence such remarks as "we cannot fight this war on W.P.A. principles." Another official in Washington who is said to have felt hurt when it was necessary to allocate planes to China has managed to escape without inflicting much injury on himself! On more than one occasion supplies allocated to China had been diverted from their destination without prior warning or adequate explanation. The combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, the real center of Allied strategy, remains Anglo-American in composition. It meets about once a month with the military, naval and air missions of some of the other United Nations for the purpose of presenting information rather than for discussion. Such meetings were unsatisfactory both from their unwieldy nature and from their technique. Because of these conditions a feeling of disappointment and uncertainty is being created in Chinese circles which, if unchecked, might tend to destroy mutual confidence. It is hard for a Chinese soldier who has for five years vainly scanned the skies for ten planes to give him some protection to hear of a thousand-plane raid upon Cologne and other cities while he still remains without the air umbrella.

To remedy these difficulties of consultation and cooperation several suggestions were put forth. One speaker advocated the formation of a United Nations Council consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China. Under such a council might be subordinate committees of similar composition to draw up war plans and to allocate supplies on a global basis. It was pointed out that, despite British overtures, the U.S.S.R. had to date been unwilling to accept

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

membership in any council which discussed war problems on the China front, and that the Soviet Government had also followed a policy of secrecy and reticence concerning its own military operations. To meet this difficulty it was suggested that invitations might be extended to China and the U.S.R.R. now, with the understanding that the Soviet Government might occupy at a later date the vacant chair reserved for it at the council table. Another speaker proposed that the council as outlined above might have subcommittees to discuss the various theatres of war, with the Soviet representative abstaining from membership in the China front committee. A final suggestion was a creation of subcommittees of the Chiefs of Staff in which China might secure representation. Given the opportunity Chinese spokesmen could then expound more effectively the potential value of their contribution to the United Nations' war effort and might be able to demonstrate the nature of their possible assistance for the Burma campaign where Chinese troops might be on better terms than some others with the inhabitants.

In any event, it is thought urgent to bring home to responsible authorities the critical nature of the Chinese situation and the risk involved to the cause of the United Nations in leaning too heavily upon the twin comforting assumptions that the war in Europe could be settled fairly quickly and that China could hold out indefinitely. None doubted the desire of our leaders to wage an offensive war, whenever and wherever possible, but a full integration of strategy involved a more thorough assessment of the value of the China front and a willingness to take some risk there as elsewhere. Some American members believed that in Anglo-American circles there had been a chronic under-estimation of the urgency of the need, and of the gains to be secured by the proper allocation of materials. Others argued that, so long as the Axis forces remained superior in numbers, it was impracticable to alter materially the present ratio of supplies in the various theatres of war.

#### CHINA'S INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES

Not only was China facing a difficult situation on the battlefield but also on the home front. Although Chinese national solidarity had rapidly increased during the war and morale remained high, economic difficulties were rapidly increasing until there was a real danger of what has been called in China "hyper-inflation." By prodigious efforts Free China had removed 100,000 tons of her productive machinery from the clutches of the Japanese, but this still left 90 per cent of modern plant facilities in

## *China*

Occupied China. The remaining 10 per cent had to supply more than half the population and area of China. By extraordinary efforts at improvisation in a backward area the Chinese Government had helped to resettle millions of refugees, developed new irrigation projects and expanded agricultural production. But the transportation problem remained a bottleneck. The building of new roads had been offset by the lack of motor oil, tires, trucks and assembling plants. Consequently Free China was being forced to revert to a "stage coach" system of transportation which created a system of provincial economies, functioning as best they might, with abundance in one area and starvation in another. Free China had involuntarily become a closed economy reverting from a money economy to a barter one, from a machine economy to a handicraft one, and from a modern economy to a medieval one. The resulting lack of goods and the expansion of currency had forced China into a period of inflation in which note circulation had increased fifteen times while prices had risen sixty times their pre-war levels. Mass hoarding, which wasted the scanty supply of food and clothing, black markets, over-worked printing presses and the increasing velocity of currency were ominous symptoms of a dangerous inflationary disease. In these circumstances the intellectual, the civil servant and the professional man suffered most but at least they recognized the cause of their misfortunes and endured them with as little complaint as possible. At one time Occupied China presented a more favorable picture but its position had rapidly deteriorated since Pearl Harbor. Thus rice in pre-war China used to cost \$5 (Chinese) or \$6 a picul. The price was now \$600 in Chungking and from \$800 to \$1,000 in Shanghai. Under inflation the peasants and laborers had made some economic gains and one Chinese speaker suggested that when deflation came they should not be deprived of too great a share of these. The morale of the army remained high and it was the first charge upon the nation's assets but the soldiers were naturally aware of the plight of their home folk. Their diet was also becoming deficient in elements essential for initiative and energy for night fighting. China would welcome such technical assistance and material aid as could be made available. It was urgent that no time be lost in affording it.

### CHINESE ATTITUDES ON POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

Faced by these desperate difficulties on the military and economic front, it was hard for China to consider in detail post-war policies of reconstruction. One thing was certain. The Chinese Government was

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

determined never again to be dependent upon a Burma Road for its armaments. It therefore planned in the post-war period to establish heavy industries for munitions purposes in the interior. For their creation it required both domestic and foreign capital. With the end of extraterritoriality the Chinese Government was ready to accept foreign capital, always provided that no attempt was made to infringe on Chinese sovereignty. The end of extraterritoriality would remove the former fears. If Western powers should look askance at the investment of their capital in armament industries these funds could well be invested in railroads, coal mines and light industries. China did not want a "soup kitchen" attitude on the part of Western nations towards her rehabilitation. She believed that reconstruction of her transportation system in particular was the most effective form of relief.

On the other hand, some Americans warned the round table that in business and political circles it might be difficult to secure approval of such a reconstruction policy. One speaker suggested that China might receive loans from government agencies such as the Export-Import Bank, rather than from private sources, and that these long-term loans at low rates of interest would also be of real value to American industry. By creating a market in China for machine tools, trucks and transport planes, for instance, these loans would assist the American manufacturer in the difficult period of transition between a wartime and a peacetime economy. The American farmer in the South might also benefit from the Chinese need for cotton. According to one Chinese estimate 800,000,000 pounds of cotton goods would be required to restore even the low per capita consumption of cotton textiles in China. The expression of liberal American views on the advantages of full employment stimulated in part by loans abroad found a gratified acceptance in Chinese minds. In reconstructing China the government expected to receive as war indemnity the industrial plants controlled by Japan in Manchuria and elsewhere. It was not felt necessary, as was suggested by one member of the round table, to make temporary use of Japanese managerial and technical skill in Chinese reconstruction. China had an adequate supply of trained personnel for this purpose.

In the political sphere of post-war reconstruction as indicated in the Generalissimo's message to the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum, China was prepared to enter into any effective system of collective security whether universal or regional despite her disillusioning experience with the League of Nations. Like India, China expected adequate recognition

### *China*

of her strength and importance in the Far East. The view expressed by an English speaker that the recent Anglo-American declaration on terminating extraterritoriality in China meant the complete sweeping away of all special privileges, concessions, etc. in that country was received with satisfaction by Chinese members of the round table. The question of the position of Hongkong as discussed in a British opening statement to the conference was carefully examined. The argument for the use of Hongkong with satellite airfields as an international security base did not receive much support from the experts present. Chinese speakers stressed the unsuitability of Hongkong as a crowded commercial center for a defense base and suggested the examination of alternative sites such as might be found in Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. Provided that they were previously restored unconditionally to Chinese sovereignty these areas might possibly be made available for a universal system of bases if such a scheme should be adopted by international agreement. The Chinese also emphasized the vital importance of Hongkong as the great commercial center for south China.

The round table concluded with a deep sense of the urgency of the Chinese military and economic problems and an appreciation of the need for their exposition in the proper quarters.

## JAPAN

The round table on Japan was not disposed to assume a United Nations victory at the outset and examine only the issues to be faced at that time. On the contrary, it began with problems of cooperation in defeating Japan, on the assumption that the pattern of the post-war future will be laid in the war aims and the machinery of cooperation evolved in the course of fighting the war.

### POLITICAL WARFARE

On the subject of psychological warfare against Japan—its possibilities, limitations, and the need for more adequate concerted action, these conclusions emerged:

(1) The results of radio propaganda to Japan—especially trans-Pacific broadcasts—will be modest at best, and for two principal reasons. (a) There are very few short-wave receiving sets in Japan in private hands—not more than a dozen, said one member. But a good many officials do have sets, and if this group can be reached, the results may permeate more widely than one might expect. (b) The second limitation is a psychological one: the entrenched loyalty and unity of the Japanese people. How susceptible they may be to United Nations propaganda was, in fact, a matter of some debate. Several members argued that Japan was by no means impenetrable, nor completely unified. There are latent opportunities, a potential receptiveness, which might well be exploited. Other members voiced skepticism, pointing out that liberalism in Japan had never had firm roots, and that it was an illusion to look for effective opposition, or any breakdown of morale, in advance of the collapse of Japan's armies. However, no one really knows how Japan will react to defeat; we can only hope that propaganda will exert some influence. Everything possible should be done through various channels and appeals to soften up the Japanese, to confuse them, to undermine their confidence in the success of Japanese arms by telling the truth about Japan's defeats, to appeal to war weariness and stimulate the hope of their decent treatment following a United Nations victory.

(2) The largest opportunity for effective action seemed to be the occupied territories. So far as Japan Proper is concerned, steps should be taken to install a powerful medium-wave transmitter in East China. One-third of the homes in Japan, one expert said, have sets of intermediate wave length capable of receiving such messages. Why not develop an aggressive program, then, from such locations in China as come within

## *Japan*

their reach. India, incidentally, is also in need of equipment for effective broadcasts to Burma.

(3) Steps need to be taken to secure more effective coordination of United Nations policy in this field. The Office of War Information in the United States cooperates fully with the Political Warfare Committee in London, but better coordination is needed between the United States and the work of the Australian, Netherlands and Indian authorities, and especially China, the key area in this respect.

(4) Finally it was suggested that a United Nations Board be created for this purpose—to unify and coordinate political warfare, and particularly to formulate a positive line. The great weakness today is the lack of a proclaimed United Nations policy regarding the treatment of a defeated Japan and the rehabilitation of the conquered peoples. We must have a story to tell—and an appealing one—otherwise little can be expected.

### JAPANESE IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

Linked with this issue of war aims is the serious problem posed by the treatment of aliens and of nationals of Japanese descent in Canada and the United States since Pearl Harbor. A Canadian member described the growth of popular feeling against the Japanese, even before war broke out, and how the authorities finally had to consent to wholesale evacuation of all Japanese from the British Columbia coast. Here, as well as in the case of the much larger number of Japanese in the United States, evacuation from the West Coast includes not only Japanese aliens but nationals of Japanese origin as well.

Canadian policy has roughly paralleled that in the United States where these uprooted Japanese are being quartered in relocation centers, a few being released for employment in scattered communities which are willing to take them.

The earlier hostility to such workers is now changing rapidly as a result of the growing labor shortage. An American expressed the hope that this labor demand would continue to grow and eventually absorb and redistribute the Japanese throughout the country. In Canada, however, they are being accepted by communities on the understanding they will be returned to British Columbia after the war, and in both countries there is strong pressure even for repatriating some or all of them to Japan after the war.

The striking contrast in the enlightened treatment of the Japanese in Hawaii was discussed by a member from Honolulu. A full account is

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

given in one of the data papers.<sup>1</sup> The 140,000 Japanese have been relatively little molested: only a handful have been evacuated to the mainland; and the authorities seem fully satisfied that the great bulk are loyal and are cooperating fully. All the wild stories of sabotage have been categorically denied by the F.B.I. and Army and Navy Intelligence. Wholesale evacuation was rendered unnecessary by Hawaii's traditions of inter-racial cooperation and the vigilance of the authorities in dealing with suspects. It was out of the question anyway, given the shipping shortage and the dependence on Japanese labor. On the whole the situation seems to have been handled admirably.

On the mainland, however, a grave problem has arisen which is both a domestic and international issue. Domestically, the danger is that any move against one minority is potentially a threat to all minorities of which there are scores. A dangerous precedent has been created. To persecute one minority invites vengeance on everyone. Internationally, this discriminatory action, whatever its military justification—and this the round table did not attempt to decide—is the kind of thing which will be seized upon and exploited by the Japanese in their propaganda to their own people and other Asiatics. They will distort the record but the charge of racial prejudice and persecution will have a regrettable basis in fact.

#### ECONOMIC WARFARE

A second major area of United Nations cooperation in the war against Japan is economic warfare. It consists in maintaining an effective blockade against any trade between Japan and neutrals, or her European allies, and concentrating naval and air attacks upon vulnerable communications and industrial concentration. On Japan's economic position today, there is only very meagre information. The evidence contributed by various members suggests the following:

(1) Five years of war effort have subjected the Japanese economy to terrific strain. To this is added the dislocation and readjustment caused by Japan's now being cut off from the outside world.

(2) There is no evidence, however, to support the belief that Japan is near a crack-up. Her problem today is not the danger of collapse but rather the problem of expanding output to meet the growing burdens upon her and how to organize the vast area she has conquered. She is undoubtedly suffering severe shortages of railway equipment, of cloth-

---

<sup>1</sup> See Lind, *Japanese in Hawaii under War Conditions*.

## *Japan*

ing, of many minerals, of machine tools, and, above all, of shipping. Here her losses probably now exceed her building.

Unlike Germany, Japan did not conquer much manufacturing capacity. Probably she is far from utilizing many of the raw materials conquered in what are now her outlying territories such as the Netherlands Indies. The immediate importance of the Indies to her is more a matter of military and strategic advantage, and of denying its resources to her enemies.

(3) What Japan needs is time—and to be left alone. Again there is here a contrast with Germany. Germany is probably at the peak of her possibilities; Japan still has vast undeveloped potentialities in her conquered areas. In this sense Japan is our Number One enemy—in terms of her prospective trend of development. Other strategic considerations may override this factor—as indeed they have. But the costs in the East of concentrating on Germany ought to be borne in mind: both the terrific strain on China and the opportunity given Japan to dig in.

(4) Delaying or disrupting this economic development is a major aspect of United National strategy for defeating Japan. Today it is primarily a question of submarine and air attacks on Japanese shipping, and the bombing of Japanese industries. For this, in turn, good intelligence work is essential, and the fullest exchange of information among the Allies. It was said that liason between the Americans and British authorities is excellent, with the United States taking major responsibility on the Far East. But relations with other United Nations, especially China, are not so well organized. It was emphasized that Russia and China today should be the two major channels of information on Japan: Russia because she retains diplomatic relations and communications with Japan; China, because of mail and personal contacts between Free China and the occupied areas, and because of the large number of Chinese in Southeast Asia. It was reported that there had been a rapid improvement recently in Washington's access to such information, though the practical difficulties still left much to be desired.

### UNIFICATION OF COMMAND

Another phase of wartime cooperation against Japan is that of unified military command. There was general acceptance of the view that the military necessities of a global war required a division of command in the field. This merely reinforces the necessity, however, for unified strategy at the top, for coordinated policy-making. Several members, espe-

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

cially Chinese and Indian, voiced some suspicion and complaint in their countries that the distant points and the smaller nations received too little attention, and that this is still too much an Anglo-American war.

There was a general feeling that a great deal remained to be accomplished in securing both unified aims and joint machinery of cooperation for winning the war. A Canadian, with support from other members, proposed that the Pacific War Council really be given some responsibility for directing the war. Probably India should be added, it was suggested, and perhaps certain regional councils established, as in the India theater of war. Today the Council has no function except to enable members to say they belong. Why not give it effective control in the Pacific? The round table indicated a number of fields in which the Council might take responsibility: in the planning of military strategy and in political and economic warfare.

#### WITH WHAT AUTHORITY IN A DEFEATED JAPAN SHOULD WE DEAL?

On this point sharply divergent views emerged:

(1) The first view advocates making peace with any Japanese government that presents itself. If it is the generals and admirals, as it may well be, so much the better. The so-called liberals may have an opportunity to take power but will probably refuse. They will say to the Army, "You led us to defeat. You made this mess; you can clean it up." It may be best if the Chiefs of Staff sign the peace and then take the onus for all the hardships and penalties which will follow defeat. The best way to discredit the liberals would be to put them in power.

(2) The second view, advanced initially by a Chinese, is that under no circumstances should we treat with Tojo and the militarists, but only with a government of civilians who are clearly not responsible for aggression and can represent the people. This would have the effect of recognizing and strengthening liberal elements. It would push development in the right direction. The future peace will depend on the right kind of government in Japan. This is the time—at the start—to bolster the liberal elements.

On these two views there was no clear decision, but the majority apparently favored the policy of looking for and encouraging any liberal elements that might appear, though it was not possible to define their character and there was little disposition to place much confidence in their strength.

It was pointed out that what has passed for liberalism in Japan has

## *Japan*

never enjoyed a robust development. The liberal period of the twenties ended with the assassination of the Premier following the forcing through of the London Disarmament Treaty in 1930 over the opposition of the militarists. The so-called liberals had always retreated under pressure, pleading that Japanese unity came before everything else. Even the trade unions passed over in 1935 to a reactionary chauvinism.

Some in the round table were prepared, however, to suggest—none too hopefully—certain possibilities. First, in local affairs the Japanese have shown certain capacities for semi-democratic self-government, notably the cooperatives, and this might provide the basis for common action on a wider, national scale. Second, especially if Japan undergoes severe bombing, the lessons of defeat may stick. The Japanese like to be winners and are not so sealed to foreign influences as many people think. After 1916, and again after 1939, the success of German arms led to imitations of Germany, just as the blossoming of liberalism in the twenties followed upon the Allied victory of World War I. With the victory of the United Nations, this again may happen.

Without counting too heavily upon this, that is, while taking all necessary precautions, everything possible should be done to encourage such tendencies, hoping that gradual political, economic and educational reforms in Japan will permit them to grow. There was little disposition to recommend wholesale intervention in Japan by direct action to attempt to bring this about. But it was recognized that inevitably the terms of the peace must play an important role in influencing internal developments.

### JAPAN'S COLONIES AND MANCHURIA

On the disposition of these territories, a Chinese member said that China would ask first that Manchuria be returned unconditionally. No international regime was acceptable. Second, Formosa, likewise, was Chinese from every point of view and should go back to China—without strings. If the United Nations wished an international airbase on Formosa, as some had proposed, this should be negotiated with China following the restoration of Chinese sovereignty, but not as a condition of it. Third, Korea was entitled on all counts to full independence. (Earlier in the round table, Chinese and Korean members had urged the importance of now extending some gesture of recognition to the Korean independence movement as one way of implementing the Atlantic Charter and strengthening Korean aid in the war).

From the points in the Chinese statement there was no dissent, except

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

that some debate developed around the future of Korea. The question was raised whether steps were not necessary to assure that an independent Korea, situated as she was in the Northeast Asia triangle, did not become a springboard of attack against China, the U.S.S.R. or even, as one member suggested, Japan.

It was suggested that Korea was a good place for the United States to assume a mandate. American responsibility for Korea would be the best guarantee of the security of the area—better even than international control. To this, American members replied that (1) this would be a difficult assignment technically for the United States; (2) much more important, it would be regarded by United States public opinion as an extremely retrogressive step. It would look like parcelling out colonies among the victors—straight imperialism; (3) independence for Korea was the only course consistent with our war aims, and should be supplemented only by an international guarantee and international aid in rebuilding Korea's national life if she requested aid, under the auspices of whatever international body emerged in the Pacific area.

As regards the Pacific islands, especially the Japanese mandate, American members felt that there would be strong influences in the United States pushing for a nationalistic, aggressive policy. Air developments had shown the vital strategic importance of this vast area for American security. In addition, these islands were important for the development of commercial air transport. It was emphasized by Dominion representatives that the United States had consistently refused to grant freedom of the air in its possessions, and had done everything possible to extend its own air bases. Unless some effective international control of these islands could be assured, there was danger of American control on a very exclusive basis.

Several members urged just such international control, arguing that here was a relatively simple case, the stakes being air power alone. If no agreement is possible on this, the international future is hopeless. International administration should be set up, or, if the United States demanded predominant authority, it should be granted only on condition that guarantees be required of her.

#### MILITARY AND ECONOMIC TERMS OF PEACE

The third major problem in dealing with a defeated Japan is that of the military terms of the peace. This in turn is closely linked with economic considerations: How to ensure that Japan does not again build

## *Japan*

up the means of aggression and how to enforce disarmament? It was clear that the military terms to be imposed on Japan, the nature and extent of any occupation that might be necessary, and all such questions depended so much on conditions at the time that it was very difficult now to have a clear view.

It was agreed, first, that Japan's armed forces should be demobilized and disbanded, and her whole military and naval establishment destroyed or confiscated. But then what? How prevent its being again rebuilt to threaten the peace of the world? One possibility would be to destroy, or remove, all heavy industry; to require Japan to return her economy to agriculture and the light industries. But this seemed undesirable—for both Japan and her neighbors' prosperity—and impossible of enforcement in any such discriminatory fashion over a long period of time by outside force.

Less drastic would be rigid prohibition of munitions industries, arsenals, naval shipyards, military aircraft—all the direct weapons of war—and enforcement by inspection and sanctions. There was considerable sentiment in favor of this, but the preponderant view was that, apart from disarmament at the outset, any special regime imposing special disabilities on Japan over a long period of time was quite unrealistic. The Allies would not go through with it, any more than they did in Germany.

The only solution is (1) to make aggression impossible everywhere; (2) to enforce this with general disarmament and collective security guarantees enforced against everyone; (3) to attempt to encourage in Japan a regime which will provide stability and well-being in the future.

If these seemed inadequate precautions against Japan, it was argued (1) that loss of her colonies would impose "geographical disarmament" by depriving Japan of advance bases; (2) that this loss would also make her highly vulnerable to economic pressure, dependent on Korean rice, Chinese iron, and other imports; (3) that the emergence of China as a strong national state will create a new balance of power in the Far East, tending itself to hold Japan in check.

As for Japan's economic future, removing the possibility of aggression and the military burdens of the past decade should open the way to a substantial rise in the standard of living. Disarm Japan and she will prosper, provided only that overdue social reforms are effected at home, and that Japan is given stable and expanding economic opportunities abroad and not barred all round from trading outlets.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

This international economic issue was not discussed at length, but it was recognized that Japan's future is necessarily bound up with the prosperity and economic security of the world as a whole.

#### CONCLUSION

One other portion of the discussion, though it moved far from the specific topics in hand, went to the central issue of this conference. This is the question whether the post-war future is to be a future of power politics or of some new and genuine international order. Here we appear to find ourselves in a dilemma. American public opinion is highly critical of the old order of colonies and power arrangements, without offering anything in its place. Those whose security depended on this order—and especially Britain—are asked by Americans to surrender special privileges and positions. Yet they are offered no guarantees of United States responsibility or participation to ensure that something new and different will be firmly established. They are asked to make specific commitments without knowing the general framework.

With varying reservations, most members came to the conclusion, that this dilemma is more apparent than real. At any rate, there is only one practical course of action here—to hope that there will emerge a positive collective system embodying the ideals now being proclaimed as war aims and to attempt to persuade our national communities to join in support of it. To achieve this is a dynamic process in which all elements must move forward together. Every step liberalizing the colonial order, such as Queen Wilhelmina's declaration, will make it easier for United States opinion to move forward. The growth of an international outlook in the United States on post-war security will in turn encourage further steps in the colonial field. Language should be exchanged for language, as an I.L.O. representative said, and specific acts for specific acts. Both the above problems should be made part of a general settlement, no part of which goes into effect without the other.

Uncertainty regarding American participation is a real difficulty, to be sure. Participation will be more likely, however, if America is convinced that a new spirit is abroad. One cannot look for absolute guarantees, but only ask: has it a reasonable chance of success? If this seems an uncertain foundation for the future, it is nevertheless what we must build on. Only if we formulate what we want, and go after it, will we be able to sustain the United Nations morale during the war and receive a just peace thereafter.

## *Japan*

In this connection a United Kingdom member suggested a broad proposal for United Nations Council—or an Association of Free Nations—to be formed at once to keep post-war problems under review. Its headquarters, he thought, should be somewhere in North America. To ensure its success all the big nations should come in. Ultimately this Council might become an executive body with an international police force, which would have the power to inspect the heavy industry and ship building of all nations to enforce disarmament arrangements. It might also form regional councils or branches to deal with the problems of a particular area—for example, Southeast Asia. The proposal underlined the point which ran through all these discussions—that the post-war treatment of Japan, as well as the winning of the war, calls for speedy agreement among the United Nations on their joint war aims, and the building of joint machinery to put them into execution.

## SOUTHEAST ASIA

Since the area discussed by this round table is so largely made up of colonies, the interest of its members centered upon impending and proposed changes in the political status of subject peoples. They were aware that this is not a situation peculiar to the region but one fraught with possibilities of an almost revolutionary character for international relations generally and for the historic position of some of the colonial powers in particular. Nevertheless, the Southwestern Pacific—or Tropical Asia, as some of the members called the region under survey—was seen to offer tasks for a statesmanship somewhat different from that required in Africa, the West Indies, or other colonial areas. The Atlantic Charter, with its incisive declaration of war aims, applies to all of them; but here, in the central arena of old imperial rivalries, the realization of those aims was seen to require an unusual amount of specialized adaptation to diverse needs. For the peoples whose welfare, security, and advance toward full self-government is to be ensured range from the heirs of ancient civilizations to groups hardly yet emerged from a primitive way of life. Some of them are on the verge of complete autonomy; others have had but little contact with the modern world of power industry and of international commerce.

The round table started off with expressions of seemingly irreconcilable opinions on the major task of applying the relevant articles of the Atlantic Charter to this medley of human conditions and desires. But common ground was soon established. There was agreement, for example, that in none of the colonial dependencies of the region could there be a simple return to the *status quo ante bellum*; all existing political relations in the region were to be regarded as subject to change—if there was need for change. The common ground widened and grew firmer as the group wrestled with specific tasks, once acceptance had been found for the aim of aiding all the hundred and fifty million or so of the region's population to reach as speedily as possible the goal of self-determination—and this in the reality of every-day life and not merely in the terms of constitutions that may or may not be carried fully into effect. Indeed, after the initial exchange of views it became apparent that political independence, however interpreted, was only one—and some thought, not the most important—of the goals to be attained. It was recalled that the Atlantic Charter covers political, economic, and general social aims without giving one precedence over the others.

Although representatives of colonial powers were at first unavoidably

### *Southeast Asia*

placed in the position of defendants, no one in this fairly representative group asserted the right of colonial powers to pursue their paths separately without permitting themselves to be influenced by world opinion. And although some members had come to the conference prepared to advocate the immediate dissolution of all imperial systems in a single international system of trusteeship for undeveloped areas and backward peoples, the practical difficulties of such a transformation were soon recognized in the give and take of arguments; when the round table finished its labors, that proposal was in the limbo of forgotten things. All had come to see that some intermediate solution must be found which would permit administrative continuity in as far as it was conducive to efficiency and welfare; while at the same time there must be spread more widely the responsibility for the execution of internationally agreed policies—especially the policy of a progressive and rapid advance of subject peoples toward self-government.

#### THE MEANING OF SECURITY

Another theme that ran through this round table was that in a period of such far-reaching changes as those contemplated in the agreed war aims of the United Nations, there was need for a more substantial contribution from powerful third parties than mere statements of sentiment and good advice. More especially, the United States as possibly the strongest nation likely to emerge from the war, even though it may no longer have any dependencies of its own in Southeast Asia after the achievement of complete independence by the Philippines, would have to pledge its share in the maintenance of that international law and order without which all hopes of reforms in that area might prove illusory.

From such initial and still rather general considerations, the round table proceeded to a more detailed discussion of those conflicts of interest that have marked the recent history of the region and threaten its peaceful and orderly progress in the days to come. It became apparent that problems of a political, a strategic, and a social or cultural nature cannot in practice be separated. Political freedom—even where it already exists, as in Thailand and the Philippines—would soon collapse if a nation found itself barred from economic opportunity. Full protection against outside aggressors requires more than a military and naval preparedness guaranteed or undertaken by a combination of great powers: namely, that inner strength which springs from the recognition and the actuality of common interests.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

Moreover, as an Australian member pointed out, even a combination of political, economic, and military measures to secure the peaceful development of such a region as Southeast Asia does not suffice unless it is part of a more inclusive international system of mutual guarantees; and these guarantees must of necessity include economic as well as military means of mutual protection. Tariffs and immigration policies will probably continue for long to be dominated by domestic concerns; but no member at this round table, in spite of the great variety of attitudes displayed, wished to deny that some responsibility in these matters is due to the community of nations. And the need for this could easily be established by a glance at some of the data which the conference had before it, showing as they did the havoc which trade and immigration restrictions had inflicted upon the livelihood, yes, the very lives, of many thousands of Asiatic producers of materials that enter into international commerce. The need for a greater recognition of mutual responsibility, as an element in the basic security of millions, was brought out also in a discussion of civil aviation. Its international control was thought to be indispensable if an effective air defense was to be available in times of crisis. Similarly, the naval protection of the region required something more than a provision of naval bases by some powers with the understanding that under certain conditions they might also be used by others. Some form of joint international naval control must be paralleled, most members believed, by shipping agreements which at all times give opportunities of access to materials and markets, and thus real security. Port facilities throughout the region, it was suggested, should henceforth be discussed functionally and not as bargaining points in determining the sovereignty over this island or that coast.

#### ECONOMIC WELFARE

The subject of the region's foreign trade was thus discussed primarily in terms of economic security. Attention was paid to the special need of Southeast Asia for assured markets in other parts of the world because standards of living here could be raised only by removing the uncertainty as to demand and prices which in recent times had brought some of the region's greatest export trades to virtual disintegration. It was shown that the sovereign powers had long ceased to afford sufficient outlets for the export commodities of their colonies in this region. But the emphasis in the round table discussion of colonial trade relations differed from that at previous I.P.R. conferences. Much less was

### *Southeast Asia*

said about the rivalries of the industrial nations with their ever growing need for raw materials. There was no talk of "have" and "have-not" countries. Instead, serious attention was paid to the effect which different kinds of economic enterprise in tropical Asia might be expected to have on the consuming power of the indigenous people, and thus indirectly on the markets open for the products of the industrially older countries. It was even admitted on all sides that deliberately to hold back a natural and unforced process of industrialization in this region was inimical rather than helpful to world trade. Economic recovery after the present war was seen to necessitate the fullest possible use of all resources, including man-power, because only a greater and intrinsically more valuable production could raise the consuming power of those millions of colonial peoples whose poverty, ill health—and sometimes discontent—are more and more going to be the real dangers to economic security in all parts of the world.

This phase of the discussion led to the following tentative formulation of the consensus reached on the economic future of Southeast Asia:

1. The economic future of Southeast Asia depends not only on the general policies of the colonial powers but especially also on those which after the war will be adopted by other economically strong countries, such as the United States.

2. In their policies of agriculture and land utilization, all the governments of the region should pay due regard to the production of subsistence crops and see to it that the production of export crops, however desirable their further development may be from the standpoint of revenue, shall not encroach upon the resources of land and labor necessary to ensure an adequate supply of materials for domestic use.

3. No power which possesses political or economic control over any territory in this region should place obstacles of any sort in the way of the promotion of local industries of a secondary nature or of other industries engaged in the production of commodities for local consumption.

4. Legislative and administrative steps should be taken, where required, to see to it that imported capital cannot obtain a position of monopoly or a position of such influence as to prevent the native inhabitants from themselves entering in time into industrial and other enterprises by the use of their own capital and organization. Everything possible should be done to encourage the accumulation of native capital and the training of native management.

5. Systems of taxation, royalty payments on licenses to exploit natural resources, and other means to obtain revenue should be so arranged as to secure an ample proportion of the profits from foreign enterprises or from enterprises financed with foreign capital for the benefit of the country from which these profits are drawn.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

6. The establishment of a regional council for Southeast Asia would be useful in the economic development of the region as a whole. Through mutual consultation and through cooperative action on the part of the various governments, such a council might bring about a considerable degree of coordination of policies, especially in the matter of tariffs and trade regulations—which would inure to the benefit of all.

#### TOWARD SELF-GOVERNMENT

Having reached a measure of agreement on the general aim of advancing as rapidly as possible the preparation of all peoples for economic and political self-determination, and this under the watchful eye of some regional international body whose business it would be to represent world opinion in this matter, the round table proceeded to consider some of the more obvious concrete tasks which this undertaking implies in a region with so varied a set of conditions as to resources, population, and historic background.

*Education.* Some members, experienced in colonial administration, saw the job essentially as one of education: it was the task of the state—whether independent or under foreign rule—to create in the minds of the people themselves those attitudes, that basic knowledge, and that urge, without which the transition from traditional to modern forms of economic enterprise, and hence from poverty to sufficiency and from physical inefficiency to full health, could not be accomplished. There was little of that facile and exaggerated praise for the beauty and wisdom of the inherited ways of life with which Occidentals have in the past so often condoned the low living standards of native peoples in this part of the world. On the contrary, it was realized that seeming differences of peoples or ethnic groups in their capacity to adapt their ways to modern conditions often result from discriminations which arise when educational opportunities are limited on racial grounds and not on grounds of individual ability.

In many instances, it was acknowledged, there is a good case for separate schools; but a dual or plural school system is justified only if it is motivated by the aim of advancing human ability all along the line in whatever group of the population it may be found. The value of distinct national and group cultures should be respected; but this should never be interpreted as an excuse to prevent any part of the population from drawing nearer to its full share in modern world civilization. And that share, it was stressed, is not merely a receptive one: all should benefit from the advances of science and technology; but at the same time even the

### *Southeast Asia*

so-called backward peoples have to contribute much skill and experience of which the world has not yet taken full advantage—will have much more to contribute in the future if given access to the instrumentalities of learning.

Some disagreement developed in regard to specific proposals of educational policy, but they were more on grounds of method than of principle. Some members had greater faith than others in complete freedom of speech and of teaching. Some only saw the failures of premature attempts to bring higher education to populations and population groups willing to grasp at every promise of a professional career or enhanced social status without adequate preparation for leadership and responsibility; others saw hope in the very lessons from past experience in this respect: those school systems in Southeast Asia had done most for the well-being of the community which had gone farthest in differentiating schools and curricula, in adapting courses of study to the variety of cultural backgrounds and vocational opportunities. The details of educational procedures were left for discussion on another occasion; but there was full agreement that schooling—more happily adapted than it has usually been in the past to the great variety of conditions and needs—should be placed in the forefront of the joint attack on poverty, insecurity, and political immaturity.

*Graded Progression.* Several members warned against the danger of sweeping statements about an approaching era of self-government as a means of stimulating the war morale of the peoples of Southeast Asia. The United Nations should promise, they said, only what could be fulfilled within a reasonably short time. In the more backward areas of tropical Asia (such as Borneo) anything like genuine self-government was hardly yet a matter of practical politics. Other members warned against the opposite danger: that the announced war aims of the United Nations may be kept in terms so uncertain, with so little evidence of serious attempts at their realization, as to create suspicion rather than enthusiasm. They recommended forceful propaganda within the actual limits of the Atlantic Charter, not least as a means of binding the United Nations themselves to their promises.

The round table went on, therefore, to a consideration of those tasks of political reconstruction which, while serving "preparation for eventual self-determination," could be attacked in at least some of their phases at an early date. Great practical differences in this matter were found to exist for the various states and territories that make up the

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

region. The Philippine Islands and Thailand would undoubtedly regain their independence after the expulsion of the enemy. In both of these countries there was, however, still much to do before "self-determination" could for the masses of the people have the desired reality, in social and economic as well as in political life. The case of Burma was less clear; but no obstacle was seen to a relatively early assumption by that country of a status of self-government within the British Commonwealth. The members from the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies were able to explain in some detail the far-reaching plans for the reconstruction of the Netherlands Empire, announced by Queen Wilhelmina while the conference was in progress. It was understood that under this plan the Indies would after the war attain full and equal partnership with the mother country. British members, with the aid of a series of descriptive data papers prepared for the conference, were able to convince the round table that in some respects the preparation of the indigenous peoples of the United Kingdom colonies in Southeast Asia for an increasing participation in their own government was farther advanced than some of the critics had been aware of. The safeguards that had been built up to surround the native economies and, more recently, the appropriation of special funds in the home country for social and educational developments in the colonies were an earnest, it was stated, of the British Government's intention to convert in due time even the least advanced members of the Empire into full partners in the British Commonwealth.

In every instance, including also the French and the Portuguese colonies, it was anticipated that a reasonable form and degree of international supervision would be acceptable to the respective governments if connected with corresponding international guarantees of security. On the other hand, it was considered doubtful whether any of the subject peoples of the region would respond favorably to a proposal for a mere transference of sovereignty over them from a national to an international authority, or from a regime to which, with all its faults, they had become accustomed to one whose policies might prove even more burdensome.

#### A SYNTHESIS OF VIEWS ON POST-WAR POLICY

Midway through the discussions of this round table, the chairman commissioned a small committee, composed in part of members who had shown the most divergent views at the start, to draft a brief statement of what to them seemed the consensus of opinion reached. The subse-

## *Southeast Asia*

quent proceedings were in part devoted to further clarification of points made in that statement, which follows below. Though this discussion introduced a number of new differences of opinion on particular points, these did not diminish the belief that, with good will on all sides, the colonial problems of Southeast Asia could be solved, and this in full harmony with the declared war aims. Artificial impediments to social growth—not all of them imposed by the selfishness of imperial powers but, some of them, caused by an excessive caution on the part of administrations sincerely concerned in native welfare—would have to be removed. The process of growth itself could be enhanced by the adoption of policies which, looking forward to complete self-determination, would encourage native self-reliance and leadership in every field of endeavor. Opportunities of a vocational character should match expanding opportunities of active participation in law-making and administration, from local to national and international responsibilities.

The statement, though it does not represent any formal agreement and was not put to the vote, is here reproduced with slight verbal changes needed to clarify the intended meaning of certain passages.

1. The basic object of policy in respect of those territories in Southeast Asia—as in other parts of the world—which at present are in a colonial or dependent status must be to secure, at the earliest possible moment, conditions that will permit their complete self-government. This general objective is implicit in Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter, but was recognized by the major colonial powers long before that instrument. In particular the British and the Netherlands delegates pointed to numerous public statements indicating that the main objective of their governments was to obtain the most rapid possible progress toward complete self-government of the colonial peoples subject to their control, while at the same time safeguarding their security.

2. It was recognized that the general objective set out in the preceding paragraph cannot be achieved for all the territories concerned either immediately the Japanese are expelled or at the same moment of time in the future. Differences in the degree of racial and national homogeneity of the different areas (leading in varying degrees to the necessity of providing guarantees of minority rights), differences in the levels of cultural development, differences in economic structure—these all make it necessary to recognize that some areas will be ready for complete self-government considerably in advance of others. It is hoped that if the armistice period is a prolonged one, some of the areas concerned may achieve independent status before its termination. At the same time, the group was strongly of the opinion that the main objective of self-government and complete withdrawal of colonial rule should be kept constantly in mind, and that the internal divisions referred to above should not be used

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

as an excuse for perpetuating or unnecessarily prolonging the inferior status of these dependencies.

3. There was general acceptance of the thesis that the colonial powers are not only in a position of trustees towards the colonial areas under their rule, but that they also owe a moral obligation toward the rest of the world to account for their stewardship.

4. The discussion of the group centered to a considerable extent around the way in which this latter moral obligation should be discharged. The group seemed to be unanimously of the opinion that this could only be done by the introduction of what was variously termed "an intermediate authority," "international supervision," and "third-party interest."

5. No support was found for the view that the problem could be met by the colonial powers surrendering their administrative and financial responsibility for the areas concerned to an international authority in which sovereignty would henceforth be vested. Apart from practical difficulties—the complete break with tradition, the lack of any international authority with administrative experience and other requisite knowledge—it was pointed out that the colonial peoples concerned, and particularly those who feel that they are on the point of attaining independent status, would not welcome such a transfer of allegiance.

6. There was a general consensus that the organization set up to represent the international view—let us call it the International Authority—should be fairly broad in its composition. It should include not only the colonial powers directly concerned in this region, but also representatives of the indigenous peoples and, in addition, representatives of independent powers which are not responsible for colonial administration in Southeast Asia. At least the United States, China and the U.S.S.R. should be represented on the International Authority, but the door should not be closed to the selection of nationals of any country who may have some special contribution to make.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, provision should be made, where necessary, for the special *ad hoc* representation of colonial peoples when matters affecting them are under discussion.

7. The International Authority should concern itself not only with the tempo of development of self-governing institutions in colonial areas of the region with a view to their ultimate evolution from colonial rule, but also with general social and economic development.

8. As regards the powers and attributes of the International Authority, problems of great complexity emerge. The British delegates pointed out with a force and logic which the other delegates were bound to recognize that there cannot be a divorce of power from responsibility. If the present colonial powers are to remain solely responsible for the security

---

<sup>1</sup> This reference to the selection of members of the proposed regional International Authority is to be understood as relating to the initial appointment (or partial appointment) of the Authority itself by a more inclusive international or United Nations agency the nature or functions of which it was not the business of this round table to discuss.

## *Southeast Asia*

of the peoples concerned and for their economic and social progress, then it is obvious that they cannot accept direction from outside parties which involve those parties in no collateral responsibility. If, however, the larger of the outside parties were prepared to accept, as part of an international system, their proportionate share of responsibility for the security and economic development of the peoples concerned, the feeling of the group was that the colonial powers should and would be prepared to grant wider than merely advisory powers to the International Authority. But such assurances are essential, for just as it would be unreasonable for the colonial powers to take up the position that their power alone shall determine the pace of colonial development and emancipation (a position, incidentally, which was not taken up at this conference by the representatives of any colonial power) so would it be unreasonable for the non-colonial powers to take up the position that the main determinant of colonial policy shall be the state of public opinion, whether in the United States or any other country.

9. If these assurances were forthcoming the International Authority could be endowed with specific rights and obligations of which the following are illustrations:

(a) The right of suggesting to any colonial power in the region general lines of policy for the development of self-governing institutions in the areas under its control, while leaving responsibility for actual legislation and administration to that power.

(b) The right to receive and the obligation to demand and publish, with its own comments thereon, regular periodic reports on the extent to which progress is being made and planned in the evolution toward complete self-government of colonial peoples in the region, and on their economic and social progress—including, *inter alia*, public health, nutrition, land ownership, working conditions, inter-regional migration, and education.

(c) The right to suggest to any colonial power in the region lines of economic and social policy directed to improving the well-being of the colonial peoples.

(d) The right to maintain a permanent secretariat and technical staff who would make periodic on-the-spot inspection of the several dependent areas under the obligation of formal report to the International Authority and be available for technical advice.

(e) The right to investigate on-the-spot grievances presented by any indigenous group against any colonial power in the region.

10. The round table was strongly of the opinion that the regional International Authority should be set up at once without awaiting the termination of hostilities. The immediate establishment of such a body, with the assurances it would provide of rapid evolution toward complete independence of the colonial areas concerned, would not only be a powerful weapon of political warfare in those areas, it would also go a long way toward dispelling misunderstanding and eliminating possible sources of friction among the United Nations.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

11. If the great powers, and particularly the United States, are unwilling to share in the responsibility for the security and economic development of the colonial areas of Southeast Asia, then the International Authority can be endowed mainly with advisory and consultative functions. Even such a body with restricted powers would serve a useful purpose in symbolizing the moral responsibility of the colonial powers to world opinion, and perhaps through moral suasion and publicity given to its periodic reports. There would appear to be no reason why such a body should not have the right of investigation on-the-spot as well as the right to seek and obtain information from the colonial power. For the reasons given, the group is of the opinion that this body should be established as soon as possible and before the termination of hostilities.

12. The foregoing has been concerned mainly with the political development of colonial dependencies in Southeast Asia. This by no means exhausts the problems of this region. In particular, there are the problems of political and military security and the problem of the coordination of the economic development of the area as a whole, including independent countries. For each of these purposes, agencies of international composition will have to be established. Existing functional organizations, such as the International Labor Office and the Health Organization of the League of Nations, should be built into the total structure of regional international collaboration. The organic relationship of the International Authority proposed for the dependent areas to these other bodies will have to be worked out.

13. Implied in the whole of the foregoing there is one point of such basic importance that it must be formulated as an explicit proposition. The whole position regarding economic development and strategic security is conditioned, and indeed largely determined, by the willingness of the great powers, and in particular the United States of America, to assume their responsibilities in a system of security and economic cooperation in this as in other parts of the world.

#### POST-WAR RELIEF PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

A specialist group was organized to continue discussions begun at previous sessions concerning the probable nature and size of the relief problem which the United Nations would face in the Southwestern Pacific on the re-occupation of territories now held by Japan, and also concerning such planning and preparation of international action as may be necessary now to secure the greatest possible speed in the operation of relief activities when they become possible.

The chairman and other members gave a number of telling illustrations to show that, however inadequate present knowledge—and sources of knowledge—about the condition of the people in the occupied terri-

### *Southeast Asia*

tories may be, it is possible to piece together a fairly clear picture of the actual state of affairs from many fragments of information. Even rumors and propaganda broadcasts often yield clues to actual facts which those who spread them have no intention to give away.

Members who have kept in touch with events in Thailand, the Philippines, Indo-China, Netherlands India, Burma, and Malaya reported in such detail as they could on what seemed to be the conditions in the respective countries as regards the supply of consumer goods—especially food and textiles—at the time of the invasion, on the probable extent of destruction during the campaign and since, on the effects of the occupation, and on social trends generally in as far as they affect the probable situation at the time of re-occupation.

On the whole, the destruction of property in the region—except such as was of direct military or economic advantage to the enemy—has not been great mainly because of the rapidity of the campaign. In some instances, notably in Indo-China and in Burma, the peasantry has not only continued a fairly full schedule of farming operations but seems also to some extent to have eluded the exactions and requisitions of the occupying forces and hidden away substantial portions of rice crops not needed for immediate consumption. However, about the size of such accumulations and about the time at which they must be expected to have been exhausted, no definite data could be given.

While as yet no food shortages have been reported from the area as serious as that in Hongkong, and therefore no epidemics of famine-induced diseases have developed to any extent, nevertheless the shortage in some instances is one liable to assume dangerous proportions before the enemy has been expelled, especially because, with lacking transportation facilities, stocks which existed at the time of enemy occupation will have been exhausted.

Conditions in cities and urban centers are bound to be worse than in rural districts, not only because there can be no recourse to local substitute food materials and because stores of food were more easily sequestered and pillaged by the enemy, but also because urban populations have become accustomed to the consumption of imported foods now entirely cut off.

Lack of contact with the outside world is responsible for a great deal of suffering more especially, however, because of the exhaustion or near-exhaustion of medical supplies in most of the countries. Without access to quinine, malaria has become serious. Its incidence in some areas has

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

grown because customary preventive public work—such as the oiling of stagnant water surfaces—has ceased to operate. Water supplies seem to have been interfered with but little; or—as in the case of Singapore—there is a fairly adequate supply of well water when the public works or reservoirs have been destroyed.

Throughout the region, a considerable deficiency of textile goods has developed, mainly because the various countries are cut off from their accustomed sources of supply (raw cotton and cotton textiles)—India, France, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. But the break-down of production in Japan itself and in Japanese-occupied China, through lack of access to supplies of cotton, is the main cause of that country's inability to use the seeming opportunity to acquire the consumer markets of Southeastern Asia for itself. Japanese endeavors to secure large supplies of cotton from new sources—i.e. primarily Burma and the Philippines—have so far failed to materialize.

Manipulation of the local currencies and their linkage to the military yen have in most of the occupied territories so diminished the purchasing power of money that large sections of the population have returned to a pre-money bargaining economy. Labor employed by the enemy is usually paid in rice, but in amounts wholly insufficient to sustain normal life. This is another reason why conditions are especially bad in the sea ports and other cities where a large proportion of the population must support itself through wage labor.

The fishing industry has been reduced by the loss or wilful destruction of native craft during the war and by requisitioning of craft on the part of the enemy. However, because of its own requirements, especially for shipment between the ports of the region itself, Japan seems to be stimulating the building of sea-going sailing vessels of modest tonnage, especially in the Netherlands Indies; and with good luck several hundred thousand tons of shipping space suitable for inter-island trade may be available because of this for post-war distribution.

It was agreed that the size of the relief problem in the now occupied areas will greatly depend on the time of year when the enemy is expelled and on whether the campaign leading to that desired result will be sharp and short or will permit the enemy to destroy crops and properties.

In the Netherlands Indies, for example, a re-occupation by Allied forces in April or May, when the new rice crop begins to come in, would if adequate machinery for distribution were available make unnecessary a

### *Southeast Asia*

large supply of foodstuffs from outside and the task of the relief agency would mainly be that of making up local deficiencies. On the other hand if the campaign of re-occupation were to end in December or January, and if the enemy should have been able to destroy or take with him the residue of stored rice, the situation and the immediate need for tonnage might be very serious.

Similarly, whether re-occupation takes place in the monsoon season or in the dry season makes all the difference in some areas which rely on rice supplies from Burma or Thailand by native craft.

For these reasons flexibility in global plans for the use of available shipping in the period of enemy expulsion from occupied areas is of special importance to Southeastern Asia.

A discussion of the extent to which other foods might, under given circumstances, be substituted for rice in countries where that cereal is the main recourse of the staple diet led to no agreement. However, it was found that the question was somewhat academic. The largest problem for post-war relief the world over obviously is that of finding enough ships to distribute supplies. In these circumstances it would hardly be rational to send, for instance, large quantities of Argentine maize to relieve distress among the peoples of Southeast Asia if they can be supplied with the ingredients of their accustomed diet from neighboring countries.

The suggestion, first made at another round table, that Japan after its defeat should be obliged to make good as far as possible the losses inflicted on the countries it had occupied and pillaged through reparations in kind, was discussed here from the standpoint of the actual contribution to relief which such action might be expected to afford. It was agreed that if any stores of textile goods were discovered in Japan at the end of the war they should certainly be used in this way. There was more doubt as to the desirability of including in the armistice terms a demand for the distribution to other countries of looms and other equipment of production. While such action might help to set going processes of industrial reconstruction, it would hardly be in the nature of relief, necessitating as it did attention to such other factors as distribution of raw-cotton supplies, training and technical aid.

Similarly, it was doubted whether, from the standpoint of practical utility it was desirable to have substantial Japanese uniformed forces engaged, as had been suggested, in road making and other labor services in the areas now occupied by the enemy—except for the purely sym-

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

bolical purpose of deflating the false prestige of Japanese militarism, which would not, perhaps, have been sufficiently broken down if victory came suddenly.

The round table was unanimous in desiring an early merging of various international agencies now engaged in the planning of post-war relief. The tasks of post-war re-provisioning, it was held, were so urgent and of so intricate a nature as to demand immediate concerted planning, so that all the necessary preliminary steps can be taken without delay. These would include the working out of methods of cooperation between public and private, between international and national agencies: the selection and training of personnel, the preparation of alternative plans of distribution according to seasons and character of re-occupation campaigns, and so forth.

The round table agreed that eventually all tasks of large-scale international relief in the Pacific region should be one of the functions of the proposed Pacific Council. But the members inclined to the view that for the present the planning and preparation of post-war relief should be entrusted by the United Nations to an *ad hoc* commission or other joint agency, so as not to have urgent emergency plans and operations complicated by political considerations. Such an agency might later easily be absorbed by an international organization of wider scope.

While post-war relief operations would have to be considered in their world-wide interrelations, there was some danger, the members thought, that the Western Pacific would not receive adequate attention in the plans of an international authority dominated by Western powers and pre-occupied in the first instance with the needs of Europe. Therefore, it was hoped that such an inclusive international authority would not only permit the setting up of a regional international agency to function in the Western Pacific but would actively cooperate with it, especially in the allocation of ships.

Because of the impossibility of foreseeing shifts in the situation and because of the probability that other revealing information about the probable nature of the relief task would in time become available, it was agreed that it was desirable for representatives of United Nations countries in eastern Asia to meet in Washington from time to time—perhaps once a month; and the chairman of the special round table was requested to take the initiative in calling such meetings.

## INDIA

The round table opened with an examination of India's place in the general strategy of the United Nations. It was noted that the Pacific War had suddenly changed India's long-standing pre-occupation with the Northwest on defense problems to concern over the weaker Northeast. In this change difficulties of rail and road communication were most important. An Indian member reported that the Eastern Group Supply Council was now being coordinated with the recently formed British Commonwealth Supply Council. There was some question as to whether India's relative importance in the Pacific War has not declined recently, but it was agreed that India's offensive power was steadily growing and likely to become more evident after the Mediterranean campaign had been concluded. Nevertheless an Indian member emphasized that the Government considered the danger of a Japanese attack as still very real.

From the Chinese viewpoint also, India's position is of great and growing importance and even though supplies come through from India (by air) in only a tiny trickle, the existence of India as an arsenal and operating base is a source of great reassurance to China. India now produces some 45,000 items out of the 60,000 needed for modern war, but feels it has not been getting the foreign war supplies it needs and deserves (especially modern planes), particularly when such modern equipment does go to British and United States forces in India. Shortage of equipment alone has limited Indian recruitment to about 50,000 troops a month and at times soldiers have had to train with wooden rifles.

Commenting on a suggestion made by an Indian in another round table, an Indian member felt that it might be desirable to establish in India some local branch of the Pacific War Council or other Executive Council of the United Nations, provided this did not unduly complicate existing machinery. Canadian and American members agreed and asked why it should be assumed always that only British and American forces can give Japan the knockout blow. British and Netherlands members, however, were more inclined to stress the difficulties of merely multiplying Councils when real power would continue to reside in Washington and London.

### EFFECT OF INDIAN POLITICAL CONDITIONS ON THE WAR

This topic was introduced with a long statement by a member of the Indian delegation. Indians, he said, immensely appreciate the American interest in India and for that very reason are specially concerned that

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

the United States should have a better understanding of the facts. The following paragraphs summarize his remarks:

The main obstacle to India's full participation in the war is the Congress non-cooperation policy. To understand Congress, it is essential to appreciate Gandhi's dominating position at all times and his utterly sincere belief in non-violence—a belief which he naturally holds all the more strongly in wartime. He simply cannot be expected to support a policy of vigorous cooperation with the United Nations in the war. Other Congress leaders may question this creed of Gandhi's, but nobody dares oppose it in the last resort. Cripps failed by not seeing this fact and by thinking that Nehru had real power in Congress. Actually Gandhi immediately rejected Cripps' plan and said he need not have come out to India to present it.

As to recent speculations on whether Cripps was forced to change his offer in the midst of the negotiations, one thing is certain. Some of the Indian members of the Viceroy's Executive Council (which first saw the Cripps plan) at no time thought it meant a real National Government with full power, retaining the Viceroy as merely the titular head. Not only these members but also Mr. Jinnah had the definite impression that there would be no such fundamental change in the Viceroy's powers. Possibly, however, the Congress leaders may have misunderstood Cripps' statement that the new Government would function with joint responsibility as the Executive Council does now.

Nobody in India wants a continuation of British domination, but many groups are opposed to a constitutional change now. The reason is that some, the Moslems especially, insist that there must be a prior understanding among the parties, notably on the matter of "self-determination." For right reasons or wrong, the Moslem League has greatly increased its strength, especially since the period of Congress rule in the seven provinces. Mr. Jinnah has now the support of very many of the Moslem leaders and insists on Pakistan although the rest of India is almost entirely against this "vivisection." By placating the Moslem League and conceding its demands, an immediate transfer of power is possible but in fact the great mass of Indian opinion is opposed to Pakistan. Any attempt to break this deadlock during the war (e. g., by intervention from outside) would be disastrous to India.

Mr. Gandhi says to the British: "Quit India!" At first sight that seems a patriotic cry. But is it really? The Japanese threat of invasion is still real. India was not responsible for the war or for being put into it. Thus it is no good for Britain to quit India now and desert her; rather Britain must help India win the war and then afterwards hand it over to Indians.

## *India*

### A PROPOSAL FOR ADJUSTMENT

As long as Gandhi dominates, Congress cannot cooperate with the Government of India, but other parties can. Today in the Executive Council the Indian majority (eleven members) usually determines the decisions. But three key portfolios (Finance, Home Affairs and War Transport) are still held by Britishers. As a first step towards breaking the present deadlock, it is proposed that these should be replaced by Indians. The British Commander-in-Chief would remain as War member and the Viceroy would still retain his veto powers. In reality, however, it is not the Viceroy but the Executive Council which conducts the Government of India.

Before the Cripps promise of post-war independence can be fulfilled there will have to be a great deal of study and preparation before a new Constitution can be worked out. Therefore, in order to start this preparation, the second step of the proposal would involve the setting up of an Exploratory Commission which would include Indian leaders representing the points of view of the various political parties.

The third step would be that this Exploratory Commission should study all the questions requiring consideration in framing a new Constitution. In that task foreign experts could give valuable assistance and advice. It is therefore proposed that a United Nations Advisory Committee be established for this purpose. Its precise functions, status, and method of operation would clearly depend on the circumstances of the moment, but it could be extremely valuable.

After the Exploratory Commission had worked for some time and examined methods of adjusting the various differences among the parties, it would, it is hoped, have a basis for a settlement acceptable by all groups. Having done this, the next step would be to work out the nature of an Indian constituent assembly which would be responsible for actually drafting a new Constitution.

This proposal aroused considerable interest. At first some United States and Canadian members were doubtful about its practical value and were inclined to urge more formal mediation or arbitration by the United Nations, e. g., by urging Congress to suspend civil disobedience in return for a release of Congress leaders from restraint and offering some measure of self-government. But an Indian member argued that this would create a belief that the arbitration body was really for the purpose of appeasing Congress and would immediately arouse the hostility of the Moslem and other minorities which already feel that the United States and China have an undue partiality for Congress, partly as a result of inadequate or inaccurate news reporting in those nations. Therefore, to avoid this difficulty, the above proposal of a United Nations Advisory Committee would be better.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

The round table then turned to examine how this scheme might improve the present situation in India, or improve relations among the other United Nations, and to consider other steps that might be taken (by Britain especially) to allay current misgivings and create a better psychological background for an accord in India. Americans and Canadians stressed that they were not blindly supporting the Congress Party but were primarily concerned about breaking the present deadlock and finding a way to restore the possibility of cooperation in India. This view was also expressed later by a Chinese member.

It was agreed that the above plan could greatly help in the improvement of British relations with the United States and other United Nations, where imprisonment of Congress leaders and recent statements of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery have created a very bad impression. It was felt that Indianization of the Executive Council would greatly improve the situation. Even though in fact the Viceroy practically never intervenes now, it would be even more difficult for him to overrule a fully Indian Council and face the risk of its resignation. Furthermore, it is alleged that many important decisions are today made by the individual members of the Council without ever being brought formally before the Council itself. In a fully Indian Council that would be much less likely, and points of grievance or dispute would be more thoroughly aired in the Council itself.

Some United States members felt that an effort should be made to make the Executive Council in some way a responsible Cabinet, but it was argued that this was not practical. A Cabinet would have to be responsible to something and it was just the dispute over what that "something" is that constitutes the crux of the problem. Similarly another suggestion of making the Executive Council responsible to the Legislature, or of having the new plan placed before both Houses for ratification was said not to be feasible as the Legislature is now boycotted by Congress.

Many members felt there was urgent need for a new British Government statement, preferably by Mr. Churchill, clarifying the application of the Atlantic Charter to India. Without this, there will remain serious suspicions among the United Nations—the Chinese and Americans especially—about the sincerity of the British promises. It was felt by certain American and Canadian members that Mr. Churchill's attitude was a much more serious obstacle to improvement in the psychological situation than Mr. Amery's, though the latter has acquired a symbolic (if not

## *India*

wholly deserved) significance in the eyes of many people as typifying the old diehard imperialist spirit.

Similarly a change in the status of the India Office in London (e. g., by merging it with the Dominions Office) would probably have some psychological benefit, but almost no real advantage in the handling of British relations with India. Some American members felt that a change of Viceroys might also have psychological advantages.<sup>1</sup>

It was strongly felt by many members that release of, or some removal of restraints on, Congress leaders would greatly improve general relations among United Nations.

By the end of the third session the Indian member's plan, which had at first been received with some doubt by North American members, was regarded by many as being promising and likely to be of practical value. It had also become evident that earlier ideas of direct, formal intervention or mediation by third parties (on the initiative of the United States or other United Nations) were impractical in the present situation, and even dangerous in that they might drive the minorities, especially the Moslems, to take an even more intransigent position regarding prior assurances of protection or self-determination before any conversations even began. The new plan provided a means of making a start and re-establishing the habit of cooperative discussion—a fact of immense importance.

### THE VIEWS OF INDIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

With this general agreement, the round table tried to imagine itself as the Exploratory Commission and called for statements from representatives of the principal Indian political groups.<sup>2</sup>

*The States.* In brief, the Indian States would be ready to hand over certain rights to a new central national government provided there was a precise demarcation between the internal affairs of the States and those of the new central body. There should also be certain other guar-

---

<sup>1</sup> Newspaper reports announced on December 9, however, that the present Viceroy is to continue in office until September 1943, instead of retiring in April as had been rumored in some quarters.—*Editor.*

<sup>2</sup>It was fully realized that most unfortunately no Congress spokesman was present, though Congress is the most powerful party and in the view of many observers, is most representative of Indian nationalism as a whole. American and Canadian members expressed disappointment and dissatisfaction that no Congress member had found it physically possible to attend the conference. A serious effort was however made by both Indian and other members to present and give full weight to the Congress view.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

antees which might be assured by a Federal Court. It was suggested that a kind of Privy Council on the British model might be set up, with a sub-committee on Privileges to deal with special States' rights. The several hundred smaller States would have to be amalgamated into larger units. In general the States would not welcome complete separation from Britain, but if it does come, they feel confident that they can survive as, in fact, they survived long before the British came to India.

*The Moslem League* demands the right of self-determination on the basis of the existing provinces (and States also). In the case of Hyderabad (with a predominantly Hindu population), they would say that its right to secede or accede should depend on the decision of its Moslem ruler. It was said by an Indian Moslem member that over 90 per cent of the Moslems have now taken up the cry for Pakistan. If there is to be an All-India federation at all, it will have to be some kind of loose union with more powers delegated to the provinces; otherwise there will be continual fear of Hindu domination from the center.

*The Hindu Mahasaba* opposes Pakistan (calling it the "Balkanization of India") but favors giving "reasonable" powers to the provinces though with a strong central government. It advocates abolishing the communal electorates, but is prepared to give full minority rights and in disputes to accept international arbitration. It does not recognize the Depressed Classes as a separate group but is willing to assure the Depressed Classes of equal treatment with other Hindus. The Mahasaba wants (a) an immediate declaration by Britain of Indian independence; (b) immediate opening of negotiations to resolve the present deadlock; (c) immediate formation of a National Government cooperating in the war with the United Nations; (d) formation of similar governments in the provinces. During the war it desires that the operational control of the war should remain in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. It desires an entirely Indian Executive Council with nominees from the parties. It would prefer the Legislature to be re-elected but is willing to leave the Constitutional issue in "cold storage" during the war. It was said that the Mahasaba's proposal for establishment of a National Government had the support of other political parties and leading individuals, e.g. the Moslem premier of Bengal, the Moslem premier of Sind (who is also the President of the Azad Moslems), the Monim Moslems, the Indian Christians, and the Sikhs.

*The Depressed Classes* desire independent representation and increased separation from Hindu communities, e. g., by establishment of

## *India*

separate villages. They desire a prior assurance of special protection and oppose the idea of a constituent assembly in which they fear their interest will be neglected.

The main *Congress* demand (as distinct from some aims which are similar to those of the Hindu Mahasaba) is for an immediate transfer of full power to an Indian national government. It desires full adult suffrage eventually.

As summarized by an American member, it thus appeared that the three main conflicting ideas to be adjusted in the Exploratory Commission would be (a) the Moslem demand for prior assurance on the right of self-determination; (b) the Hindu Mahasaba demand for prior assurance of a unified India; (c) the probable Congress demand that the Commission's recommendations be binding and its expectation that Congress would have a majority of seats.

Despite the conflicts thus revealed there was considerable agreement (it cannot be said to be complete) in the round table that the Indian member's proposal offered a promising means of starting the process of resolving the present deadlock. It was realized that there is a vast difference between what political leaders must say in public statements and what they will accept in unofficial conversations.

### INDIA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE

The round table devoted its concluding sessions to a consideration of India's war economy, and her basic economic and educational backwardness and her possible role and responsibilities (as a free nation after the war) in a world or regional organization for collective security. Indian industrial development has been rapid in recent years, mainly in war industries, but industry still accounts for only 11 per cent of the total occupied population. More rapid expansion is now hampered by difficulties of getting plant and capital goods from the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus the Grady Mission found it impossible to recommend the establishment of new heavy industries (aircraft, automobile, shipbuilding). Communications are a serious bottleneck. Shortages of locomotives and freight cars, especially on the very important broad-gauge railways, have been a great handicap. India, earlier in the war, sent much of her branch railways' equipment to the Near and Middle East. Industry is a responsibility of the Provinces, not the Central Government, and this fact has led and will continue to lead to neglect of industrial promotion through lack of funds.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

Indian industrialists have in the past been suspicious of foreign capital trying to control Indian industry but with the liquidation of all foreign public debt this fear is now reduced. Indian opinion generally is opposed to the present foreign control of shipping, the import-export business, insurance houses, and of all foreign-exchange banks and aims to break that control. There is increasing emphasis on public enterprise. According to one Indian member, British economic and financial interests no longer constitute a major political obstacle to Indian economic development.<sup>3</sup>

Education is still backward but improving, especially in the cities (Madras being a distinguished example). It has also suffered from being a responsibility of the Provinces, and from consequent lack of funds.

As for defense, the added expense of modern war will make great difficulties for a free India and make it harder for her to spare funds for internal development and social welfare. India will be eager to participate in a collective security organization (world or regional) but will hope for some help (at least initially) from abroad in special armaments and in naval protection. The round table ended by stressing the need for some form of collective security, including the United States. Only thus will it be possible to break the vicious circle of United States isolationism and unwillingness to accept future foreign responsibilities, on the one hand, and, on the other, British imperialism and reluctance to give up control over territories without assurance as to what new form of control will succeed their present rule.

---

<sup>3</sup> In this connection it was noted that the war has radically transformed the previous financial relations between India and Britain. By her exports of war materials India has been accumulating such large sterling credits that she will have been able to pay off by about the middle of 1943 the whole of her public debt in sterling, a debt which had amounted in 1936 to some £376 million.  
—Editor.

## OTHER UNITED NATIONS

The agenda of this round table provided for a discussion of the Pacific relations of the United States, the Soviet Union, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France.

### AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH OTHER PACIFIC COUNTRIES

To traditional American support of a strong and unified China, it was said, has now been added the relinquishment of extraterritoriality, the probable disappearance of other inequalities, and the new framework of relationships created by the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of the United Nations, and the Lend-Lease Act. Further, the present urgent significance to China of the Burma front was recognized.

American relations with the Soviet Union are in a state of flux and unpredictability. The sharp change in American opinion since the Nazi invasion of Russia has not yet settled. Admiration for the magnificent war effort of Russia's army and citizenry is tempered by a degree of uncertainty as regards future political policies of the Soviet Union. Opinion in the United States has had to swing farther than in Great Britain, especially among labor groups. While some members felt that attitudes toward Russia should not be more prejudiced than toward any other country, others held that the future trend of opinion vis-à-vis Russia would depend on whether Soviet policies were avowedly anti-national in other countries.

In this connection attention was called to the difference between Stalinist and Trotskyist policies, to probable Russian preoccupation with internal reconstruction after the war, and to the steady growth of cordial relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Despite any uncertainty concerning trends in American and Russian sentiment, relations between the two governments were now cordial, it was said. Members recognized that Russia is destined to play a very important part in the world of the future, especially as regards security. On the more constructive side of American-Soviet relations, three common denominators were cited as providing a basis for increasing understanding and cooperation: first, the common fight against a common enemy; second, a deep mutual concern for human welfare; and third, a strong interest in stopping war and in achieving security.

With full recognition of the gravity of problems to be faced on the Soviet western front, there was no disposition in the round table to encourage now the opening of a Soviet eastern front.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

American relations with Australia and New Zealand were considered to be very satisfactory both ways. Adjustments between troops now in Australia do call for a mutual exercise of understanding and good will. While sentimental ties between Australia and the United Kingdom are still extremely strong and there is nothing to disturb them, Australia does look increasingly to the United States for leadership, power, and even inspiration. With growing awareness of her geographic position, Australia will also look forward to closer political and economic relations with the peoples of Asia. With the mother country very far away, Australians feel that they are living in a world and an area where new life is beginning. Their relations with Britain, still strong, are moving out into a larger synthesis.

In New Zealand, enlightened social and economic development has been matched by a progressive foreign policy. The early rejection of appeasement vis-à-vis Japan has attested to the recognition of New Zealand's complete dependence on and support of a system of collective security. Cooperation between New Zealand and the United States has been extended during the war, with New Zealand taking its full quota of responsibility. After the war New Zealand looks to a share in the development of communications and trade in the Pacific area, including the United States. The policies of New Zealand are conditioned by the desire to maintain and extend the standards of living and of social relationships developed especially during the last forty-five years. In trade relations, New Zealand's tariffs have been low. Import control has been found better than any tariff for developing industries. Through the direct handling of exports, the government is enabled to determine through purchase the scope and character of imports. New Zealanders are completely organized for the war effort and they think of the Southwest Pacific as an offensive area. While the war has brought closer cooperation especially with the United States, no nation has given aid to New Zealand comparable to that given by Great Britain.

Canadian-United States relations have been most cordial before and during the war, with little attention paid to the unfortified boundaries between them, a fact referred to by a Chinese delegate as "an object lesson for the world." Trade and cultural intercourse loom large. The idea of possible annexation by the United States is generally regarded with amusement. Canada's contribution to the war effort, like that of Australia and New Zealand, has been extensive, and in this, cooperation with

### *Other United Nations*

the United States has advanced on a broad base. In the Pacific War, Canadian soldiers were sent to Hongkong, and Canadian air forces have been sent to other points, including the Aleutians, where they are serving under a United States command.

United States relations with India, normal though more or less distant before the war, have increased in scope during the past year. The presence of American troops in India has not raised any serious problems, and their relations with the Indian people have been good; however, the attitude shown by Americans toward colored troops in the American forces has been a source of perplexity as regards American attitudes on racial issues. There is in India a feeling that Lend-Lease aid has been somewhat inadequate. At the same time the Indian people recognize that American sympathy with their national aspirations is warm. In her relations with the United States after the war, India expects to be awarded a status at least equal to that of the Dominions. With such status India would welcome reciprocal economic arrangements. In the view of the Indian delegates present, racial discrimination applied to immigration or other issues will not be tolerated, and if it persists, will be met by counter-discrimination. The Indian members regarded security in the Pacific as primarily a responsibility of nations dwelling there, with less responsibility for present and past aggressors. India will seek its place in the sun as a unified independent nation acting in full cooperation with other peoples of the world.

There has been a noticeable increase in United States interest in the Netherlands East Indies during the last forty years, as evidenced by some \$200,000,000 of investments; by large imports of rubber, tin, quinine, and palm oil; and by cooperation in industrial research, social hygiene, and agricultural development. Cultural relations have also grown in importance. All of this has occurred in spite of the fact that the number of Americans in the Netherlands East Indies has never been large. As the war approached and reached the Indies, the Dutch sank on the average a ship a day. The lack of planes was a decisive factor, aid from the United Nations being too little and too late. As withdrawal became necessary, installations useful to the enemy were made as far as possible unusable. All available means of continuing the fight have been put under United Nations command and the United States has now made available special training facilities for Dutch flyers. It is expected that there will be a re-establishment of the Netherlands Indies, on a joint basis with the Indonesians, under the rule of their Queen, and on a

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

basis of full equality between the units of the Netherlands Kingdom. The Indies look forward to full cooperation with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, China, India, and the whole world in order to obtain security.

A Fighting France member was invited to comment on the declaration of American authorities relative to the restoration of parts of the French Empire seized in accordance with military necessity. Reference was made to a declaration by the State Department as pronounced by the U. S. Consul at Noumea, in which it was stated: "The policy of the Government of the United States as regards French territory has been based upon the maintenance of the integrity of France and of the French Empire, and the eventual restoration of complete independence of all French territories." Commenting on this statement, the Fighting French member interpreted it to mean that when the war is won, the first step will be the restoration of territories occupied to French sovereignty. Thus France would have an equal right with, say, the United Kingdom, to discuss the future status of its dependent areas. The statement of the American Government was not interpreted as being inconsistent with any developing United Nations policy respecting what are now colonial areas.

It will be noted that considerable attention was paid to the wider Pacific relations of the other nations discussed. Partly for this reason and partly because the earlier discussion had raised issues of deep and general interest, the remaining sessions of this round table were devoted not to the specific analysis of the relations of individual countries, but to broader questions of general concern.

#### IMMIGRATION POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

To the Chinese and Indians present, the question of immigration was largely one of racial discrimination. Immigration laws, specifically discriminatory against particular national groups, carry an implication of national inferiority, are inconsistent with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, and furnish a continuing source of irritation and resentment among the peoples affected. A member of the Chinese delegation asked that the initiative for removal of such discrimination be taken by the nations concerned without waiting for the demand to arise at the peace table. The demand would necessarily arise if the question had not already been dealt with by prior action.

### *Other United Nations*

In response to these views, American members agreed that logic and justice were wholly on the side of removing specific discriminations from the American immigration laws. The question was viewed as one of practical politics, since popular opposition might prevent a repeal of Oriental Exclusion Laws, opposition being greatest perhaps among labor groups which fear an impairment of their living standards. The problem cannot be settled by Executive action but would require Congressional legislation; fear was expressed that such legislation might fail of passage. It was pointed out that Chinese immigration under the American quota system would be so small that it would not threaten any impairment to American living standards, and that failure to end the present discriminatory system would furnish occasion for cumulative resentment in areas of severest population pressure. Moreover, Chinese living in the United States are now subject to draft and are entering into the American armed forces with complete loyalty. Illustrations were given of the successful assimilation of Chinese in the United States.

Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian members viewed the problem more from an economic standpoint. It was felt that any substantial influx of Asiatic peoples into these areas would rapidly reduce standards of living developed over a period of years. A New Zealand delegate recognized that a position wherein New Zealand with 104,000 square miles and 1,640,000 people was in the same ocean with Japan having 140,000 square miles and 73,000,000 people, was an insecure situation not conducive to world peace. The solution, in his mind, lay in a spread of productivity from the more sparsely populated areas, rather than in the revision of immigration policies.

In general, there seemed to be agreement that an obligation existed for a removal of the sting of discrimination from existing immigration policies, but the specific methods whereby this might be achieved were not further explored.

### MACHINERY FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

From the standpoint of a Chinese member, the present machinery for consultation with regard to war plans and strategy was not all that could be desired. The extension of this machinery, in the view of an American member, involved difficult problems due to the complexity of present global strategy, the absence of Russia from the Pacific War, and the need for strictest military secrecy. Despite these difficulties, there appeared to be general agreement as to the desirability of extending as

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

far as possible the scope and reality of joint discussion. A further proposal for a supplementary Pacific War Council in India, which would be more responsive to the needs of that region, was advanced by an Indian member. It was pointed out by a British delegate that the machinery evolved to date for the conduct of the war obviously was not yet a foundation for a powerful post-war organization.

On the subject of psychological warfare, a specific suggestion was advanced that there be instituted among the United Nations a weekly program devoted to the presentation of issues from the standpoint not of individual nations but of the United Nations as a whole. By this and other available means the effort should be made to supersede selfish pluralistic considerations by a larger view of what this war is being fought for. Some members felt strongly that civilian populations would rise to this larger approach. For an effective continuation of this approach, however, it was felt that a gradual but steady implementation of the United Nations concept would be essential.

#### AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT FUTURE COMMITMENTS

A British member felt that the United Kingdom had been put "on the spot" at the conference. The assumption seemed to be that colonial rule had been uniformly bad. Great Britain was being asked to give up administrations built up over long years without any assurance as to what would take their place. If the United States and others were ready to take a full share of responsibility with respect to these areas, well and good; there would be something to discuss. British members, it was said, were ready to support the establishment of an advisory body to bring the light of public opinion to bear on security, health and welfare, and the progress of self-governing institutions in those areas. An American asked if the British people would support the proposal already advanced by a British member of the conference.<sup>1</sup> In reply it was said that this was in line with a governmental trend, and with a very considerable body of public opinion in Great Britain. An American delegate then commented that if this could be made known to the American public it would have a very beneficial effect.

How far can the other United Nations rely on the United States to accept future responsibilities and commitments under the Atlantic Charter? Chinese, New Zealand, Australian, and Canadian members emphasized the vital importance of this question in the consideration

---

<sup>1</sup> See above p. 13.

### *Other United Nations*

of their own future policies. An American pointed to the difficulty in predicting the course of American policy. The acid test of United States policy is not necessarily to be found in Executive Acts but rather in treaties ratified by Congress, or in the continuance of a given policy following a change of the party in power. The Atlantic Charter, to be sure, is in harmony with a prevailing trend of American public opinion, but one cannot say with certainty that it is a definite and assured statement of American policy, or what Americans will do to support it. Referring to the future security of what are now colonial or semi-colonial areas, he said, in effect, to the British members, "The burden is on you. If you want our help, say what you want to do. If it meets with our approval we will probably do much to help; if not, we won't."

To this view a Canadian delegate remarked that the United States has the key and there isn't any key. An Indian maintained that third parties are also concerned, who have taken the Atlantic Charter in good faith and acted accordingly. An Australian member said that the crux seems to be a question of prior action. It is difficult for the British to start unless there is some indication as to what will be supported by the United States. There must be a two-way traffic or none at all. A British delegate stated that his colleagues were ready to go very far on the colonial issue, that reservations were all on the table, but that it was most important that the question of future responsibility be faced.

At this point, another American stated that the group had perhaps gone too far in emphasizing certain aspects of the United States constitutional system limiting the power of the Executive to make future commitments. There is a long history of Executive Acts, accepted by the American people, and fulfilled in good faith. Such Executive Acts can mean a very great deal. If the Atlantic Charter expresses what the people of the United States want, then it is very important, and the influence of the American people can be counted upon in support of it. Further, the initiative need not come altogether from the British side; there might be a continuing gap unless there was a process of mutual discussion on the basis of specific proposals like that advanced at the beginning of the conference, and on other suggestions which might follow.

Apprehensions as to the role which the United States would be prepared to play in any plan of collective security after the war led to a more specific discussion of public opinion in the United States and, in less detail, in the other United Nations with interests in the Pacific area.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

The prevailing view seemed to be that the strong trend in the United States today is in the direction of participation in a general security system, especially in relation to the Pacific and the Far East, in connection with which there is a special sense of American responsibility. As one American delegate put it, "We are in the Pacific to stay." The vogue of autarky is on the way out, and if the United States does not enter into a cooperative international system, the alternative would more likely be a course of political, rather than economic, imperialism.

The future trend of American opinion will be determined largely, it was felt, by the course of the war and how it ends, by skillful leadership, and by a process of education among the American people. Danger points were frankly recognized: the inevitable desire of soldiers to get back home and of their families to have them return, the very real commitments and sacrifices which must be made in entering a collective security system, and the inevitable temptation, after a time, to get flabby in maintaining the peace. On the other hand, the experience of insecurity without a collective system, and the development of air power were mentioned as potent factors making for a breakdown of isolationism and the growth of a felt need among the American people for an effective international organization for the maintenance of peace.

The probable support by British opinion for the entrance of Great Britain into some form of collective organization was noted. With less reservation members from China, India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands expressed the readiness of their people to enter into a collective organization for the maintenance of security.

#### A SECURITY ORGANIZATION IN THE PACIFIC

On the analogy of a policeman who can act in a small way without reference to the city council, it was said there is need for a type of regional organization which would act on appropriate issues without endless delays and references. On questions involving war there would need to be reference to wider authority. An American introduced for consideration a hypothetical proposal with a specific illustration. Suppose that a ship loaded with iron starts for Japan, the ultimate use of the cargo being in doubt. It is necessary to stop and search that vessel. Who is to do the stopping? Who is to search the vessel? It should be an international police force, with power at hand or in reserve, which is responsible to a United Nations command above which is a civilian power. The gunboat which stops and searches the vessel should be part of an armed force

### *Other United Nations*

available to this civilian power. The civilian power is a body representing the United States, Russia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France, the Philippine Islands, in time India, and someday, we should hope, Japan. Under this power should be police stations involving sufficient land, air fields, and port facilities to function effectively. The responsibility of this force in the initial stages should be first to police Japan and, second, to prevent disorder. This plan would call for an allocation of forces by agreement among the powers concerned. Functions other than policing would also come into the purview of the United Nations civilian authorities. There would be some political functions perhaps, for example, in the case of Korea; there would also be responsibility concerning the Pacific islands, trans-Pacific airways, and so on.

It was explained that the proposal advanced by the British members in the opening session does assume a security system capable of performing functions such as those just outlined. The proposal assumes a regional approach in relation to a larger collective system. In the economic sphere the Council for the Pacific Zone could fulfill important and necessary functions in accordance with principles laid down by a world authority. Within the zone it could facilitate economic collaboration with respect to markets, the allocation of production, supervision of the development of backward areas, trade restrictions, and the like.

On the political side, the proposal would provide for an international supervision over the tempo of change with consideration given to the practical problems which require solution in each area. Important assistance could be given on social problems. There would thus be adoption of the principle of accountability and thereby a means for satisfying the conscience of the world. The British, it was said, were influenced in putting forward this proposal by the consciousness that there is considerable idealistic demand that in the place of sovereignty exercised by external powers, there is need for some alternative other than international administration which has proven impractical. It is hoped that by such arrangements the progress of peoples to the point where they can stand on their own feet may be quickened. In the view of an American member, this would involve no underwriting of the status quo. A Dutch member, when asked whether such an arrangement would be satisfactory to his people, expressed the view that if it was applicable among all the United Nations, his people would not offer objections.

### *Regional Round Table Summaries*

The question whether the Council for the Pacific Zone was to be unique or whether there would be other councils in other parts of the world was answered with the comment that there was no reason to copyright the idea for a particular area. If it is found workable here, the prospects of its application elsewhere would be enhanced.

#### *EDITORIAL NOTE*

##### *Special Meeting on Relations with the U.S.S.R.*

In the absence of any members from the U.S.S.R., it was felt inappropriate to hold any extended discussion of Soviet policies and foreign relations in the regular round tables. At the request of numerous interested members, however, an informal meeting was held to exchange information on the present relations between the U.S.S.R. and their respective countries. No attempt was made to appraise Soviet foreign policy in general or Soviet relations with Japan in particular, since it was considered that this could not be satisfactorily done without the participation of Soviet members.

The discussions briefly reviewed the existing diplomatic relations with, and public opinion towards, the U.S.S.R. in the United Kingdom, the United States, China, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and the Netherlands. It was noted that Canada and Australia had recently established diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and were about to send ministers. The Netherlands Government had also recently announced its readiness to exchange envoys. Members gave short accounts of the recent attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. on the part of the British public, of American labor groups and of Catholic groups in French Canada. There was also discussion on American, British and Canadian war aid to Russia and statements on recent Sino-Soviet relations in Sinkiang and on the present and possible future status of the Mongolian People's Republic.

*PART III.*

TOPICAL ROUND TABLE SUMMARIES

## POLITICAL-MILITARY PROBLEMS

The discussions in this round table were mainly grouped around two major questions: first, political requirements for the development of a system of collective security in the Pacific area; and secondly, the political problem arising over the restoration of territories now occupied by the enemy, and including the attainment of independence by or restoration of independence to certain areas.

### A PACIFIC AREA REGIONAL COUNCIL

The round table felt that its first task was to consider regional machinery for the post-war security of the Pacific area, to examine its functions, obligations, and composition and then to test the detailed problems which would arise in the immediate post-war period against the machinery which it had devised. The discussions proceeded upon two assumptions: first, that there would be some world-wide political body of which the Pacific regional one would be a subsidiary; second, that pending exploration of its character and feasibility a Pacific area regional organization was desirable. The general functions of this regional body were examined under the following three categories: (1) the task of creating conditions in which irritants to the security of the region would not arise, in other words, the task of establishing the conditions of peace; (2) the task of resolving disputes at their source and as soon as they arise which implied a system of conciliation and arbitration; (3) the job of employing force when necessary; the exercise, in other words, of police power.

### CREATING THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE

Under the first function, creating the conditions of peace, the Regional Council would be empowered by prior agreement, perhaps by a series of multilateral treaties and by arrangements made by and with the world-wide organization, to deal with certain international questions, but it would be prohibited from dealing with certain internal questions. As the entities composing the Council would be sovereign nations, certain of their domestic affairs, though not all, would be outside the Regional Council's authority.

The kind of questions with which the Council might be concerned is suggested by the following illustrations: assuring Japanese adherence to the terms of the armistice and of a subsequent peace treaty; certain aspects of immigration; problems arising out of trade discrimination; control

### *Political-Military Problems*

or supervision of international communications by land, sea and air; problems of minorities; fisheries; certain labor and social conditions; and the complex problems of the dependent areas. On this last subject, the relation of the Regional Council to the dependent areas, the round table associated itself with the conclusions of the previous round table on Southeast Asia.<sup>1</sup>

It will thus be seen from the substantial tasks which had already been envisaged by that round table as falling within the jurisdiction of the Regional Council that it would not be just a small international advisory body but a substantial organization with heavy responsibilities which might well on further elaboration involve a number of subsidiary bodies assigned to particular sections of the program.

#### RESOLVING DISPUTES AS THEY ARISE

Under the second function of the Regional Council, the resolving of disputes at their source, the round table envisaged the establishment of a system of conciliation and arbitration. In this connection a sharp warning was given that disputes must not be permitted to develop pending arbitration. A system would have to be arranged whereby disputes could be controlled during the process, sometimes lengthy, of appeal and final judgment. In the case of smaller disputes of a local character difficulties could immediately be handled by the Council's police authority, in much the same way as a city police force functions.

#### THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

The Regional Council would have to have an armed force. The force would not have to be very large and it would be composed primarily of air and naval units based upon strategically located areas. There was difference of opinion as to whether the force should be completely internationalized as a mercenary force actually belonging to the Council through financial contributions made by its members, or whether the force should be composed of armed units still belonging to the respective members of the Council but loaned to it under agreed quotas. Most members seemed in favor of the former plan.

It was felt that the regional armed force should be part of a global force under the authority of whatever world-wide security organization was to be established, but that it should be under local command empowered to act within the limits assigned to it. The armed forces for the

---

<sup>1</sup> See above p. 55.

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

Pacific region, as for other regions, might wear a uniform of the United Nations, thus symbolizing the fact that their authority derived from the United Nations as a whole. The point was emphasized that the local command would have to have sufficient authority to take immediate police action in many instances without prior reference even to the Regional Council. There was, in other words, one field of police work in which the armed force would act immediately under its local command and another field in which it would act only after deliberation by the regional organization.

This international police force would not be a substitute for the armed forces of each of the United Nations. While the latter would probably be limited through some form of arms limitation, national armies, navies and air forces would still be required in case of troubles too large for the regional force to handle. It was stressed that the regional instrument should be given only those jobs which it is big enough to handle. The importance of manning the international force with nationals of the smaller countries, preferably those not having empires or vested interests in the area, was also suggested.

#### COMPOSITION OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL

The following membership of the Regional Council was suggested: China, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, France, the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U.S.S.R., with the Philippine Commonwealth joining only after it had achieved independence. Other colonial areas would also become members upon attaining independence. Representation on the Regional Council of a member of the world security organization would also be desirable.

In one respect a discrepancy exists between these recommendations on the composition of the regional organization and those of the South-east Asia round table which proposed the inclusion of representatives of the indigenous peoples of the region whether or not they had yet obtained full independence. The discrepancy is however, probably more apparent than real and susceptible of adjustment.

On the question of how the Regional Council was to reach decisions, there was agreement that no questions should require unanimity. Some types of questions might be determined by a mere majority, others by a two-thirds vote.

## *Political-Military Problems*

### WHEN SHOULD THE REGIONAL ORGANIZATION BE ESTABLISHED?

Chinese members felt it extremely important that China's confidence in the post-war objectives of the United Nations be assured while the war is still being fought. They pressed the view, therefore, that the post-war machinery which the round table had been discussing should be set up now with China a full and equal member. Their point was met by the proposal that the solution of this question lay more in the bringing of China into a position of full equality in the machinery now existing for the prosecution of the war than in the premature establishment of a machinery designed to deal with post-war problems. How this could be done has been suggested by the round table on China.<sup>2</sup>

### POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE RESTORATION OF TERRITORIES NOW OCCUPIED BY THE ENEMY AND THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR CERTAIN AREAS

*Formosa.* With respect to Formosa, considerable discussion was provoked by the rather strong British and Dutch views with which at least one American associated himself that the problem of Formosa was analogous to that of other dependencies in the Pacific and was therefore under the scope of the Atlantic Charter and subject to the jurisdiction of the Regional Council. The Chinese members were joined by several others in dissenting from this view on the ground that Formosa was 97 to 98 per cent populated by Chinese and that it had previously been an integral part of China. For these reasons they felt that it was in no way comparable to areas such as Malaya or the Netherlands Indies. The Chinese view was firmly expressed that China wanted Formosa returned to her without any qualifications whatsoever. If, following such unconditional return of this territory to China, the United Nations wished to take up the question of establishing international bases on Formosa, China would be more than willing to negotiate.

*Outer Mongolia.* The question of self-determination for Outer Mongolia was brought up by the British and Dutch. It was indicated that 98 per cent of the population of Outer Mongolia was Mongolian, and that in view of the differences between the Soviet Union and China about Outer Mongolia this was perhaps a region to which Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter definitely did apply. The Chinese response was first, there had been no request for self-determination from the people of Outer Mongolia; second, if such request should be made, China would favorably consider it; third, in view of the extremely good rela-

---

<sup>2</sup> See above p. 33.

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

tions existing between the Soviet Union and China during recent years, it was likely that any problem which might arise respecting Outer Mongolia could be settled bilaterally. If any dispute could not be settled it should then be referred to the Regional Council.

*Korea.* There was agreement that Korea must be taken away from Japan and that following a long period of harsh Japanese administration, the country would be found in a very weak condition clearly unable to stand entirely by itself. Whatever was done regarding Korea must be done speedily for the purpose of strengthening and rehabilitating the country and its people. The point was here made that in considering the independence of an area like Korea we are inclined to set up standards of perfection which we would not dream of applying to certain existing independent nations.

Two proposals for handling the problem of Korea were advanced. The first was that Korea should be assigned to the United States as a mandate, subject of course to supervision and inspection by the regional organization. This proposal received rather strong support from some of the Chinese and Canadians present and one American, without associating himself with the plan, indicated that the United States might parallel in Korea its performance in the Philippines, though the process of attaining independence would have to be greatly accelerated. There were several objections to this plan, not only that it might be regarded as a retrogressive step in the liquidation of the colonial system, as suggested in a previous round table, but also that it would be less likely to gain the support of American public opinion than would a solution more international in character.

The second proposal called for a United Nations declaration during the war guaranteeing the independence of Korea immediately after the war and simultaneously guaranteeing her security from outside aggression and asserting the willingness of the United Nations to provide through the Regional Council any form of assistance Korea might need. Such assistance might range all the way from policing to questions of public health, from the administration of justice to technical advice in the fields of agriculture and industry. In the event of this solution being adopted some members believed that the United States might be asked by the Regional Council to play a prominent role in aiding Korea but it was emphasized that in this event it would be doing so as an integral part of a regional security system. The round table did not reconcile these two proposals.

### *Political-Military Problems*

*Pacific Mandates.* The round table inclined to the view that the present Japanese mandates should be directly administered by the Regional Council or by a body thereof. In connection with the other mandated areas in the Pacific under either Australian or New Zealand direction, most members took the view that they should be returned to the sovereign powers which hold the mandates and which hereafter, working together with the Regional Council, would be obligated to raise them to the point of self-government as rapidly as possible.

*Other Dependencies (British, Dutch, French, American).* It was the view of most members that these too should be returned to their sovereign powers subject to the far-reaching recommendations of the round table on Southeast Asia. In the case of Hongkong hope was expressed that as a gesture of good will the United Kingdom might be willing to consider its return to China. It was noted that for some of these areas steps leading to independence or self-determination have already been taken. The Philippines will have independence in 1946 and if conditions permit this date may be advanced. President Roosevelt, moreover, in a message to the people of the Philippines before the fall of Bataan offered the guarantee of that independence on the part of the United States, a step which, it was felt, in itself assured American participation in maintaining the security of the area. For the Netherlands Indies, Queen Wilhelmina's recent declaration assured self-determination at an early date after the cessation of hostilities. The same may be assumed of Burma, following a brief period of rehabilitation.

An Indian member said that he did not believe that there had yet been made a clear-cut statement by the British on the question of immediate post-war self-determination for India. He pointed out that the Cripps proposals had been turned down by every single Indian group and that consequently declarations made in connection with the Cripps mission did not now constitute a clear declaration on this subject. He referred to the qualifications of the Atlantic Charter made by Mr. Churchill and to the "undemocratic proposals" of the Cripps mission. He expressed the fear that after the war India would again be offered no more than the Cripps proposals. In reply a member of the British group said that he believed that the British public as a whole has said to India, "Immediately after the war you are at liberty to decide exactly what sort of a Constitution you want. I can say categorically that there would not be the slightest disposition in any part of Great Britain to object to any decision the people of India make."

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

The above summary may have given the impression that the round table was in more complete agreement on all the matters than was actually the case. In fact, at least two members dissented very sharply not so much on the nature of the regional machinery which had been proposed but on the attitude, or the political atmosphere, which seemed to lie behind the proposals. One of them agreed that we had worked out new machinery which was much better than the old but he was disturbed at the use to which many persons wished to put it. Another member was doubtful whether the scheme which the round table proposed for the restoration of the colonial areas to their sovereign rulers might not mean the perpetuation of the monopolies and discriminatory commercial practices which had prevailed before the war.

The discussions ended on a note which gave great encouragement to a continuation of exactly the sort of discussions begun at Mont Tremblant. It was said that the conference had painted with a wide brush a picture of the way in which the war can be more effectively fought and in which the post-war world may be given security. The next task must be to convene a number of smaller conferences of this nature, international in character, which would take the broad picture we now have and continue to fill in the details so that whenever the time is appropriate our proposals can be brought to the direct attention of the governments concerned in the hope that they will make a substantial contribution to attaining the objectives in which all the United Nations are interested.

## MILITARY-POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The round table attempted to examine not the immediate military position of the United Nations but rather the situation that will develop as the war is being won. It first discussed what should be the relation of the military forces reoccupying such territories as Burma and the Netherlands Indies to a civil authority. The view was put forward that in these areas the military should carry with it a civilian authority, for instance the Burma government functioning in India analagous to the "shadow" governments of various occupied nations in Europe functioning in England. The situation in China was reported to be relatively simple, because in partially occupied provinces the government had just moved out of the zone of occupation and in the case of Manchuria and Jehol there are governments functioning in Chungking. There are also representatives of the Formosan people in Chungking.

### PROBLEMS OF REOCCUPATION

It was pointed out that in all areas there is and will be some form of local administration operating. It cannot be assumed that all people participating in these administrations are Quislings. In fact an Indian delegate said that a plan had been worked out in India at the time when invasion seemed imminent for withdrawal of all military and police personnel from invaded regions, but for leaving civilian authorities to carry on local administration as far as they could consistently with their obligations to their country. This situation in regard to local government was recognized to be in marked contrast to the question of the central authority in reoccupied areas. It is at this point that questions of broad United Nations policy enter. It is important, one member held, that the reoccupying forces come as liberators not reconquerors, that they come under the colors of the United Nations.

In the first place, the military position in some of the areas likely to be reoccupied first, such as Burma, will demand that the military authority remain in command for a considerable period. The commander will probably not be a national of the territory so occupied—for instance, American officers may be in command there. Under these circumstances there was felt to be a pressing need for United Nations planning and detailed agreement in advance as to what policies will be followed. The question was raised as to the implications in this respect of the American assurance to the French of the full restoration of the French Empire. These broader political questions were not answered—but in

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

raising them the trend of the round table was to the view that the military reoccupation of the United Nations territories carried with it political implications, since whatever civil administration is first instituted will have a profound effect on the ultimate character of the civilian authority. A further opinion was that this is a United Nations problem and one of the first matters in point of time on which there must be agreed United Nations policy, or else there is grave risk of serious friction.

#### MILITARY OCCUPATION AND DISARMAMENT OF JAPAN

The round table passed over the question of occupation of Japanese colonies to the more important question of the military occupation of Japan Proper. It was generally thought that the knock-out blow to Japan would come from the air and not from invasion of the Japanese islands. Therefore the occupation of Japan was a question to be approached from the view of its value in teaching Japan a lesson and in preventing the recurrence of Japanese aggression. While most agreed that prolonged military occupation of Japan was probably impossible from the point of view of our own people and that it would serve little purpose, there was some opinion in favor of temporary occupation of Tokyo by a United Nations force in which there would be units from all the countries of Asia. The purpose of this would be to convince the Japanese that all Asia was against them in the war and that their military leadership had made a political error in its policy. Even more important it would let troops from the adjacent areas see that Japan is not all-powerful and make it possible for them to return home and say that they themselves had in fact defeated and occupied Japan.

There was also discussion of the efficacy of a symbolic act such as the occupation or destruction of the Imperial Palace. After recalling the after-effects of the burning of the palace in Peking and of the White House in 1814, it was rejected as a bad suggestion. The idea of a labor corps of Japanese sent to China to rebuild what they have destroyed was rejected by the Chinese who said they preferred to do their own rebuilding. But most felt that the perpetrators of atrocities should be punished. Some doubt was expressed as to whether it would in fact be possible to fix responsibility so clearly that the Japanese people would also see the guilt and would not regard those who were punished as martyrs.

Another suggestion for getting new ideas into the Japanese mind was that for ten years after the war the United Nations should be given free

### *Military-Political Problems*

access to radio broadcasting in Japan. In analyzing Japanese psychology, which a Chinese member referred to as Paranoia Japonica—a compound of inferiority and superiority complex—it was said that we must knock Japan down hard, but it would be of little use to rub her nose in the dirt. We must make the Japanese hate war by beating them badly in the war, and love peace by treating them justly, if not kindly, in the peace.

Returning to the more technical military aspects of the question, the round table discussed the actual destruction of the present Japanese military power. The military experts agreed that no armistice should be signed, but that an unconditional surrender, covering all the troops in all the pockets of resistance all over the Pacific area, must be given. Under these conditions Japan would have to surrender its navy, most of which it was thought would be at the bottom of the sea by that time. Such surrender would completely disarm Japan for the moment.

The question of preventing the recurrence of Japanese aggression until such a time as it was a well-behaved member of international society led to a discussion of the technical practicability of various controls against rearmament. In regard to aircraft it was pointed out that, in contrast to the past, it was no longer so necessary to control commercial aircraft in order to control military. Today the divergence between commercial and military aircraft is very wide and it even takes considerable time to convert the manufacturing plants from commercial to military aviation. This means that the age of improvisation in aircraft is ended. In regard to the navy, although any shipyard that can build merchant ships can in time be converted to build warships, there again the gun turrets and other special devices which are manufactured separately, are all-important. In the control of armament industries, the suggestion of forbidding the import of certain machine tools was rejected on the technical ground that such tools are not sufficiently different from tools needed in other industries. Control of strategic raw materials seemed more feasible.

As to possible types of control, the question remains: even if they are possible, are they politic? Is it advisable to continue long-term discriminatory armament controls against the defeated nations? It was recalled that the victorious powers get tired of enforcing them; that, in point of fact, the interest in control and inspection is at its height when it is least necessary that is, right after the war. A second objection was that permanent humiliation arouses a strong reaction among the defeated peoples. Moreover, do we want to knock out industrial Japan or do we want it to

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

take part in world industry? The final argument raised against such permanent controls is that they are not enough: oil was the screw that we had on Japan but who was to decide to turn the screw?

Nevertheless, it was emphasized that even without discriminatory controls, Japan without its colonies and without its navy would actually be almost unable to rearm without full knowledge and in fact collusion on the part of other powers. Therefore, it was the general feeling that we should smash the Japanese during the war and that then because of their geographic position it would be safe to leave them to work out the lessons of their own defeat until they were themselves prepared to come back into the world community, as most members thought they ultimately must if we are to have a truly international system.

#### INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCES

Having more or less ruled out discriminatory long-term limitations on armaments for the defeated powers, the round table examined the military aspects of a collective system under which those controls which would exist would apply to all. The first topic discussed was air power as an instrument of international control. A British expert put forward a scheme based on the experience of the present war. He pointed out that there are now in England squadrons from many of the United Nations all cooperating together under British command. The same thing is true in Australia under American command. In an international air force, this expert, judging from present experience, did not believe that the personnel should be mixed within single squadrons, but rather that the squadrons should be raised in each of the countries. The air force would have to be located regionally and in each region one power would predominate, that is, its language would be used in operations. For instance, the United States would predominate in the force based on Hawaii. These international bases would be located all over the world and would be close enough together so that forces from one could reinforce those of another in a matter of hours.

The international air force would make regular shifts from one base to another all the time to become accustomed to different places, and so that the people of the world would be kept aware of the readiness of this force to go into action. The international air force, it was emphasized, must be "in being." It cannot be improvised when the crisis arises. With the air force there would be units of air-borne troops as well as some "naval vessels of sorts."

### *Military-Political Problems*

In the discussion that followed, it was pointed out that the value of this force is that it would be an ever-present warning to nations and would have a great psychological effect. When trouble brewed, the force could fly over on a "routine" flight. It was felt by American members that the idea of an international air force might appeal more to Americans than the idea of an international land force. Americans are willing to let their navy operate away from home and probably would have that feeling about the air force.

In the discussion of how the bases would be arranged, a Chinese delegate said that whether or not Formosa would be made available as a base depended not only on whether other nations were reciprocally lending bases, but also on the general international set-up which controlled the use of the international air force. China would want to be sure that there were no remnants of balance-of-power politics in the new international machinery. In reply to this, it was recalled that the Lytton Commission on Manchuria had considered an international force made up of the nationals of small nations. That might be a better way to start the force in order to meet possible fears of Great Power domination in the force.

Further discussion on the problem of bases brought out doubt as to whether the United States would be willing to internationalize its airports. It was recalled that the Americans were unwilling to open Hawaii for foreign commercial airlines in 1939. On the other hand one American reported that two years ago Pan-American Airways had, for business reasons, advocated changing the 1919 Paris Convention to give greater freedom of the air.

On the question of whether air power could act alone there was disagreement. An air expert felt that it would be the balance of power between national forces, but a naval expert felt that the operations would have to be amphibious. Regarding an international naval force, one naval expert felt that it was not very practical to internationalize the naval units. Bases are already in joint use and it is not difficult to get joint operations. In fact it has often been done before. However, there should be a prior plan of agreed action.

There should also be an understanding that the ports and naval bases are open to all. One American could see no reason why Pearl Harbor could not be open to all; it is not secret and, besides, we are assuming an international situation in which secrecy should not be necessary, it was said. He thought that there were adequate harbor facilities now and

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

doubted if money could be raised to build more. This expert envisaged a naval conference like the 1922 conference in which the relative sizes of the forces to be maintained by each would be determined. He thought that it would be primarily the smaller vessels which could be placed at the disposal of the international force—perhaps up to 10,000 ton cruisers. There would also be a coast guard for each nation for customs patrol, etc.

There was little discussion of land forces, although reference was made to the Culbertson plan.

Who would control these international forces? It was suggested that at the end of this war there will be only three great industrial powers—the United States, Great Britain and Russia. In the first year after the war it will be easy enough to handle the problem of the resurgence of our present enemies or even the minor wars and revolutions which are likely to follow war. But the long run problem of the international force is to prevent the rise of a new major aggressive power. The general feeling was that unless there is a concert of feeling and intention between Russia, Great Britain, the United States, and China there is no use in discussing an international police force, as it would not be able to achieve the major objective of preventing world-wide war which might be set off by the big powers.

#### AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

In considering the broad political basis of such security machinery, the round table was driven back to the point that no matter how good the mechanism, its success depends on the good will and the general atmosphere or attitude to international affairs that prevails. For this reason it seemed wise to consider how, in the very process of fighting the war, the United Nations could get the habits and attitudes of mind which would ensure the necessary atmosphere for successful collective security after the war.

It was therefore felt that we should start with the present United Nations set-up and go step by step towards improving this so that it could be projected into the post-war situation. It seemed vital that some permanent organization be constructed during the war because if there is something in existence at the end, the isolationists in the United States and other groups elsewhere will be confronted with the task of knocking it down rather than the infinitely easier task of just preventing anything new from being constructed.

### *Military-Political Problems*

How far under the compelling pressures of war have we built machinery with which the United Nations can carry on? At present we have the executive authority in the hands of two men—Churchill and Roosevelt. A Canadian said that the small nations are beginning to feel that an Anglo-American power complex has grown up since Pearl Harbor, on the basis of the idea that “we have the stuff and we are going to decide what to do with it.” Assuming that Churchill and Roosevelt want to reduce this Great Power complex, what steps are to be taken? The Pacific War Council is consultative in the sense that it is informed and when it raises questions the President assigns an American committee to look into the proposals. But the real problem remains: can there be wider representation in actual decision making? Without this it was feared by an Indian delegate that at the peace we would come back to what happened at Versailles where the Four-Power group made all the decisions for the whole world.

This led into a discussion of China's part in the United Nations as an example. It was recalled by a British delegate that Chinese suspicion of international collaboration really traced back to Versailles and it is now up to us to dispel this suspicion. An American explained that at present there is a general feeling that China is rated below the highest level in policy making. It is not a question of giving China a vote. It is a question of whether the other powers realize the full importance of the Asiatic theatre of war. It was remarked that before the Western powers got into the war it was conspicuous that American and British technical experts never studied what could be learned about war in China. (The first blitzkrieg occurred, it was said, in Jehol in 1933; the Chinese learned how to combat it, and did so in 1937.) Only the Germans and Russians learned. Further, although the United States and Great Britain have great interests in the Far East, one reason why they were caught so badly there was that they did not understand the elementary facts of the Far East. The problem of the participation of China in the United Nations cannot be solved by China's demanding more representation, it was said, but by the Western powers realizing that they have something to learn from China and being willing to learn it.

#### A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

Why is there reluctance to expand the United Nations machinery? The problem of secrecy in military matters does not apply at the level of policy making above that of military strategy. Suppose the thirty

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

United Nations were invited to a conference; what would they be asked to do? First of all, they themselves should decide what they should do. For the purposes of further discussion in the round table, it was agreed to put in concrete form two documents: first, a possible invitation which might be sent to all the United Nations, inviting them to meet together; second, a possible draft agenda for this first meeting of the United Nations.

A member of the round table undertook this task. The two documents are appended to this summary.<sup>1</sup> In the draft invitation the effort was made to bring out the reasons which led the round table to conclude that a meeting of the United Nations would be useful and in fact necessary. The draft agenda for this hypothetical United Nations Conference includes many of the points which, in the round tables at Mont Tremblant, it had been concluded should be taken up on a United Nations basis.

The Conference would set up various committees: for example, a Committee on Relief and Rehabilitation, with perhaps European and Far Eastern subcommittees; a Committee on Economic Questions, to discuss economic needs and potentials of the United Nations, maintenance of labor standards in international projects and in occupied territories, questions of shipping, etc.; a Finance Committee, to discuss currency problems in reoccupied territory or stabilization of exchange or United Nations efforts to prevent inflation in any one of the United Nations; a Political Committee, to take up problems of propaganda and war aims, censorship, clearance of information, use of radio, and, most important, permanent collaboration in the post-war period; a Military Committee, for liaison with the United Nations Chiefs of Staff; a General Committee, for other matters.

The following comments on these documents may clarify certain questions embodied in them.

*Time of the Conference.* While it was recognized that it might take some months to convene a conference of the United Nations under war conditions, it was the consensus that steps in that direction are needed now. While nothing should be done to slow the military conduct of the war, the winning of battles, it was remarked, will mean nothing if the political front is lost. The round table was reminded that in September 1941, a conference of many of the present United Nations was held in St. James' Palace to discuss the Atlantic Charter and it served as a demonstration of a general unity of purpose. (It was later pointed

---

<sup>1</sup> See below p. 98.

### *Military-Political Problems*

out that the Fighting French were at the St. James' Palace Conference, and the implication was that the Fighting French would be represented at the United Nations Conference under discussion.) While one American felt that to push the project at this time might slow up military operations, a Chinese thought it would speed them up. It seemed to many that the psychological moment had come when something must be done, regardless of military considerations, and few felt that it need interfere in any way with the military conduct of the war. One Canadian member said he felt it urgent to set this up now and urgent that we sell the idea to our peoples now. It would have helped in the province of Quebec, he said, if this had been done a year ago and it will help if it is done now.

*Powers of Representatives sent to the Conference.* It was stressed that the representatives must be of the highest calibre, holding high position in their governments, and that they must be accompanied by competent staffs. However, none of them would be in a position to commit their governments and all would have to refer back to their governments. Consequently, there is no problem about the delegation of power to these representatives.

*Relation of such a Conference Organization to the Military Conduct of the War.* In this two questions arise: first, the problem of the relation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the United Nations as a whole; second, the composition of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was unanimously agreed that the actual military decisions must be taken by a very small group. A town-meeting cannot run military strategy. Criticism of the present organization of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in this respect was that it has no organic relation to the effort of the United Nations as a whole. It would therefore be a real advantage, it was thought, to tie the Combined Chiefs of Staff in with other machinery of the United Nations, so that it would be the plenary agent of the United Nations as a whole. In this way the whole world would know that it is the United Nations which are running the war. One member thought there was a real advantage just in changing the name from Combined Chiefs of Staff to United Nations Chiefs of Staff. On the actual composition of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it was felt by most that it should, if possible, be extended to include Russia and China, not only for psychological reasons, but primarily because it was felt the two nations would have a real contribution to make. The difficulties were recognized. The Russians want to run their own front and the British and Americans think they

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

know best how to run theirs, but the view was expressed that at the present time there might be a favorable opportunity to try again to bring them together.

*Meaning of the Two Documents.* First, while the points on the draft agenda for the hypothetical conference were elaborated in detail, this was just by way of illustration and did not mean that the round table agreed on the exact formulation of any one detail or that the omission of one or more of the items might not be desirable. The document itself which is appended to this report then is to be regarded only as an instrument which the round table used to clarify and summarize its general discussion. As such, it would serve afterwards only as an *aide memoire* to illustrate the consensus of the discussion as to the military-political necessity for taking steps *now* for a more perfect union of the United Nations, both in order to win the war and to provide the avenue to a post-war world in which collective security can be a reality.

## A SUGGESTED METHOD OF BEGINNING NOW TO MOVE TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

### DOCUMENT I

*Points which might be made in a communication addressed to the heads of state of the thirty United Nations.*

1. Reference to the common effort and the common ideals expressed in the Atlantic Charter and in the declaration subscribed by all the United Nations and dated January 1, 1942.
2. Recognition of the fact that the United Nations are fighting one war and striving to establish one peace.
3. Acknowledgment of the obvious fact that no two of the United Nations have precisely identical interests or are able to make precisely identical contributions to the war effort.
4. Statement of the fact that this variation in interests and contributions is reflected in the various United Nations' organizations now functioning among the United Nations.
5. Statement of the fact that these various agencies, situated in London, Washington and elsewhere, have been created from time to time since September 1939, as the needs and opportunities of the moment have required and permitted, with their membership and also their number and nature changing as the roster of the United Nations has increased.
6. Assertion that the time seems to have arrived at which the United Nations should take common stock of the whole situation and realize in terms of the actual organization of their common effort the central spirit which animates them.

## *Military-Political Problems*

7. Invitation to each head of state to designate a responsible representative of the highest rank, with an appropriate staff, to attend "The First Conference of the United Nations," to be held in.....on the .....day of....., 1943.

### DOCUMENT II

#### *Points for a Draft Agenda for "The First Conference of the United Nations."*

- I. Organization of the Conference, election of officers, committees, etc.
- II. In plenary session, discussions of the permanent organization of the Conference as a body continuing during the war and growing into the peace.
  - A. Reference of details to subcommittees to consider:
    1. Composition of the Conference.
    2. Location of the Conference and its subordinate bodies.
    3. Secretariat.
    4. Regional and functional sections.
    5. Regional and functional affiliated boards and councils.
    6. With reference to 4 and 5 above, the use of existing bodies (e.g. Canadian-U.S. Defense Board, Pacific Council, Combined Shipping Allocation Board, Munitions Assignments Board, etc.
    7. Powers of the Conference.
    8. Method of voting.
    9. Admission of new members.
    10. Discussion on carrying over into post-war world.
- III. Assignment of tasks to committees of the Conference, as follows:
  - A. *Military Committee*
    1. Discussion of general strategical considerations.
    2. Liaison with United Nations Chiefs of Staff.
    3. Questions of unified command of the United Nations forces in various areas.
      - a. Military considerations
      - b. Political or psychological considerations.
    4. Liaison with other committees of the Conference relative to supplies and transport, etc.
    5. Delimitation of problems for which the consideration of the entire committee is desired, and those in which predominantly regional interests appear and therefore consideration by regional committees is appropriate, subject to submission to the approval by the United Nations Conference in plenary session.
  - B. *Economic Committee*
    1. Economic needs of each of the United Nations.
    2. Economic potentials of each of the United Nations.
    3. Liaison with Military Committee in regard to priorities.
    4. Problem of supply of equipment and international movement of labor for construction of military and strategic roads, etc.

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

5. Maintenance of approved labor standards on international projects, including the use by United Nations military forces of labor in liberated territories.
6. Transport problems by sea, land, and air.

#### *C. Financial Committee*

1. Establishment of international organization for the coordination of finances of the United Nations war effort.
2. Problems of exchange stabilization.
3. Currency problems in occupied or liberated territories.
4. Common means to be taken to avoid burdensome inflation within any of the United Nations.

#### *D. Political Committee*

1. Consideration of problems of general interest, e.g.,
  - a. Propaganda and war aims.
    - (i) Punishment of war criminals.
    - (ii) Demilitarization of Axis nations, etc.
  - b. Mutual clearance of information.
  - c. Censorship.
  - d. Facilities to ensure the use by the United Nations of radio and cable facilities.
2. Appointments of subcommittees, e.g.,
  - a. Committee on Permanent Collaboration to discuss questions referred by plenary session, (*supra* II. A.).
  - b. Regional committees.
    - (i) Pacific.
    - (ii) European and Mediterranean.
    - (iii) Inter-American, etc.
  - c. Committee on Relief and Rehabilitation.
    - (i) European subcommittee.
    - (ii) Pacific subcommittee.

## ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

In the following brief summary most of the more technical economic problems considered in the round table have been omitted. The technicalities were in fact a sign that there has already emerged a considerable measure of agreement as to the kinds of international economic institutions that need to be set up. The round table did not discuss the need for an international authority to re-create workable monetary systems and stable exchanges. The members rather discussed the technical methods of operating such an authority. In the same way they did not dispute the necessity of an expanding volume of international trade, but talked of the difficulties likely to be encountered and the best methods of overcoming those difficulties. They discussed how commodity control schemes could be worked, whether they involved production controls or could be operated on the buffer stock principle, with buying and selling prices operating as the gold points operated under the gold standard. Above all they recognized the need of capital provision for reconstruction and for economic development to provide improved living standards in industrially backward countries. How such capital should be provided, the priorities and principles on which it should be allocated, the place of private capital investment and the method of organizing public capital investment were all discussed.

One member used the word *exegesis* in referring to the Atlantic Charter. He was told that it was a theological word to which he replied that the Atlantic Charter was a theological document in great need of *exegesis*—an expression of faith and purpose needing definition and implementation! The round table started, therefore, with a general discussion of Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement as the most binding commitment by the two senior partners of the United Nations, a commitment now shared by many but not all of the other partners. The opening words in the round table were to the effect that this commitment was to joint action aimed at getting a world economic system going again, getting it going smoothly, fully and dynamically in the sense of affording opportunities for change and growth. At a later stage in the discussion, the laymen in the round table expressed some doubts about this basic assumption. They wanted to be reassured that the United States and the United Kingdom really intended to carry out their commitment. The members from small countries who were vocal on this point wanted assurances first of political security and then of economic stability. Each of these has faced the danger of isolation without adequate military resources. China's present situation was pointed out; but every other

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

Pacific country has its Burma Road and its lifeline that may be cut by a sudden attack. This is a most important factor at present in considering future economic policy. Never again do they want to be caught without the tools of war or the means of obtaining them quickly in an emergency. If they cannot rely upon precise and adequate guarantees of collective security, they will try to reshape their economies so as to ensure their own security no matter at what cost. Some of them will in any case plan for a minimum of the industrial development needed for this purpose. In the same way they contemplate with anxiety the prospect of specializing upon export products that may not be absorbed by the world market or may suffer from violent fluctuations in that market. They want assurances, even guarantees, that they can rely upon stable and adequate outlets if they continue to specialize. If they cannot get such assurances there will be strong pressure upon them to pursue self-sufficient policies and to aim at the best living standards they can secure by diversified production within their own boundaries.

They failed to get such assurances. This was partly because no individual, no American in particular, felt able to say what the future policy is likely to be in the United States. There was an American view that security is important to the United States also and that far-reaching action may be taken on the ground that this is the only means of preventing a repetition of war in every generation. On the economic side, generous action may be taken for relief and for reconstruction in Pacific and other countries, not only on humanitarian grounds but also because it will be effective in maintaining prosperity within the United States. There is strong support in the United States for the view that such action, helping other countries to restore their prosperity and creating international machinery for this purpose, would not in fact cost the United States anything since the alternative might be destructive depression. But the warning was issued that the people of the United States, as distinct from the Administration, had not made up their minds on the domestic aspects of this question and it would not be safe for the other countries to rely upon the decision being such as to lead to the desired international action.

There was another category of doubt and reservation concerning not so much the objectives as the means that have been proposed to achieve them. Most economists in fact were agreed upon the broad objective of an expanding world economy, which they visualize as a series of expanding national economies linked together by flexible institutions of international collaboration. They supported without reservation the moving

### *Economic Problems*

plea of an Indian member for recognition of the fact that the only real alternative to an effective system of world order in both the political and economic spheres is immediate preparation for bigger and better wars in the near future. This is so obvious to economists that they are not interested in regional economic organization but start from the assumption that world organization is inevitable if peace is to be maintained and prosperity is to be achieved. If the political problems can be solved the economists are confident that the economic problems, complex and difficult as they may be, can be solved too.

There is real difference of emphasis between those who place most stress upon the prime necessity of setting up a workable system of freer trade and exchange stability and those who, on the other hand, feel that more direct and positive action is needed in the forms of international lending, commodity control schemes and planned development. All agree that a combination is needed of both types of action, but the importance attached to one or the other varies with the temperament of individuals. This, however, is mainly a divergence on long run principles. On the immediate future, the complicated and difficult transition period in which an effort must be made to cope with urgent emergencies and situations of profound disequilibrium, there is unanimous agreement that control must be exercised by governments to maintain liquid credit conditions, to provide the means of capital development in areas of scarcity, to control the distribution of essential commodities and prevent the disastrous sequence of uncontrolled inflation or deflation. Given the necessary political machinery and the will to operate it, the means can be found to achieve these economic purposes. This point was made about the inflation in China, which enabled a Chinese member to make a neat distinction between China's lack of political machinery and the United Nations' lack of political will to reopen the Burma Road, without which action China's inflation can hardly be checked.

A more important point was raised by an Indian member who pointed out that India is not yet a part to the agreement which contains Article VII and that her hesitation rests upon doubts concerning the phrase "reduction of tariffs." This does not mean that India, and China also, are not fully in accord with the general desire for expanding trade and an interdependent world economy. It does mean that they have no desire, or intention, to assist in restoring the system of international specialization built up by European initiative in the nineteenth century.

A brief discussion on capital investment illustrated this point and indicated also that a new point of view was emerging in regard to eco-

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

nomic organization. The virtues of direct investment had been cited. It was pointed out, however, that no matter how flexible and useful such investment was from the point of view of foreign investors and the balance of payment, it was made primarily for purposes of trade rather than for domestic consumption. It did not train local craftsmen and managers in the new technical methods of industry. Rather it created a network of foreign interests—production, shipping, insurance, banking, trading—in great centers like Shanghai, Singapore and Calcutta. While this matter was not fully discussed, it is clear that it is a basic issue of policy, of which more will be heard.

It seemed obvious, therefore, that whatever institutions might be projected for the regulation of economic relations in the world after the war, they must be dynamic in the sense of providing for economic change and growth. New institutions were needed not only for exchange stabilization and for capital distribution, but also for the coordination of national economic policies. But it was also clear to many at the round table that such policies need to aim at the rapid equipment of Pacific countries on a scale and at a pace that is not likely to be achieved merely by the familiar processes of freer trade and private investment. Great political and social forces are fermenting in such countries as India and China. They may not be contained easily in the old bottles of economic arrangements conceived in the spirit of the free trading and private enterprise system. It is not easy to foresee what form the new economic nationalism will take. It could be restrictive. It could, however, be a series of bold national policies of direct attack upon basic deficiencies—transport, agricultural improvement, credit organization, industrialization—policies entered upon by the national governments with the support and encouragement of the older industrial countries, and as part of a vigorous international effort to promote efficiency and interdependence in an expanding world. The older industrial countries have much to offer besides material help, particularly in their longer experience of technical training and organization. They have also much to gain in prosperous new markets. The newly industrializing countries are ready to accept the lessons of their experience and to cooperate with them in material ways. But they do not want to be poor relations in a world organized by Western initiative upon a relief basis, a kind of international "food-stamp" plan. In the last analysis, therefore, the economic discussions, like all the others, came down to the necessity of organizing such international machinery as will give all peoples their due share of responsibility for designing and building the new world.

## SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS

This round table devoted itself to the broad and diversified problems—and these are legion—relating to the social well-being, the good life, of the peoples of the Pacific. A preliminary canvas of opinion suggested that there were rather sharp divergences as to both diagnosis and prognosis. It is often no simple task to discover what it is that a suffering community suffers from and why. Our diagnosis showed that the great pestilence of the Far East is poverty, and that this claims its heavy toll of both the freedom and the spiritual welfare of the peoples of the Pacific.

The initial views on prognosis ranged from the narrow concept of a mild *laissez-faire*, justified in the dangers implicit in attempting to meddle over much in a people's internal affairs, to the concept of a new world order in which every man would enjoy one if not two quarts of milk per day, whether he likes milk or not; though if some, as the Burmese, foolishly prefer their milk condensed in cans, they might have it. Extreme views were never pressed to extremity, however, and there was a quick meeting of minds on major problems, on basic necessities, and in a more general way, on methods of approaching them.

### STANDARDS OF LIVING

It was mainly within the framework of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Atlantic Charter that the discussions developed—the one referring to improved labor standards and economic security, the other to freedom from fear and want. Many of the participants accepted the view expressed by a Canadian member at the outset: that the common people of the world regard the war as something more than a war—as a great upheaval out of which will come something much better than they have been accustomed to. People everywhere are groping for a new and better way of life. The basic problem for all of the people of the East is food. It was understood, of course, that differences of geography, customs and economies would render futile any effort to state minimum standards of living of universal application, though perhaps comparable standards can be applied. An American member emphasized that in the final analysis planes of living can be appraised only in terms of the material and spiritual satisfactions which people derive from them. But in any case, it was accepted that people have a right to their own way of life, and no assistance from outside should take any form other than that designed to aid a people in the improvement of their living standards within the cultural molds they have chosen and desire to retain or to achieve.

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

Two basic principles were early accepted: (1) All of the peoples of the Pacific have a fundamental right to a minimum standard of living, involving adequate food, housing, clothing, health protection, and education, to be appraised with due regard to local customs: (2) depressed groups should have the opportunity to gain freedom from debt.

An English member pointed out that improvements in standards of living are intimately related to freedom, education, tolerance, training for civic and political ends, and economic change. An American participant cautioned that in each of the countries of the Pacific attention must be given to the demands of organized groups, such as the workers; what is being demanded and organized for by groups of people in the areas is more important than what some benevolent people in the world outside may think desirable, for if these demands go unrecognized while people continue to suffer, there will be the threat of violent social upheaval.

With these considerations in mind, a subcommittee of four members, one each from the United Kingdom, the United States, India and Canada, drew up the following statement of basic principles expressing the considered opinion of the table.

“With a view to the good life of all individuals and communities, it is necessary to establish minimum standards of material existence, health and living. The following requirements are fundamental: (1) freedom from want, malnutrition and disease, involving the adoption of minimum standards for physical well-being; (2) freedom for social and cultural development; (3) freedom of association. In the application of these essentials some regard must be had for the difference among peoples in culture and social and ethnic life.”

Considerable emphasis was put on the objective of raising the standard of living in the village communities of most of the Pacific countries. A second emphasis was directed to the fundamental principle of building self-reliance in a people, and giving them an opportunity, as far as possible, to achieve their own advance by their own efforts and in their own way. Aid for them should not come in the form of a benevolence. By stressing the promotion of education, trade unions, cooperatives and other free associations, most of the peoples of the Pacific can underwrite their own development. It was recognized that in India the caste system is a considerable factor in maintaining conditions of poverty among a large part of the population, but the delicacy of the problem and the impracticability of tackling it from the outside were fully realized.

## *Social and Demographic Problems*

### POPULATION PRESSURE

The discussions on population problems brought out the deplorable inadequacy of population data for most areas of the Pacific. There is, in general, a lack of the essential information on which social reforms can be projected and executed. Factors of food supply, standards of living and the control of land were held directly relevant to the population problem.

It was quite generally felt that external migration and internal relocation offer no great hope for the solution of the pressing population problems of the East, owing to such factors as: (1) the reluctance of peoples to move; (2) the unavailability of a sufficient surplus of cultivable land; (3) the great expense of mass migrations; (4) the tendency of the birth-rate to rise quickly after the migrant population settles down in the new area; (5) land control and unfavorable leasing conditions; (6) the prevalence of malaria in the uplands of several Southwest Pacific areas; (7) and last, but by no means least, immigration restrictions in the Western world as well as between countries and territories in the Pacific itself.

The members of the round table were reminded that Hitler had tried to deceive people with misleading ratios of population to land. The ratios that count are ratios of population to land actually under cultivation or ascertained to be cultivable, and it was noted that in such places as China and the Netherlands Indies there are vast areas of unused but uncultivable land. There is a pressing need for scientific surveys of the uncultivated land of the Pacific countries, particularly those in the Southwest Pacific, to ascertain any possible uses to which they may be put.

Contraceptives were not considered likely to have much practical effect in controlling the birth-rates of the populations of the East because of both the expense and the traditional pride of family. The members seemed generally agreed that an increase in the standard of living among such peoples would be the most effective restraint on the birth rate.

### CHINESE EMIGRATION

A representative of the United Kingdom considered the Chinese population problem one of the most acute in the world because here is found an expanding population associated with a strong national government. One of the Chinese participants pointed out that the Chinese population problem springs from mal-distribution and lack

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

of scientific cultivation, especially soil fertilization. There are three chief means of controlling China's population problem: (1) more scientific cultivation; (2) increase in the standard of living; (3) better internal distribution by relocation.

There appeared to be general agreement that it is not possible to improve materially the standards of living in the congested areas of the Pacific under existing conditions, that is, without first improving productivity.

The thorny problem of the immigration of Asiatic peoples was cast about like a hot potato, with most attention being devoted to Chinese emigration—both to the nearby countries and also to Australia and the Occident—and Indian emigration to Burma. There were suggestions that for reasons either of cultural characteristics or political attachment the Chinese have often remained unassimilated. Both of these views were vigorously denied. Where Chinese immigrants come to the Western Pacific, as, for example, Malaya, or Indians to Burma, it was alleged that the indigenous peoples find it difficult to compete and are deprived of an opportunity to advance on their own.

The point was made that there is a tendency among nations with restrictive immigration laws to think of Oriental immigration in out-moded terms. Past experiences, it was said, are no longer applicable; and Chinese mass migrations to foreign lands are no longer likely to take place.

The political implications in the policies of racial discrimination came in for comment; such policies store up suspicion and hostility and put difficult obstacles in the way of the settlement of weightier problems. While fully aware of the political delicacy of the question in Western countries, as in Australia and New Zealand, it was advanced as the desirable objective that: (1) Oriental peoples should everywhere be admitted on the same basis as other peoples; (2) there should be no discrimination against residents of Chinese origin once they have been admitted.

Other principles and proposals enunciated were as follows:

(1) It was affirmed with some authority by a Chinese speaker that the Chinese themselves would want to see more intellectuals and business men and fewer laundrymen and small shopkeepers among their compatriots in the countries of the Western world.

(2) The moving force of Chinese migration, especially to the Western Pacific, is an economic and not a political one.

### *Social and Demographic Problems*

(3) There is need for an international authority to regulate dual and triple nationality—even though in practice the occurrence of multiple citizenship presents few international problems.

(4) The Pacific governments concerned might agree not to use their nationals in other countries for political ends.

(5) There is a special need for the re-examination of the educational system in those states and colonies where large groups of aliens remain unassimilated.

(6) Any suggestion that the Chinese are unassimilable is open to vigorous challenge if conditions are made congenial for them.

#### NARCOTICS

Though time did not permit any extended or detailed discussion of the narcotics problem of the Orient, China's efforts to eradicate the evil were commended. There was no dissent to the view that traffic in opium could be stamped out completely if nations of the Pacific sincerely desired to end the evil and engaged in concerted action toward that end. It was thought that the immediate post-war period should afford an opportune moment for such effort. It was also thought that the new possibilities of inspection from the air, as a means of ferreting out hidden poppy fields, will in the future make easier the task of checking on the illegal production of opium.

#### INDUSTRIALIZATION

In an attempt to evaluate various kinds of industrial development as solutions for the population and poverty problems of the East, considerable emphasis was given to the distinction between industry for the production of export goods on the one hand and of goods for domestic consumption on the other.

In order to discover what lessons there might be for the peoples of the Pacific in the industrial development of Japan, a member of the United Kingdom delegation with special knowledge of the matter was invited to elucidate this subject. It was held that the industrial development of Japan over the past thirty years had in fact raised the material standard of living of Japanese engaged in both industry and agriculture. At the same time, however, the rapidity of this industrial development produced a disequilibrium between agriculture and industry, either from too great a concentration on heavy industry or the inability of Japanese agriculture to adjust itself to new conditions. Thinking in terms of the standard of living of the people, the post-war task of Japan will be to switch from heavy industry, and to some extent, perhaps, from production

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

for export, to domestic-consumer production. The Japanese consumer in recent years has been living in a virtual pre-industrial stage owing to the unavailability of manufactured consumer goods from any source.

The Japanese experience with industrial decentralization as distinct from small village crafts was not favorable. While in the latter the people worked only in their spare time, they often worked half the night in the machine industries which had become a far more important source of family income—and this really was a form of sweating.

The general view seemed to be that the industrialization of a national economy is of value in that it provides an opportunity for raising the standard of living; but the degree to which that standard will rise will depend in large measure on the degree to which the product of industry which is not exported is devoted to improving the quality of consumption at home. In other words, industrialization of the Pacific areas can be a useful instrument of raising the level of living only if properly controlled. It was also pointed out by an American member that the introduction of industry tends to destroy the twin evils of agricultural countries—landlordism and usury—by offering competition to the monopoly of land and opportunity to labor, and thus weakening the hold of the landlord through the creation of economic alternatives to high rents and low wages.

It was felt that the promotion of village industries for local needs should be a deliberate policy of state, but only under strict controls, as there have been flagrant instances of sweating and exploitation by middlemen in the past.

It was clear that India and China intend to embark on a program of developing heavy industry as a means of security, as a basis for other progress in manufacturing, and to improve the incomes and living standards of the people. A Chinese assured the group that the need for more industry is understood universally in China today as a matter of national survival. China, it was suggested, with present living standards, could have a far greater population in the next fifty years; this vast reservoir of cheap labor would constitute a danger not only to China itself but to the world at large.

China will begin almost from the ground up in her industrial development. Raw products will be processed in China for Chinese consumption and for export, and industry will be diffused. But at best China will be able to devote less than one half of her man-power resources to industry. Chinese agriculture, too, will to some extent be industrialized,

### *Social and Demographic Problems*

but will not be able to follow the Russian program of agricultural mass production. Great emphasis will be placed on the development of transportation. The dual objective in all these plans will be national defense and improved standards of living.

#### LABOR ORGANIZATION

The development of industry in the Pacific countries will inevitably be accompanied by an invigorated labor organization. While some members saw in this a danger of new social difficulties and conflicts, the consensus was that it is not for outsiders to say what forms of organization are desirable for the people. They must have the opportunity to give expression to their own will. One of the most effective media for this is the labor union. In this connection attention was directed to the significant efforts of Labor Departments in the British colonies to encourage the development of trade unions among certain classes of native workers.

A United Kingdom member urged that for the protection of labor standards in certain colonial areas which provide important raw materials and food stuffs to the world, all international schemes regulating the output and price levels of specific commodities should be integrated in the world economic organization which in any case would have to be created by an international authority. International agreements governing wage standards, working conditions and social services should be integral parts of such commodity control schemes. Likewise, adequate steps should be taken to protect the prices paid to primary producers with safeguards against the disasters which have so frequently overtaken them at times of world depression.

An Australian member stated it as a broad principle that wherever people are engaged in wage labor the government must assist and protect the rise of union organization as the only effective means of self protection for wage-earners. Cooperation between government and trade unions also can in some circumstances be a most effective form of control over production, as well as a force in the promotion of that world unity of labor essential to a successful fight against fascism.

A country by country roll-call indicated clearly that throughout the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand excepted, labor organization is in its swaddling clothes, and in some large areas, notably China, free association of workers is virtually unknown. A representative of the International Labor Office suggested that one of the great handicaps

### *Topical Round Table Summaries*

in the organization of labor in the Orient is the lack of true labor leadership. Much of the present leadership is from above rather than from the rank and file. Labor leaders springing up from the working class itself not only strengthen the labor movement but provide able political leadership for peoples on the road to self-government.

It was noted in passing that, partly through the work of the I.L.O., one of the worst restraints on labor freedom in the Pacific region had been practically eliminated by the substitution, except in New Guinea, of free labor contracts for contracts with penal sanctions.

---

#### EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

The discussion on education was projected on the issue of relative emphasis on Western or Eastern forms. There was wide recognition of the value to the world in the retention of Oriental cultures and of the danger of their bastardization by the imposition of Western educational techniques and philosophies. There was a prevailing sentiment that there should be a two-way cultural traffic, a real interchange of cultures as between East and West. An English member stressed the importance of educating adults as well as children for life in the community, and the vital need for diminution of mass illiteracy as a prerequisite to self-reliance. If the peoples of the Pacific are to be armed with the instruments for advance—political institutions, labor associations, cooperative forms of enterprise—they must know how to use them effectively in behalf of their own welfare.

Judging from the response he received, the New Zealand representative sounded the keynote of the sessions of this round table when he stated that any nation's willingness to progress can be measured by the extent to which adequate protection and adequate provisions for growth and development are afforded the young, the old, and the infirm; by the extent to which the nation is willing to permit merit and ability to find its own level; by its attention to methods of insuring equal educational opportunities for all, irrespective of ethnic or status considerations; by the extent to which it underwrites social security, medical care and full and free opportunity for workers to associate in unions. The real test of any colonial power's sincerity of intention to administer colonial areas with a view toward self-government may be similarly measured by the extent to which provision is made for like guarantees for its colonial population.

This round table had no doubt concerning American public opinion

### *Social and Demographic Problems*

and the question of American participation in a concerted Pacific or international plan of action. Implicit in all the discussion was the concept of an international authority, either regional or global, or both. There was a realization that the problems considered are not the exclusive problems of any one nation, area or people, but are interrelated, and require for their solution joint actions of the nations of the Pacific as well as the actions of individual governments and peoples.

The round table was little concerned with any of the more spectacular proposals for world government and policing. The members confined themselves to the mundane but non-the-less vital problems of the everyday life of the peoples of the Pacific—a life that will go on, it was hoped, on a much higher material level. The round table envisioned no perpetual feast for the peoples of the Far East; but there was a unanimous and humane recognition of the basic right of all people to a decent and dignified existence—a right which some of them have never realized. The continued denial of this existence to them would eventually have not merely dangerous political consequences but even material implications of a most serious nature.

Schemes of international organization, regional or global, devices for policing the world, new methods of economic association—these are all means and not ends. They are useful instruments only if those who employ them never lose sight of the real objective: the realization of the hopes if not the clamorous demands of the vast millions who struggle tragically to eke out a meager existence. The real objective must always be the good life for all of the people. International machinery will mean something to the common man in the Orient, as indeed to the common man throughout the world, only when it is translated into terms that he can understand—peace, bread, a house, adequate clothing, education, good health, and above all, the right to walk with dignity on the world's great boulevards.



*PART IV.*

SOME CONCLUDING STATEMENTS

## FINAL PLENARY SESSIONS

Having heard and discussed the rapporteurs' reports of the "topical" round tables, the conference met in plenary session to consider a group of eight special proposals for further study. These were in no sense intended as resolutions of the conference or even as summarizing all the points on which there seemed to be most general agreement in the round tables. They were described as a series of practical steps which, if intelligently directed, might make a useful contribution in spheres of mutual interest to all the conference members. It was stressed that the propositions were not to be considered as a complete and exclusive statement of the whole duty of the members. They omitted some of the most important subjects discussed in the round tables, such as the construction of a new world order, agreement upon essential international programs in the field of finance and economics, and the development of policies leading to a social basis which would make the "good life" a practical possibility.

It was urged that the consideration of these and similar subjects should be a basic responsibility of members when they returned home. The eight propositions, however, were mostly matters of specific and limited importance chosen because of the substantial agreement behind them and because of the belief that it might be possible to contribute in this way to an improvement in United Nations' collaboration which is essential for the successful prosecution of the war and for a more hopeful approach to the problems of peace.

Each of the propositions was separately presented and discussed in plenary session. They are not reproduced here in their original wording or order of presentation, but they dealt with the following needs: (1) studying methods of improving the joint conduct of the war by admitting China to fuller participation in the higher councils of the war, particularly at the policy-making level; (2) further study of the suggestions advanced in the India round table for resolving the political deadlock in India; (3) promptly initiating studies of the international rivalries in air transport and possible methods of cooperation; (4) further study of the treatment in Canada and the United States of persons of Japanese racial origin; (5) studying ways of modifying discriminatory immigration practices based on ethnic grounds, especially in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; (6) securing further consideration, in the countries concerned, of the "synthesis of views" appended to the report of the Southeast Asia round table (p. 54 above);

### *Some Concluding Statements*

(7) studying ways by which the United Kingdom might make an appropriate declaration which would dispel existing uncertainties (whether justified or not) in some countries concerning its acceptance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter in all its terms and in relation to all areas. The eighth point, which was added later, stressed the importance of bringing home to public opinion in the United States the full implications of the Atlantic Charter and of American active participation in cooperative international arrangements for assuring the security of all nations.

In the ensuing discussions a lively debate arose over the seventh point dealing with the attitude of the United Kingdom to specific applications of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The following selected passages from statements made from the floor are fairly representative of differing points of view expressed, and they exemplify a recurrent theme which ran through all the conference discussions.

#### *A New Zealand Member*

I thought when we came to this conference that we started off with the acceptance of the Atlantic Charter, not that we had to consider whether we would accept it or not. It may be that there was no legislation written in the statutes of the two countries concerned regarding the Atlantic Charter but I am certain that the world understood that the objectives of this war were written into the Charter and that the United Kingdom and the United States were committed to it. If they are not committed, then the Charter is plain humbug. If we are not fighting for its principles, then I question whether our fighting can be even 60 per cent effective.

There is not the correct feeling between the United States and some other countries and the United Kingdom that there ought to be. From my own experience I am certain that the war effort of the United Kingdom is not as completely known as it should be in the United States. It is one of the faults of the United Kingdom to go on with a job and not to let anyone know about it. I have found that there is more being done in the United Kingdom in working out plans to apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter than in any other place that I know. It is true that one of the two men who signed the Atlantic Charter did suggest that we ought to think about the war and forget for the time being the post-war period because it might promote differences. This created a major doubt not only in the minds of the people of the

### *Final Plenary Sessions*

United States, where some people try to foster differences between the United Kingdom and the United States, but also in many other countries. With a little knowledge of the public opinion in the United Kingdom and with a greater knowledge of what is being done there, I know there is a pressure in the United Kingdom for the principles of the Atlantic Charter so great that it will sweep out of the road anyone who tries to stop their application.

There is something more. Unless you do apply these principles—not only those in the Atlantic Charter, but also those in that other statement on the Four Freedoms, and unless there is an emphasis that the principles of the Atlantic Charter are to be applied in particular, not merely in general, then we shall create more troubles in the post-war period than we have ever had during the war. There is no hope for the world unless this is a United Nations war, not just a United Kingdom-United States war. These two countries have no right to dominate the world. There are no superior people in the world. We must give all the people a chance.

#### *A British Member*

There ought to be no doubt whatever that the United States of America and the United Kingdom both fully and without reserve accept the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Yet I confess it came as rather an unwelcome surprise when in the last two round tables here we were told that the Atlantic Charter had been signed by the President of the United States, but that it was by no means certain it would be confirmed by the Congress. That came as a shock to us. We thought that there would be no doubt whatever in view of the character and sentiments of the American people that the Atlantic Charter would be endorsed and carried out by them in letter and in spirit. I think perhaps what some of them had in mind was not so much the clauses of the Atlantic Charter which refer to the granting of self-determination to all peoples as those clauses which refer to the absence of discrimination and the freedom of trade and the like. It would be a great comfort to those of us who have come from the United Kingdom if we could feel that there would be no doubt whatever that the United States does affirm the Charter and will carry its principles out. I seek the support of that proposition from any citizen of the United States here. There is no doubt whatever in the minds of us who have come from the United Kingdom that the British public has accepted the Atlantic Charter and

### *Some Concluding Statements*

intends to carry it out. I know that doubts have arisen in regard to certain reservations which have been made. I think that Mr. Churchill was perfectly genuine in stating that the original intention was that it would apply to those nations overrun by the Axis which already had been fully independent and to which it was necessary to restore independence. When asked how far it applied also to India, his answer was that the long course of constitutional adjustment on which we were now engaged in India was in itself a guarantee that we accepted the principles of the Atlantic Charter. I think if Mr. Churchill had not been the downright man he is, he might very well have said, "Of course, we accept the principles of the Atlantic Charter as regards India and we are determined that India shall have the fullest power of self-determination." If he had not said it then, he could certainly have said it after the Cripps Mission to India. To my mind there is no doubt whatever that the Cripps Mission took to India the absolute promise of self-determination and I would go further and say that if by any chance there should be anyone in a dominant position in British politics who tried to go back on the promise given to India, even if it were Mr. Churchill himself, he would lose his position. I do not believe there is anyone in Great Britain who would want to go back on that declaration.

Then came the question as to how far the Atlantic Charter—I am referring to Clause 3—applied to the colonies. Here there was a real difficulty. Mr. Churchill might very well have said, "It does apply but it takes time to carry it out." You cannot apply self-determination to people who are not qualified in any of the principles of government. After all, that clause as applied to dependent peoples could not rationally mean immediate liberation. It meant that they are to be given the power of self-determination as soon as they arrive at a stage at which they can themselves set up a form of government which is consistent with modern ideas of civilization. It is not logical to suppose for instance that the Atlantic Charter would immediately restore the rule of the peoples of the Malay Peninsula to the Malay sultans. Therefore there was that slight, not unreasonable, hesitation, in trying to avoid the suggestion that the Atlantic Charter meant the immediate and unconditional return of the dependent areas to their former rulers. But that the *spirit* of the Charter applies there I have no doubt whatever. This is proved by the steady development of self-governing institutions in which we have engaged through many long years in our colonial policy, a course which has already given many of the colonies what amounts to independence

### *Final Plenary Sessions*

and self-government or a very near approach to it. This is the most practical argument of our intention in that respect. With the principles of equality and with the idea we must do everything in our power to foster these self-governing institutions and give them a more vital reality, I also agree. I have no hesitation, nor is there any on the part of the British people, that we should do everything to quicken this process. So far as the British people are concerned there is no desire to go back to what in the old days was called imperialism. We have in truth quite a new conception of imperialism in Great Britain. It is a pity we still have to use that word but we must now give it a new meaning. If we can express in any way the present spirit of the British toward their dependencies, it is certainly not in the old terms of domination or of acquisition. We feel not without justice that we have been fortunate in the world and that we have given much. We also feel, and with confidence, that we still have much to give.

#### *A Canadian Member*

I support the point of view just put forward by the New Zealand member because I live in one of the smaller nations, the Dominion of Canada. I have felt disappointed that we have not come to grips with what I believe to be the fundamental problems that face both this conference and the world. First, I think the attitude of the British members has been that of somewhat complacent acceptance of the position that certain measures of progress towards implementing the Atlantic Charter would proceed at a leisurely pace. My second disappointment was with the American group. At least some members of the American delegation, while criticising the British position, seem to be unable to give any assurance that the principles of the Atlantic Charter would be approved by public opinion in the United States. I believe that today the men and women who are engaged in the prosecution of this war, particularly the younger men who are actually doing the fighting on various fronts, are not fighting for any leisurely development of the world towards a better order but are hoping that this war itself will bring about a better and a fairer outlook for all mankind.

I believe that the Chinese for the last five years have been putting up a heroic resistance against the forces of aggression on our behalf and that we have not yet fully recognized the part that they are playing. I recognize also that the Russian people are fighting not for the restoration throughout the world of any power but because they believe that

### *Some Concluding Statements*

they are engaged in the liberation of mankind from a great menace. I think that the small nations have a duty to perform. We in Canada cannot look with any equanimity upon what we term a British-American agreement to dominate or to set up a new form of imperialism, which some are afraid may develop. I am of the opinion that in all these disputes as to the amount of self-government to be given the dependent nations, the powers to whom the dependencies belong should not be the sole arbiters of what should be done. It is not enough to say that Great Britain is following out a well-defined policy established some years ago. The world ought to have the assurance that these backward peoples are not solely Britain's responsibility; they should not be the sole responsibility of any one nation, but should be placed under some form of international authority or international leadership.

Senator Pepper's statement has been quoted that when he heard Mr. Churchill's Mansion House speech it sent a chill through him as it did through many other people. If you recall, Senator Pepper said, "How can I whisper into the ear of the young men we have sent overseas that after all they are fighting for the restoration of the British Empire?" May I suggest, however, that Senator Pepper might also have made one other comment. He might also have wondered how an American boy would have received the whisper that his own country had not yet made up its mind as to what it would do about the principles of the Atlantic Charter. I urge that when we go back to our respective countries, each one of us individually and without stint should try to mold public opinion. I think that we as individuals should accept that responsibility. I am certain, as has been said here, that the British people would sweep from office any government which failed to keep its promise in relation to the Atlantic Charter and I am certain that if the present governments fail to give liberation to the common people of the world, the people will demand other leadership.

### *An American Member*

I want to address myself particularly to this challenge which has been addressed to the Americans. Many of us came here with a vivid memory of misunderstanding in many countries at the time when Woodrow Wilson went to Paris. We had had an election and this had had a very clear meaning, a meaning which certain of the other countries represented in Paris apparently chose to overlook. At any rate they did not understand it; perhaps there were not the right channels through which

### *Final Plenary Sessions*

to make it known to them. Woodrow Wilson did not speak for the American people when he went to Paris and there had been a clear signal that this was so. Yet for many years after that Americans had to hear the charge that somehow the United States had broken faith with the nations which met at Paris. We came here not able to tell you with certainty what the American people feel about the Atlantic Charter. We have been bending over backwards trying to make you stop and think and not commit ourselves because we do not again wish to be placed in the position in which we seemed to be after Versailles. If you ask us what we are fighting the war for, I say *it is in order to keep our country just like that, that no one will be able to commit the American people to anything!* That is a most precious thing to us and it is implied in the Atlantic Charter. Having said that, and we cannot repeat it often enough, then we would reaffirm what we have often said here that the Atlantic Charter is in harmony with the spirit of our finest traditions. If there is anything that the American people have responded to in all their history, it is this: we think that if anyone wants to be free they ought to be free. We have not been trying to put either the British Empire or the Netherlands Empire on the spot. We have tried to make it very clear that while the Atlantic Charter is in the tradition of the American people, we are quite sure that we shall travel along and go much further, as the British Empire also goes forward. The further the British go, the further we will go; of that there seems to be no doubt. But we don't want a country, nor do you want us to have a country, where people can come to a gathering like this and tell you what the American people will do. We are a free people and we intend to keep free, for your sakes as well as our sakes.

#### *A British Member*

The people of Great Britain today have no reservations whatsoever about the application of the Atlantic Charter to every part of the world and I entirely agree that no statesman, not even a man of Mr. Churchill's prestige, would survive for one moment in the leadership of England today if he were to suggest that there were any qualifications whatsoever to that document. We have no qualifications in our own mind in regard to India or to any of our dependencies. So far as India itself is concerned nothing would bring such a thrill to the Parliament of Great Britain as to learn that the difficulties which today prevent India from attain-

### *Some Concluding Statements*

ing complete independence were suddenly resolved and that India was going forward into a new period of her history.

I fail to see why Great Britain should be signalled out for this criticism. In particular we have reason to feel misgivings about the attitude of the United States. One of the features of the Charter is the idea of freedom from fear. Let us be quite realistic. What meaning is there in the words freedom from fear for the peoples of the world if the United States goes back to isolationism? What sense is there in that phrase unless the United States is prepared to accept responsibility?

### *An Australian Member*

We are not concerned here as to whether the British public opinion is united on this issue. What caused the doubt in the United States is the feeling that British opinion has not yet been made clear to the world. British opinion has to be clarified, emphasized, discussed and made clear again and again, preferably by Winston Churchill himself. The British members here must not go back feeling that they have been misunderstood or feeling a sense of injury. They should go back concerned to emphasize to the British people and to the British leaders the need for clarifying this matter again and again. However, if I have listened correctly to the round tables, I think there will also be something equally urgent that the American delegates should consider when they go back to their country.

As to the Atlantic Charter, one or two important things seem to have been forgotten. The unity of the British members here in their interpretation of British public opinion is most amazing. But British opinion is not united; the significant thing is that in every country there are struggles between conflicting points of view. The Charter is fundamental but vague; it was made deliberately vague because as soon as we begin to work out the details we get into the same disagreements that we have had here in the last ten days. It is important for the purpose of arousing public opinion that we should have ideals, but let nobody imagine that we are going to solve the post-war problems with the Atlantic Charter as vague and ill-defined as it is at present. The responsibility of everyone is to translate these ideals into practice, to say what we mean by self-government in India, to say what we mean by freedom from fear.

America is also on the spot. The problem is to translate into terms of our own political experience the full application of the Atlantic Charter. That concerns not only India, not only the colonial powers, but

### *Final Plenary Sessions*

also the attitudes of our own people. What guarantee has anyone that following this war we may not again have the insecurity, the depression and unemployment which followed the last war? You remember the promises we gave our soldiers and what happened. If we are to avoid a repetition of that this time, we have to work out our course in much more detail.

#### *An American Member*

I would like to make it clear that the American labor movement at least has no reservations in regard to the Atlantic Charter. We in the labor movement do not consider America without blame on this general issue. I have in this conference raised the question of the poll tax because we need to apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter within the United States as well as outside. We are opposed to the disenfranchisement of some ten million Americans by this method of the poll tax and we want to take a very strong position against such discrimination. American labor will fight for the application of these principles. I have been put on the spot like the other American delegates in regard to the degree of American participation in post-war settlements and to all that we have had to express some doubts and reservations. There are some doubts in labor ranks as to what form American intervention should take in the international sphere. But these doubts have mostly been confined in my opinion to a very few leaders. Most of the membership has followed President Roosevelt's foreign policy and wants to see American participation in creating a more just and secure world order. If America is to be called upon to take part in post-war rehabilitation, that is going to mean spending a great deal of American money throughout the country. Secondly, what is international collective action to protect American investments abroad and might lead to war. To this possibility there is considerable opposition not only in labor ranks but throughout the country. Secondly, what attitude is international collective action going to mean in regard to social upheavals in different parts of the world? In the last war we had such experiences of public opinion in regard to Soviet Russia. Therefore the doubts I am expressing now relate to the attitude which labor may take in the United States if it feels that American intervention is likely to involve fighting to protect American capital abroad or to suppress social upheavals. People have the right to revolution under certain circumstances if there is no other way of solving their problems.

## *Some Concluding Statements*

### *A Canadian Member*

One result of this conference is that the small nations have discovered one another and we have found that we have a common set of questions to ask you big shots. We want to know what you are going to do about the question of your vested interests so that we can live. We don't find that you are going very far or very fast and it worries us. So we make speeches like this which would be much better made somewhere else or not made at all. We have to make them because, frankly, you haven't given us the kind of leadership we expected here. The British came here on the defensive and then passed the blame to the Americans who have remained on the defensive ever since. The Chinese, we have found, have not been given the aid they should have and the small nations are equally disappointed in the attitude of the members from the great Powers here. I suggest that you British have been playing your cards close to your chest and I suggest that you Americans ought to play the kind of role that the world expects of you, and must get from you if we are not all going to be sunk.

### *A British Member*

I wish to reply to the suggestion that what was wrong with the British was that we were not prepared to quicken the leisurely pace at which we were proceeding in the discharge of our colonial responsibilities. No one in Britain resents criticism of British colonial policy or administration, always provided that the criticism is soundly based and is conceived in a genuine knowledge of the way in which Britain has discharged its responsibilities. It may be that some of you felt none too happy at the way in which the British Prime Minister expressed himself, but it ought to be clearly understood that the administration of the British Colonial Office, and the policy of the British government today, is not in accord with the conception of colonial policy as it is apparently envisaged at this conference. There has been a very considerable overhauling of our policy in recent years. It is wrong to assume that there is complacency on the part of the British delegation here. It has not been our intention that when we found ourselves on the spot we should transfer the blame to the United States. We have been a little defensive; it has been necessary to be defensive largely because of your false assumptions as to British policy, but whenever the spotlight has been transferred to the United States in regard to some of its problems and in regard to its future attitude, we have tried to direct the attention of the conference back to the

### *Final Plenary Sessions*

constructive proposal one of our members made at the opening session in regard to future reconstruction work, and the jobs to be done in the Pacific. We have come forward with suggestions, which have won very considerable endorsement in the conferences, that not only should there be the fullest participation by all the peoples in security schemes, but that there should be an effort to break down racial discrimination and that the principles of international cooperation and international inspection should apply to all the dependent areas. When it is suggested that we have been complacent or on the defensive, we are entitled to point out the constructive ideas we have presented and the constructive steps we have taken to carry them through.

We are not wholly satisfied with the administration of our dependencies; *of course* there are black spots in our colonial methods; *of course* there are still the roots of economic imperialism in various parts of the world. None of us have denied those things; but it has been peculiarly unfortunate that when we have been discussing the needs of colonial areas we from Britain have had to combat false notions and have not received a proper understanding of the major problems which concern us. It has been pointed out that there has been a considerable amount of constructive work in this field going on in London. We tend to hide our light under a bushel. We do not proclaim to the world either our social or our military achievements. In all fairness to the British people I ask you to believe that we are coming to grips with the basic problems of our colonial areas and are working out a more advanced social and economic policy for them. The British people are determined that these people shall be liberated and take their place in some organization of United Nations in which all the countries of the world will join.

#### *An American Member*

I feel that we Americans have not yet been put sufficiently on the spot. I would like to see greater recognition by this whole conference of the necessity of international organization after this war is over with particular emphasis upon the necessity of the American delegates here doing everything in their power to stress to their own people the importance of such organization. As one who has perhaps pressed too hard on the faults of the British and Dutch Empires, I would say that our concern has largely been toward creating a condition at the end of the war in which the United States can play its full part in a world organization. We understand perfectly well the tremendous loss that would result in

### *Some Concluding Statements*

the standards of living of the British people and others if there is to be no such fundamental organization in the world after the war. We have heard about the impossibility of committing the American people to an opinion or policy. I feel that we *can* and *should* commit the American delegates here to at least a struggle to educate our people not for the avoidance of commitments, but for the acceptance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter which their President has signed.

I would say, in refutation of what has been said, that most of the American people *did* believe in the ideals and the program of Woodrow Wilson when he went to Paris. One of the crucial failings in America was the fact that American liberals and liberals everywhere were very much bewildered after Versailles, because their ideas had not received recognition in the Treaty, and they would not support an organization which did not reflect those ideas. I feel myself that that was a mistake and that they should have supported it anyway. I want to see America take an active part in a world organization along with Great Britain and other nations. Our sense of urgency about this question arises from the fact that in the next fight which is coming, and in which we must take leadership, an attempt will be made to tie America to an outworn system which would lead to the same outcome as at Versailles.

#### *A Canadian Member*

I am extremely glad that an American has brought this point forward. Because of my love for the Americans and because of a certain amount of heartsickness, I must confess that we people of the smaller nations have, perhaps mistakenly but quite honestly, looked to receive more leadership from the American people. For those who have great possessions the question of the safety of these possessions, whether they be private or national, is a very big thing. That is why the small nations have all been strong for collective security while the large nations were less so. It has often seemed to me that it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a big nation to enter a collective security plan. The nations which have great possessions are the ones that are on the spot. They have to balance the things, the prestige, the armies and navies that they possess against what is going to happen if they insist on clinging to their own safety. The great nations for the good of humanity have got to make the greatest contributions and sacrifices and nothing will move until all of us recognize the urgency of that fact, and what is going to happen if these things are not modified.

### *Final Plenary Sessions*

One thing has seriously troubled me. There appears to be in the minds of a large number of the American people, in whose hands and the hands of the United Kingdom the fate of all of us immediately lies, a view that there are certain freedoms, political freedoms, individual freedoms, are so true, so important, that under no circumstances should they even be modified. I speak as one who values those freedoms. Ownership is perhaps the beginning of freedom, but only the beginning; the actual achievement of freedom is realized when we arrive at the point where we voluntarily throw our possessions into the common pool for the common good. And that applies just as much to those freedoms which we cherish as it does to our physical needs and our prestige. These freedoms which we are trying to protect in the world today are going to be lost for generations if we are not prepared at this point to make large contributions even of our individual freedoms. That is true in a political sense, in a military sense, in an economic sense. I value those freedoms so greatly that I am prepared to go to almost any lengths in their modification for their ultimate preservation. That seems to me one of the most vital notions that has emerged from this conference. My great hope is that the American people who are now faced before the eyes of the world, as Great Britain is faced, with justifying their status as a people with great moral leadership, as a people to whom we can look to for advice, will so understand the urgency of the present situation that they will see that these freedoms can be retained only by great sacrifices, immediate sacrifices, by sacrificial giving at the present time.

*PART V.*

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CONFERENCE PAPERS

## DOCUMENTS OF THE MONT TREMBLANT CONFERENCE

In contrast with the 1939 gathering of the Institute, which took the form of a "study meeting" with limited membership and objectives, the 1942 conference provided opportunities for a more general consideration of problems common to the peoples of the Pacific area. The documentation, though primarily concerned with questions of wartime co-operation and post-war readjustments in international relations, was correspondingly varied. Moreover, on no previous occasion has a conference of the Institute had to offer its members so rich a body of supplementary background information as a result of I.P.R. studies issued during the preceding twelve months. This literature was made available in a conference reference library. In addition, some thirty supplementary documents—recent books and pamphlets, reprints from periodicals, proofs of works not yet published—were distributed in limited numbers to the participating groups.

Again, as in 1939, reports in the I.P.R. Inquiry Series of volumes—a survey and analysis of situations and interests in the Far East—helped to provide the story of national and group purposes now hammered out on the anvil of war and fused in the diplomacy of the United Nations. In addition, there had come to fruition in published volumes quite a number of long-range study projects, some of them planned more than five years ago. These studies had been designed to throw light upon basic conditions in the social and economic life of Pacific peoples. Among them may be mentioned those which concern the growing unity and economic modernization of China and others that have for their common theme the entry of Asiatic peoples into world civilization.

An examination of the references made in round table discussions to the documents would disclose that these served, surprisingly often, to implement topics other than those to which they were primarily devoted. It was one of the features of the conference, held under the stress of a world war, that many of the partitions were broken down which in the more academic discussions of peacetime separate one category of concern from another. Thus, references in the literature to the treatment of racial minorities were made in discussions of the role of foreign capital; facts on the recent educational progress of one people or another were quoted in arguments for or against self-government; proposals for the stabilization of world trade were scrutinized in relation to possibilities of regional military defense.

### *Annotated Bibliography*

For the sake of convenience, the listing which follows is made under geographical headings. It should be understood, however, that even studies which primarily deal with a given country often have a significance for a much larger area.

#### 1. CHINA

In addition to three papers offered by the China Institute of Pacific Relations, special studies of Chinese subjects were presented by the United Kingdom group, the American Council, and the International Secretariat. The conference also had before it proofs of a new comprehensive study of *Banking and Finance in China* (I.P.R. Inquiry Series) by Frank M. Tamagna, and made use of the pamphlet *The Post-War Industrialization of China* by H. D. Fong of Nankai University, published by the National Planning Association, Washington. The International Labour Office contributed a survey of "Wartime Economic and Social Organization in Free China" in the December number of the *International Labour Review*. Intimate recent information on official Chinese plans and opinions, given by conference members recently arrived from Chungking, was amplified with a reprinted article by Guenther Stein from *Far Eastern Survey* and a *Foreign Policy Report* by Owen Lattimore on "Asia in a New World Order." In preparation for the discussion of China's future international relations, as well as other subjects, many members used Nathaniel Peffer's new book *Basis for Peace in the Far East*. The Chinese News Service contributed to the supplementary documents an up-to-date review of *China after Five Years of War*.

Incidental references to China's political future and economic reconstruction—sometimes in considerable detail—are spread over other papers such as *Problems of the Post-war Settlement in the Far East*, interim report of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, (Section A. "A Preliminary Survey"); *A Canadian View of the Pacific* by a Toronto Branch Study Group of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; *Missions in Far Eastern Cultural Relations* by M. Searle Bates; and chapter II of *Some Factors in a Far Eastern Peace Settlement* by George W. Keeton.

TWO PAPERS ON POST-WAR ASIA, by Hu Shih (13 pp., mime.).

Part I, "Requirements for a Just Peace in the Pacific," contains a plea for the complete restoration to China of the Four Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) as well as the occupied portions of Chinese territory below the Great Wall. It demands the abandonment of all special foreign privileges in China and, in return, pledges that country's participation in a general security scheme. Part II, "Asia and the Universal World Order," enlarges the last-named scheme, espe-

## Conference Documents

cially in regard to the establishment of international controls in the interest of peace and stability, with emphasis on the need for progressive development of democratic institutions in Asia.

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN CHINA, by H. D. Fong, K. Y. Yin, and Tso-fan Koh (38 pp., mim.).

An Introduction by H. D. Fong presents the main points of Mr. Yin's translation of the "Draft Outline of the Principles for China's Post-war Economic Reconstruction," which tersely states the National Government's policy on such matters as communications, conservancy and water power, agriculture and mining, manufacture, town and country planning, public finance, banking and currency, and foreign trade. Dr. Koh's paper on "Capital Stock in China," which makes up the second part of the document, is a chapter from *The Future of Industrialization in China*, a work being produced by the Bureau of National Economic Research (Chungking) under the direction of Dr. D. K. Lieu. The author emphasizes the need for a rapid liquidation of war debts and the accumulation of domestic capital.

A PERMANENT ORDER FOR THE PACIFIC, by S. R. Chow (27 pp., mim.).

A jurist and teacher of international law here gives a rounded forecast of Chinese foreign policies after the war, bearing on such topics, among others, as the disarmament of Japan, Korea, India, the Soviet Union, Chinese nationals abroad, colonial dependencies, possibilities of regional collaboration, and China's role as a leader in the democratization of Asia. The paper is an expanded version of the author's article in *Foreign Affairs* (October 1942.).

BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY, by G. E. Hubbard (Revised edition, 52 pp., mim.).

This new edition of a monograph by the Far Eastern Research Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, while covering a larger ground, is mainly concerned with the history of British-Chinese relations since the dissolution of the East India Company up to the outbreak of the Pacific War.

THE FUTURE OF BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST, by E. M. Gull (20 pp., mim.).

This study, presenting the final section of a book soon to be published, likewise, despite its larger scope, deals in large part with China, i.e., with British investments and trade in that country.

FACTORS IN CHINESE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION, edited by Robert W. Barnett (12 pp., mim.).

A summary of discussions organized by the Washington office of the I.P.R., this report is largely concerned with problems of industrialization, the role of foreign capital, and financial reforms.

CHINA'S WAR ECONOMY, by Lawrence K. Rosinger (*Foreign Policy Report*, Vol. XVIII, No. 17, Nov. 15, 1942, 20 pp.).

An up-to-date summary, from Chinese and foreign sources, of wartime developments in rural economics, financial controls, taxation, monopolies, transportation, foreign loans, industrial production, and other matters. There is a useful supplementary note on wartime politics in China.

### *Annotated Bibliography*

CHINESE VIEWS OF WARTIME ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, translated by Y. Y. Hsu (30 pp., mim.).

Resumés of recent articles from the Chinese press on such subjects as wartime taxation in kind, government banks and cooperative finance, sales monopolies, industrial recapitalization and credit, the special economic difficulties of China's intelligentsia.

## 2. JAPAN

Since the Japanese were not represented at the conference and had no part in the preparations for it, all references to Japan were contributed by other groups. The internal structure of the empire, the recent history of its foreign relations, its administration of dependencies, the condition of its people, its defeat and disarmament, the factors likely to determine the character of its imminent revolution, the possibilities of its economic reconstruction, and its future part in regional and international security schemes were all discussed; but the factual data for those discussions were spread over many documents primarily devoted to other or more inclusive themes.

Apart from the papers listed below, several of the supplementary documents before the conference presented relevant information. Most substantial among these is Kate L. Mitchell's book on *Japan's Industrial Strength*. The *Foreign Policy Report*, "Japan as an Economic Power" by L. K. Rosinger, Nathaniel Peffer's *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, and other publications helped to fill in the gaps in the picture. A serious discussion of Japanese disarmament will be found in S. R. Chow's *A Permanent Order for the Pacific*, already mentioned. *A Canadian View of the Pacific* contains sections on Japan's post-war government, Japanese colonies, and Japanese trade. Japanese rehabilitation is considered in the Royal Institute's *Problem of the Post-war Settlement in the Far East* (Section A. "A Preliminary Survey"). A chapter is devoted to Japan in *Some Factors in a Far Eastern Peace Settlement* by George W. Keeton. The only document exclusively dealing with Japan is:

POST-WAR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, by Sir George Sansom (16 pp., mim.).

Disarmament, the disposition of Japan's territorial possessions, the probable economic and social consequences of defeat for Japan, and possibilities of reconstruction under international supervision are some of the topics covered. Psychological elements, such as racial antagonism and cultural misunderstandings, are given due weight.

## 3. INDIA

Indian political and economic relations with the world of the Pacific in modern times have, in the main, been limited to the borders of the

### Conference Documents

region, though Indian trade and Indian labor have in recent decades penetrated more deeply into its economy. Because of India's importance for the war in the Pacific and because of the effect of its struggle for political independence on many of its neighboring peoples, this greatest of British possessions has moved from the outskirts of Pacific concerns to a central place in the Institute's considerations. For the first time, India was ably represented in every round table of the conference; and this personal participation was paralleled by a correspondingly rich offering of papers for the consideration of the conference. Although references to Indian topics occur in many of the other data papers, only those are listed here which in whole or in large part deal with that country. The conference had before it, as a supplementary document, a special number of *International Conciliation* (June 1942) on "The Cripps Mission to India," giving the principal statements and letters involved in the Cripps negotiations.

INDIAN LABOUR AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION, by M. N. Roy (17 pp., mim.).

The development of a labor movement in a preponderantly agrarian country is described with due acknowledgment of its inevitable weaknesses. The economic divisions of Indian society, often overlooked abroad when the limelight plays upon its cultural schisms, is here shown to be accentuated by artificial barriers to industrial growth. The effects of the war on output and earnings, likewise, are sketched with emphasis on the barriers to such natural growth as the nation is capable of. And from recent and present experience conclusions are drawn as to probable post-war advances toward a more productive use of Indian labor.

THE STATES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT, by K. M. Panikkar (9 pp., mim.).

The treaties of the British Crown with the Indian States and other more recent commitments are examined constructively as justifications for special safeguards to protect the autonomous political units of India in the setting up of an inclusive autonomous Indian federation, and not as obstacles to the creation of a stable, strong, and moderately well united Indian commonwealth.

WARTIME ECONOMIC TRENDS AND POST-WAR POLICY, by B. D. Adarkar (24 pp., mim.).

A brief summary of wartime economic trends in India—in agriculture, industry, transport, trade, currency expansion, and population movements—is followed by a discussion of post-war policy in regard to all these matters. Special attention is paid to the question how the necessary machinery for reconstructing the Indian economy and for raising the whole level of life may be geared into international policies of trade and investment.

UNTOUCHABLES AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, by Dr. Ambedkar (20 pp., mim.).

This plea for political safeguards in any new Indian constitution contains a good deal of information not familiar to Western readers who have made no

### *Annotated Bibliography*

special study of the Indian caste system. Doubt is thrown on the numerical and functional unimportance attached to the depressed classes in the official literature. The principal demand is for separate settlements where the so-called "scheduled castes" may unhindered diversify their skills and ways of living, and develop their own political leadership.

WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN INDIA, by Begum Shah Nawaz (12 pp., mim.).

The Begum gives a new idea of the present interests, status, and organization of womanhood in India. The paper is a condensed history of the feminist movement in India, which is branching out into the fields of politics, education, social reform, and professional life.

PAKISTAN: A HINDU VIEW, by Mehr Chand Khanna (37 pp., mim.).

The Indian Muslim demand for political independence from the Hindu majority is here set forth by a former finance minister of Northwest Frontier Province with the restrained argument of an experienced parliamentarian. Incidentally, this document explains why the issue has flared up at a time when the world rather expected a show of national unity from Indian patriots.

SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INDIA IN TRANSITION AND FINAL, by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (14 pp., mim.).

A distinguished jurist here examines the laws under which the Indian Government now operates and shows why the existing constitutional provisions cannot satisfy any section of political opinion in India. Hindu and Muslim views are shown not to be irreconcilable.

MUSLIM DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN, by "An Indian Muslim Politician" (16 pp., mim.).

Another eloquent plea for separation, more especially to reply to some of the more recent Hindu arguments in favor of a single government with far-reaching guarantees to minority communities.

INDIA, A BIRD'S EYE VIEW, by Sir Frederick Whyte (56 pp., mim. Also published as a pamphlet by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and the Oxford University Press, 1942, 76 pp.).

A British refutation of most anti-British arguments advanced in discussions of the Indian problem, based on examinations of the history of British rule in India, the long-range effects of that rule, the actual state of India, the complexity of the problem of self-government, the legitimate interests of the Indian States, the wartime position of India, the mutual contradictions of anti-imperialists, and the world stake in order and stability.

INDIA TODAY, by W. E. Duffett, A. R. Hicks, and G. R. Parkin (John Day, New York, 1942, 173 pp.).

This little book, originally prepared for Canadian study groups and brought up to date after the failure of the Cripps Mission, offers an excellent general summary of recent events and of "the background of Indian nationalism" for Western readers. The chapter headings indicate its scope: population and social structure, economic structure, constitution and government, India's external relations, the political groups, the nationalist movement, prelude to conflict—1939, Indian politics in the present war, Indian political leaders.

## *Conference Documents*

INDIA AND THE PACIFIC REGION, by members of the International Labour Office (15 pp., mim.).

Beginning with the role played by Indian troops and labor services, the establishment of a Ministry of Supply, and other forms of Indian participation in the present war, this paper describes the wartime expansion of certain Indian industries and the new forms of organization to which it has given rise—notably the establishment of a tripartite national labor organization. The effect of the war on Indian economy is seen as offering new opportunities for far-reaching social reforms.

DOCUMENTS ON THE INDIAN SITUATION SINCE THE CRIPPS MISSION, compiled by Staff Members of the American Council, I. P. R. (120 pp., mim.).

An up-to-the-minute, comprehensive collection of state papers, resolutions, reports, broadcasts, addresses, newspaper comments, and other materials—ranging from bitter denunciations to new proposals for settlement.

AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS OF INDIA, by S. Higginbottom. (32 pp., mim.).

Without attempting to give a comprehensive review of the present state of agriculture in India, an American faculty member of an agricultural college in Hyderabad here presents some personal observations, showing the difficulties involved in any attempt to improve agricultural practices without reference to the larger social situation in a typical rural area of India.

POST-WAR EDUCATION IN INDIA, by Zakir Husain (14 pp., mim.).

A forecast of Indian educational policies which, according to this writer, will be national but not nationalist. He proposes a graded system of schools which bring out the innate ability of the educand, as shaped by the community with all its cultural ingredients, through work on concrete, partly vocational tasks arising from that environment. Thus, "purposeful activity" connects all educational institutions from infant school to university in a single coherent national system.

## 4. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Successful prosecution of the war and security against future wars are the major themes of the data papers presented by these two British Dominions in the South Pacific. In former years, their concern for trade opportunities dominated their contributions to international discussions of Pacific affairs. Australia has long demanded a greater precautionary organization for the protection of outlying portions of the Empire. Both Australia and New Zealand have had problems of their own in immigration and development policies and in withstanding Asiatic population pressures. Australian and New Zealand members have, at previous conferences of the I.P.R., tried to satisfy the curiosity of other states in the success of their progressive social legislation. On the present occasion, all these interests still have their place in the conference documentation

### *Annotated Bibliography*

but are overshadowed by the urgent reality of wartime and post-war needs.

Ten documents from the Victoria and New South Wales Branches of the Australian Institute of International Affairs were brought by plane to the conference. Unfortunately there was not sufficient time to reproduce and distribute them at the meeting, but they have since been mimeographed in two volumes under the general title *Australia and the Pacific* (Vol. I. Political; Vol. II. Economic). The separate papers are listed below.

#### *VOL. I. POLITICAL* (90 pp., mim.).

- A. AUSTRALIA'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, AS AFFECTING HER POST-WAR ROLE AMONG THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FAR EAST, by K. H. Bailey (18 pp., mim.).

In four chapters, dealing respectively with Australian national sentiment, national policy, wartime changes, and post-war probabilities, the Professor of Public Law in the University of Melbourne sets forth a number of conclusions concerning the future part of Australia in the British Commonwealth. These are illustrated by many references to recent political and economic actions. The main point is that a more independent policy of Australia in the Pacific can be harmonized with the joint stand of the British Commonwealth on fundamental issues of world organization.

- B. STABILITY IN THE PACIFIC: THE POSITION OF AUSTRALIA, by W. D. Forsyth (9 pp., mim.).

This paper warns that any economic and political planning for the Pacific area which insufficiently considers the structural differences between the countries that compose it will produce chaos rather than stability. As regards China and Japan, the proposed international policies do not differ much from those advocated by a majority of informed people elsewhere in the United Nations. As to Southeastern Asia, the principal Australian demand will be the removal of any danger of a Japanese "come-back." Relaxations of restraints on trade and closer economic cooperation are other policies advocated.

- C. WAR TRENDS IN AUSTRALIAN OPINIONS, by P. D. Phillips (18 pp., mim.).

Probably one of the first objective studies of Australian public opinion on war and post-war issues, this essay is mainly concerned with trends of international and domestic interest, as influenced by past experience, geographical location, the existing political machinery, and traditional cultural and racial attitudes. The author distinguishes in all these matters the short-term changes that are influenced by immediate events from the more fundamental "broad directions of national aspiration."

- D. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, by Julius Stone (86 pp., mim.).

A Professor of International Law at the University of Sydney here examines the bearing of the Atlantic Charter, as illustrated by other pronouncements of United Nations war aims, on the political and economic re-orientation of

## *Conference Documents*

Pacific states and dependencies. As a working basis for this comparative study and interpretation he uses a statement made in September 1942 by Dr. H. V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs. The proposals contained in the various documents are shown to cover many but not all of the problems that loom large in the external and internal relations of the region. The author advances some suggestions of his own to make the agreed principles of policy which definitely apply to the region more nearly co-extensive with the need for a clear formulation of aims.

E. WHITE AUSTRALIA AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER, by a Member of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (9 pp., mime.).

A succinct explanation of the "White Australia" policy—but not a defense or an apology—here serves as starting point for a set of proposals that would transform it from a negative, protective line into one of positive contribution to the peace and progress of Pacific peoples. Though insisting on Australia's right to regulate its own access of population, the author suggests a program that would make the restriction of immigration less absolute and non-discriminatory, would speed up the assimilation of immigrants, and subject Australia's immigration and assimilation practices to international supervision. Australia would strengthen its case for non-admission of large numbers of aliens by helping, through appropriate trade policies, to reduce that population pressure in various countries which results from lack of economic opportunity.

*FOL. II. ECONOMIC* (50 pp., mime.).

A. THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY IN RELATION TO POST-WAR CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC, by G. L. Wood (10 pp., mime.).

The position of Australia in regard to trade and tariff policy, to expanded industrial production, and other matters, is expounded in terse paragraphs by the Dean of the Faculty of Commerce in the University of Melbourne. The war, according to the picture of recent economic developments here presented, has accentuated some of the trends set going by the crisis of 1930 to 1933 and the subsequent years of slow recovery. The danger of post-war contraction of the principal markets for Australia's primary export commodities makes that country especially sensitive to changes in the consuming power of backward Asiatic countries.

B. AUSTRALIAN MARKETS, PARTICULARLY FOR PRIMARY PRODUCTS IN THE PACIFIC AREA, by S. M. Wadham and K. H. Northcote. (11 pp., mime.).

The great importance to Australia of an increase in the consuming power of Asiatic peoples is stressed in this statistical study of prewar exports. Methods are discussed by which, for example, the risks of larger wheat exports to China might be lessened. On the other hand, the authors are not optimistic enough to believe that the monopoly pressures that hold down the prices of native products in Southeastern Asia and in Africa—and thereby reduce the largest potential additional markets for Australian products—will be greatly relieved.

C. THE EXCHANGE VALUE OF THE AUSTRALIAN POUND AND THE FUTURE, by Roland Mountain (8 pp., mime.).

Problems likely to arise from lack of free capital after the war for Australia

### *Annotated Bibliography*

itself are here discussed after an examination of the country's financial experience just before and during the war. Financial measures are proposed to meet the "two fundamental post-war international monetary aims," a flourishing international trade without automatic transference of economic disturbance from one country to another, and a wider sharing of the disabilities carried in the past by the so-called "financially weak" countries.

D. POST-WAR PURCHASING POWER IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, by Walter Hill (8 pp., mim.).

This study also is part of a series of "reconstruction studies" undertaken by faculty members of the University of Melbourne in conjunction with the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Omitting eastern Siberia, which is economically linked to European Russia, the region here considered has a population of nearly a billion people, half the population of the world and "living in conditions, for the overwhelming majority, of miserable poverty." The colonial period is at an end, according to this author, because the Western nations can no longer enrich themselves by policies of colonial exploitation. He describes different types of intensified production, including industrialization, which alone promise adequate returns on investment and which are impossible without substantial rises in standards of living. Part of the paper is given over to the question of where and how the necessary capital for the rehabilitation of the occupied territories of the region is to be obtained.

E. AUSTRALIA'S COMMERCIAL POLICY IN RELATION TO ARTICLE VII OF THE MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, by Members of the Canberra Branch, Australian Institute of International Affairs (13 pp., mim.).

After a retrospective survey of the working of the Australian tariff, the Ottawa Agreement of 1932, and the various reciprocal agreements which followed it, the wartime changes in Australian trade objectives and instruments of trade regulation are examined. A hypothetical "national" policy for the maintenance of full employment after the war is found impracticable. The larger part of the paper proceeds to examine the extent to which the expansionist international economic policies agreed upon between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom can be adopted by Australia without losing the proven supports of its economic existence. The difficulties of a full participation by Australia in a new economic world order without satisfactory protection of its vital industries are set forth in orderly array.

### *NEW ZEALAND*

A NEW ZEALAND VIEW OF THE WAR AND PEACE AIMS IN THE PACIFIC, by H. Belshaw and others. (30 pp., mim.).

Part I, on "New Zealand's War Aims in the Pacific" by H. Belshaw, with the assistance of W. T. G. Airey and P. Martin Smith, is devoted, after a general introduction, to an "agenda for peace in the Pacific" which runs the whole gamut from reparations to the future of dependencies. Part II, on "Programme for Peace" by Messrs. Airey, Belshaw, and Julius Stone, surveys in almost the same order the conditions of a durable peace. A comparison of the two state-

## *Conference Documents*

ments—one mainly concerned with the war aims as part of the United Nations' dynamic war power, the other setting forth the same aims in a more sharply formulated agenda for peace discussions—provides a useful exercise in the translation of social ideals into legally circumscribed principles of action.

NEW ZEALAND'S WAR EFFORT, by F. L. W. Wood and J. O. Shearer (15 pp., mim.).

Two thirds of this paper are devoted to a description of the Dominion's war effort on the home front: expansion of the fighting services, production of munitions, and the contribution of New Zealand's agriculture to the common enterprise. The last third gives a chronological account of the way in which these activities have been financed.

### 5. CANADA

MINORITIES OF ORIENTAL RACE IN CANADA, by a Study Group of the Winnipeg Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (28 pp., mim.).

In Canada as well as in the United States, the new part which China is playing as one of the leading United Nations in the war against the Axis has led to a re-examination of national immigration policy, more especially in its effect on relations with China. Implemented with the latest available statistics, the present report describes the evolution of that policy—and of the inequalities in the treatment of Oriental minorities to which it has given rise. Without attempting to predict future changes, the study group sets forth those wartime happenings and expressions of public opinion which foreshadow that some agreement with the Oriental nations on restriction of labor migration under less insulting conditions than those prevailing in the past will be possible.

CANADA AND POST-WAR CIVIL AVIATION, by a Study Group of the Toronto Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. (15 pp., mim.).

One of the first to recognize the revolutionary consequences of wartime technological developments for post-war civil aviation, this study group has explored the position of Canada in an international system, the possibility of controls in the interest of world trade, probable routes and connections, and other matters of not too technical a nature to interest the layman.

A CANADIAN VIEW OF THE PACIFIC, by a Study Group of the Toronto Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (12 pp., mim.).

A general survey of Canadian interests in the post-war position of Japan, China, the USSR, India, and the colonial dependencies of the Pacific. Canada's potential contributions to the peace and progress of the region are indicated.

### 6. THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

The interest of the conference in the most recent pronouncements of the Netherlands Government concerning the post-war status of the Indies created a demand for information which the five papers presented by the Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council went a long way to satisfy. In addition to the data papers described below, the conference had before

### *Annotated Bibliography*

it a cabled official translation of the speech broadcast by Queen Wilhelmina on December 7, a reprint of an article by Eelco N. Van Kleffens on *The Democratic Future of the Netherlands Indies*, and a pamphlet by Charles O. van der Plas on *Recent Developments in the Netherlands East Indies*. Numerous references to the Netherlands East Indies will be found also in the data papers named below in the section on "Other Pacific Dependencies."

NATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES. by Charles O. van der Plas (23 pp., mim.).

A history of movements from the beginning of the present century and now recognized in retrospect as "nationalist," as seen by a colonial official with exceptional opportunities for intimate contact with Indonesians. More than one half of the paper is devoted to the attitudes and actions of nationalists immediately before and during the war and to the reactions of the people generally to the war experience.

THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES. by Peter H. W. Sitsen (54 pp., mim.).

This array of facts and figures concerning the prewar state of industry in the Indies, the relation of secondary to primary industries, the industrial policies of the government, the growth of factory industry, and related matters comes from the pen of one of the country's most experienced administrators in the field of economic development. The discussion of future possibilities of industrial expansion, though cautious, sufficiently indicates the line likely to be followed.

EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES. by Raden Loekman Djajadiningrat (49 pp., mim.).

One of the first Indonesians to attain to high rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the Indies, the Director of Education here describes in detail the country's school system—a system which, because of its dual character, has sometimes been misinterpreted by outside critics. Native education, lower occidental education—with its special provision for Chinese—and advanced and secondary education are treated at about equal length. In the eyes of the author the dual system has been justified by its results.

INTENSIVE RURAL HYGIENE WORK IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. by J. L. Hydrick, M. D., with an Introduction by I. Snapper (83 pp., illustrations).

This pamphlet, a revised edition of part of a report first issued in 1937, describes in popular terms the eminently successful work of the public health service of the Netherlands East Indies in which the author has for many years been active—more especially in making the most extensive use yet attempted in any tropical country of educational devices to reinforce preventive medicine and sanitary engineering.

## Conference Documents

TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by G. H. C. Hart (123 pp., illustrations).

Prepared not only for the conference but also to educate the English-speaking world about basic economic realities in the Indies, this pamphlet illustrates the general trend of Netherlands Indian policy in recent years. The eight chapters deal with the incipient institutions of self-government, population problems, foreign enterprise, planned native economy, farming for self-sufficiency, migration and resettlement, crafts and small industries, international commodity controls.

THE NETHERLANDS INDIES AND THEIR NEIGHBORS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, by G. H. C. Hart (7 pp., mim.).

An attempt to show the bearing of the recently announced constitutional changes in the relations between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies upon subjects discussed at greater length in some of the other papers. It contains a spirited refutation of various American and British suggestions made since 1941 for political mergers or federations in Southeast Asia. In such schemes, it is argued, the advances made in the government of the Indies would be in danger of being lost.

## 7. OTHER PACIFIC DEPENDENCIES

The third point of the Atlantic Charter, on the subject of sovereign rights and self-government, dominated so many of the conference round table discussions that at one point the text of the Charter was distributed to all the members, lest others of its provisions be forgotten altogether. It may therefore be permissible here to group together, as falling into the same general realm of discourse, a number of territories, distributed over the Pacific region, each of which was of interest to the members largely as a case problem in that advance towards political self-determination which was one of the central topics. In addition to the data papers listed below, many others, too, are in part devoted to the future of colonial dependencies in the Pacific. Such references will be found, for example, in Dr. Hu Shih's paper (concerning Korea); in Dr. Chow's *A Permanent Order for the Pacific* (Korea, Indo-China, Hong-kong, Macao, colonial policy generally); *A Canadian View of the Pacific* (Japanese colonies, Southeastern Asia); *New Zealand's War Aims* (two sections on colonies and dependencies); G. E. Hubbard, *British Far Eastern Policy* (Atlantic Charter); E. M. Gull, *The Future of British Economic Interests in the Far East* (Malaya, raw materials); *British Reactions to the War* (popular attitudes to colonial system); Tyler Dennett, *Security in the Pacific* (American attitudes on colonial questions); Benjamin H. Kizer, *The North Pacific International Planning Project* (Alaska, Yukon); M. Searle Bates, *Missions in Far Eastern Cul-*

### *Annotated Bibliography*

*tural Relations* (Korea, Formosa); Sir George B. Sansom, *Post-war Relations with Japan* (Japanese possessions); P. E. Corbett, *Supplement to "Post-war Worlds,"* (colonial rights, equal access, Indonesian union); George W. Keeton, *Some Factors in a Far Eastern Peace Settlement* (Chinese in Southeast Asia, Korea).

Among the supplementary documents, the following are relevant: The *Fortune* reprint, "The United States in a New World, II. Pacific Relations"; Owen Lattimore's "Asia in a New World Order" (*Foreign Policy Report*, Vol. XVIII, No. 12); "Color," a special number of the *Survey Graphic*; Nathaniel Pfeffer: *Basis for Peace in the Far East*; and four publications of the Fighting France organization in London: *New Caledonia*, by Governor Henry Sautot (30 pp., mim., map); *French Oceania*, by Major E. de Curton, former Governor (36 pp., mim., maps); *Tahiti, Terre Française Combattante*, also by Major de Curton; and *La France en Indochine*, by Pierre Laurin (in French, 57 pp., mim., map). While the first three of these incipient publications give a rather general survey of population, resources, economic activities, and wartime experience, the last deals mainly with social and intellectual progress.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION in the Pacific Colonies, by Members of the International Labour Office (22 pp., mim.).

After a brief discussion of the principles involved in the concept of "trusteeship" and in the Atlantic Charter, this data paper proceeds to report the relevant resolutions and discussions of the New York-Washington Conference of the International Labour Organization in 1941. Parts III and IV describe the international labor conventions that apply to the Pacific dependencies and the development of labor and welfare policies, more especially in the British and Netherlands dependencies. Part V is devoted to the social and economic problems of colonial reconstruction in the post-war period.

PROBLEMS OF THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT IN THE FAR EAST. An interim report by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, in eight sections, as follows:

A. A PRELIMINARY SURVEY (13 pp., mim.).

A brief general survey on the Far East as a whole in which the dependencies of sovereign powers nevertheless receive stimulating treatment in brief sections devoted to such topics as the future of Hongkong, Korea, the role of Chinese and Japanese in Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Netherlands India, Burma, Malaya, the Japanese possessions, the principle of trusteeship, standards of living, and the meaning of "ultimate self-government."

B. BURMA (24 pp., mim.).

A handbook of general information, with notes on the political position in recent years, the Japanese invasion, post-war problems and external relations.

## *Conference Documents*

### C. BRITISH MALAYA (24 pp., mim.).

General information with details of the complicated constitution, the state of economic advancement, trade and tariff, investments, communications, land policies, post-war problems.

### D. HONG KONG (12 pp., mim.).

Historical and other basic data, administration and social services, defense, communications, and a hint of the colony's growing dependence on political and economic security in China.

### E. NORTH BORNEO, SARAWAK, AND BRUNEI (19 pp., mim.).

Separately for each of these states the basic information required to judge the nature of their population and resources, the relative advance of their systems of government and administrative services, trade and communications.

### F. THE PACIFIC ISLAND DEPENDENCIES (35 pp., mim.).

A general survey of Fiji, the Gilbert and Solomon Islands, Tonga, Pitcairn and the Line Islands, and the New Hebrides, with detailed data on population, constitutions, administration, public finances, economic resources and their development, land labor and social conditions, trade, social services, and hints of possibilities for future development.

### G. GREAT BRITAIN AND HER DEPENDENCIES: NOTE ON GENERAL POLICY, by the Lord Hailey (31 pp., mim.).

An explanation of Great Britain's recent colonial policies in terms of actual performance as well as intentions—extending over fifty Crown colonies, protected states and mandated territories, with a total population of over sixty million. The principal problems considered are: improvements of standards of living and the part played by the state, private enterprise and native production in economic development, the social services, issues arising from the existence of "plural" communities, and the applicability of international controls.

### WELFARE AND FREEDOM IN POST-WAR SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Bruno Lasker (41 pp., mim.).

An attempt to show how the Atlantic Charter might be regionally applied, with detailed suggestions for regional international collaboration in the separate fields of economic, cultural, and political relations; and a scheme for a three-dimensional regional organization which at the same time would facilitate the advance of dependent peoples to self-government and represent the international stake in their progress and security.

### MEMORANDUM ON KOREA'S AGRICULTURE AND RESOURCES, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev (78 pp., mim.).

A critical survey of the net results of Japanese rule in Korea in its effects on agriculture, forestry and fishing, on the use of the country's mineral resources and sources of power, and on the growth and distribution of population.

### MEMORANDUM ON KOREAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev (23 pp., mim.).

A study of the machinery and character of Japanese government and ad-

### *Annotated Bibliography*

ministration in recent years, with suggestions for a post-war system of administration under international control, that would produce economic rehabilitation and make possible an early resumption of self-government by the Korean people.

PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by J. S. Furnivall (19 pp., mime.).

The conclusions of a larger study of educational systems in Burma, the Netherlands Indies, Formosa, Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand; more especially a discussion of the discrepancy between popular native demand and what, in the light of the development of these tropical countries, seem to be the most needed kinds of knowledge and skill, with some suggestions for post-war policy.

#### 8. THE U.S.S.R.

Two major contributions to the documentation of the conference had for their main subject the Far Eastern regions of the Soviet Union; these were offered by the International Secretariat. In addition, the role of the Soviet Union in the political and economic reconstruction of the north Pacific is briefly discussed in some of the more general papers on war and post-war policy. The two principal Chinese contributors, Hu Shih and S. R. Chow, refer to the possibility of an entirely friendly and mutually helpful regulation of Chinese-Russian relations after the eviction of Japan from the Asiatic continent. The marked change of Western popular opinion of the Soviet Union in the last year or two is noted by the Toronto Study Group (*A Canadian View of the Pacific*) and by P. E. Corbett (*Supplement to "Post-War Worlds"*). Of the supplementary papers, the following refer to the Soviet Union's influence on post-war Pacific relations: "The United States in a New World, II: Pacific Relations" (Reprint from *Fortune*), "Asia in a New World Order" by Owen Lattimore (*Foreign Policy Report*, Vol. XVIII, No. 12), and *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, by Nathaniel Peffer.

THE SOVIET FAR EAST, by William Mandel (56 pp., mime.).

A description of the resources, the population and settlement, the cultural and economic development, and the capital equipment of the Soviet Far East, mostly from official sources not previously translated, with considerable detail on two subjects of special importance to post-war adjustments: the assimilation of native and immigrant population groups, and the impetus given to intensification of production by wartime necessity.

A RECORD OF SOVIET FAR EASTERN RELATIONS, 1931-1942, by Harriet Moore (92 pp., mime.).

A chronological, year-by-year progress report from the threatened entanglement in a Manchurian war in 1931 to the precarious Far Eastern "neutrality" of the Soviet Union in 1942. The history of Russian-Japanese relations during

## Conference Documents

these twelve years and the development of Russian-Chinese accommodations are told with reference to the source material and so arranged as to be available for ready reference.

SOME FACTORS IN A FAR EASTERN PEACE SETTLEMENT, by George W. Keeton (30 pp., mime.).

The first section of this paper (14 pp.) gives the story of Russian Far Eastern policies from Czarist days to the present time with a forecast of Soviet participation in post-war security arrangements to the extent to which these remain within the spirit of the announced war aims of the United Nations.

### 9. THE UNITED STATES

Two of the American data papers, named below, deal primarily with the state of public opinion in the United States on international affairs which has become so important and so doubtful a factor in plans for post-war world reconstruction. The subject is also taken up by George Keeton, in the paper just mentioned, as it relates to the history of Anglo-American cooperation in the Pacific, and also by Herrymon Maurer in *Coalition War in the East*. P. E. Corbett discusses it in his *Supplement to "Post-War Worlds"*. Among the supplementary papers, a reprint of William L. Holland's "War Aims and Peace Aims in the Pacific" from the December 1942 number of *Pacific Affairs* anticipated the practically unanimous opinion of the conference that there can be no lasting peace unless the American people assume the full burden of their responsibility under the tenets of the Atlantic Charter. The subject is prominent also in Nathaniel Peffer's *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, though with an emphasis on established rather than new involvements, while Owen Lattimore ("Asia in a New World Order") and the editors of *Fortune* ("The United States in a New World") stress American opportunities in a new Pacific set-up as well as obligations. A characteristic form of the United States' contributions to the war effort itself is described in a reprint from *Fortune* entitled "Lend-Lease to Date."

SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST: A MEMORANDUM ON CERTAIN AMERICAN IMMEDIATE POST-WAR RESPONSIBILITIES, by Tyler Dennett (37 pp., mime.).

This careful study of American interests in different parts of the Pacific region, and of American attitudes toward various policies—actual and proposed—aroused a good deal of attention at the conference, particularly because it placed the American war purpose squarely behind the third article of the Atlantic Charter. It is a statement of traditional and fundamental American policy, interpreted in its meaning for possibilities of international collaboration at the close of the

### *Annotated Bibliography*

war. To some members of the conference it came as a shock to have the humanitarian aims of the American people set forth in the form of "minimum demands."

OSTRICH INTO EAGLE: PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES ON INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST, by An Observer. (*Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XI, No. 24, pp. 241-44).

This memorandum, from an authoritative American source, provides in briefer compass a close-up view of American opinion on Far Eastern questions as gleaned from public-opinion polls and the press. The resulting total picture, which includes imperialist leanings and color prejudice as well as the consequences of a widespread ignorance of international questions, is less flattering than Dr. Dennett's.

JAPANESE EVACUATION: INTERIM REPORT, by Carey McWilliams (41 pp., mim.).

A detailed account of the evacuation and relocation of American residents of Japanese descent since December 1941, with chapters on the traditional attitudes to Orientals on the Pacific Coast of the United States and on the probable post-war status of the "Japanese." Neither a charge nor an apology, this statement by the Commissioner of Immigration for the State of California offers a suitable factual basis for the reconsideration of American laws and practices that discriminate against Oriental minorities.

THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII UNDER WAR CONDITIONS, by Andrew W. Lind (30 pp mim.).

In contrast with the above, this paper by the head of the Sociology Department in the University of Hawaii describes the measures taken in the Islands to guard against possible sabotage on the part of residents of Japanese race without a wholesale and discriminatory evacuation. The success of the regulations and their practical and psychological effects are set forth in relation to basic problems of assimilation of alien minorities.

THE NORTH PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL PLANNING PROJECT, by Benjamin Kizer (39 pp., mim.).

This is a study of joint planning by Canada and the United States for economic developments from the industrial region on the common frontier to the Arctic slope and the Seward Peninsula, and only incidentally relates to the other countries of the northern Pacific. The study is based on memoranda of the regional staff of the National Resources Planning Board and extends to such matters, among others, as transportation, agricultural and industrial production, settlement, existing and proposed collaboration in the protection of fisheries and forests, in air transport and shipping services and military protection.

### 10. OTHER PAPERS

Several papers do not definitely fall into any of the geographical categories here used. Among the supplementary papers offered for reference the following spanned large sections of the conference agenda: *Problems of Economic Reorganization*, by J. B. Condcliffe (mim., 30 pp.), dealing with economic problems of total war and of the early stages of

### Conference Documents

post-war rehabilitation and reorganization; *Basis for Peace in the Far East*, by Nathaniel Peffer (277 pp.), with chapters, among others, on the principles of the peace settlement, a verdict on Japan, the future of China, Japan's legitimate needs, settlement in Southeastern Asia, and the danger of an emerging American imperialism; "War Aims and Peace Aims in the Pacific," by William L. Holland, an article in the December 1942 issue of *Pacific Affairs*, setting forth some of the major issues and also the major obstacles to their clear recognition; *Recent Developments in Thailand*, by Members of the Free Thai Committee (23 pp. mim.), an account of recent historic happenings in the one politically independent country of Southeastern Asia.

Data papers fitting completely into none of the categories adopted above are:

MISSIONS IN FAR EASTERN CULTURAL RELATIONS, by M. Searle Bates (40 pp., mim.).

The outcome of a careful study in which the author, who was Professor of History at Nanking University, was aided by officials of mission boards and governments. Among the subjects covered are aims, organization and methods, distinctive achievements and outstanding weaknesses of missionary services, a quantitative summary of missions and Christian work in China and Japan, recent trends and wartime changes in mission enterprises, outlook for the future.

POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN THE FAR EAST, a Selective Bibliography by Aimee de Potter (16 pp., mim.).

Including articles and pamphlets as well as books and public documents, this bibliography covers, up to November 1942, all the more valuable literature available to the student of the subject and the planner.

COALITION WAR IN THE EAST, by Herrymon Maurer (10 pp., mim.).

A study of national and sectional interests and attitudes which prevent the joint war effort of the United Nations in the Pacific from assuming the dimensions of a primary "front" and which stand in the way of the fullest collaboration in military, economic, and political action.

SUPPLEMENT TO "POST-WAR WORLDS," by P. E. Corbett (16 pp., mim.).

Mentioned already in relation to particular areas, this data paper, despite its relative brevity, is important as one of the few attempts as yet made to envisage the political and social reconstruction of the Pacific region as a whole and to bring out the general principles of a lasting international collaboration to ensure its peaceful development.

NOTE. Many of the documents listed above will probably be revised or expanded and later published as pamphlets or books. Others will be included in the forthcoming Proceedings of the Conference, *Problems of the Pacific 1942*, to be published by the International Secretariat.

PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE EIGHTH I.P.R. CONFERENCE

(mimeographed unless otherwise described)

A. CONFERENCE DATA PAPERS

*Australia*

1. \*AUSTRALIA AND THE PACIFIC, Vol. I, Political.
  - A. AUSTRALIA'S MEMBERSHIP OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, AS AFFECTING HER POST-WAR ROLE AMONG THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FAR EAST, by K. H. Bailey.
  - B. STABILITY IN THE PACIFIC: THE POSITION OF AUSTRALIA, by W. D. Forsyth.
  - C. WAR TRENDS IN AUSTRALIAN OPINIONS, by P. D. Phillips.
  - D. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, by Julius Stone.
  - E. WHITE AUSTRALIA AND THE CHARTER, by a member of the Sydney Branch, Australian Institute of International Affairs.
2. \*AUSTRALIA AND THE PACIFIC, Vol. II, Economic.
  - A. THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY IN RELATION TO POST-WAR CONDITIONS IN THE PACIFIC, by G. L. Wood.
  - B. AUSTRALIAN MARKETS, PARTICULARLY FOR PRIMARY PRODUCTS IN THE PACIFIC AREA, by S. M. Wadham and K. H. Northcote.
  - C. THE EXCHANGE VALUE OF THE AUSTRALIAN POUND AND THE FUTURE, by Roland Mountain.
  - D. POST-WAR PURCHASING POWER IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC, by Walter Hill.
  - E. AUSTRALIA'S COMMERCIAL POLICY IN RELATION TO ARTICLE VII OF THE MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, by members of the Canberra Branch.

*China*

1. TWO PAPERS ON POST-WAR ASIA, by Hu Shih.
2. PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN CHINA, by H. D. Fong, K. Y. Yin, and Tso-Fan Koh.
3. A PERMANENT ORDER FOR THE PACIFIC, by S. R. Chow.

*Canada*

1. MINORITIES OF ORIENTAL RACE IN CANADA, by a Winnipeg Branch Study Group.
2. CANADA AND POST-WAR CIVIL AVIATION, by a Toronto Branch Study Group.
3. INDIA TODAY, by W. E. Duffett, A. R. Hicks and G. R. Parkin, (printed).
4. A CANADIAN VIEW OF THE PACIFIC, by a Toronto Branch Study Group.

*International Labour Office*

1. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN THE PACIFIC COLONIES, by members of the I.L.O.
2. INDIA AND THE PACIFIC REGION, by members of the I.L.O.

---

\*Distributed after the close of the conference.

## Conference Documents

### *Netherlands-Netherlands Indies*

1. NATIONALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by Charles O. van der Plas.
2. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by Peter H. W. Sitsen.
3. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by Loekman Djajadiningrat.
4. INTENSIVE RURAL HYGIENE WORK IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, by J. L. Hydrick, (printed).
5. TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by G. H. C. Hart, (printed).
6. THE NETHERLANDS INDIES AND THEIR NEIGHBORS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, by G. H. C. Hart.

### *India*

1. INDIAN LABOUR AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION, by M. N. Roy.
2. THE STATES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT, by K. M. Panikkar.
3. WARTIME ECONOMIC TRENDS AND POST-WAR POLICIES, by B. D. Adarkar.
4. UNTOUCHABLES AND THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION, by Dr. Ambedkar.
5. WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN INDIA, by Begum Shah Nawaz.
6. PAKISTAN: A HINDU VIEW, by Mehr Chand Khanna.
7. \*AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS OF INDIA, by S. Higginbottom.
8. \*POST-WAR EDUCATION IN INDIA, by Zakir Husain.
9. SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF INDIA IN TRANSITION AND FINAL, by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan.
10. MUSLIM DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN, by An Indian Muslim Politician.

### *New Zealand*

1. A NEW ZEALAND VIEW OF THE WAR AND PEACE AIMS IN THE PACIFIC, by H. Belshaw and others.
2. NEW ZEALAND'S WAR EFFORT, by F. L. W. Wood and J. O. Shearer.

### *United Kingdom*

1. PROBLEMS OF THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT IN THE FAR EAST, by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (*Seven separate papers*).
  - A. A Preliminary Survey
  - B. Burma
  - C. British Malaya
  - D. Hongkong
  - E. North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei
  - F. The Pacific Island Dependencies
  - G. Great Britain and Her Dependencies

---

\*Distributed after the close of the conference.

### *Complete List*

2. BRITISH FAR EASTERN POLICY, by G. E. Hubbard.
3. THE FUTURE OF BRITISH ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST, by E. M. Gull.
4. BRITISH REACTIONS TO THE FAR EAST, 1941-2.
5. INDIA: A BIRD'S EYE VIEW, by Sir Frederick Whyte.

#### *United States*

1. SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST, by Tyler Dennett.
2. THE NORTH PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL PLANNING PROJECT, by Benjamin H. Kizer.
3. WELFARE AND FREEDOM IN POST-WAR SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Bruno Lasker.
4. JAPANESE EVACUATION: INTERIM REPORT, by Carey McWilliams.
5. THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII UNDER WAR CONDITIONS, by Andrew W. Lind.
6. MISSIONS IN FAR EASTERN CULTURAL RELATIONS, by M. S. Bates.
7. OSTRICH INTO EAGLE, *Far Eastern Survey*, November 30, 1942, (printed).
8. FACTORS IN CHINESE ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION, by Robert W. Barnett.
9. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN THE FAR EAST, compiled by Aimee de Potter.
10. DOCUMENTS ON THE INDIAN SITUATION SINCE THE CRIPPS MISSION, compiled by Staff Members of the American Council, I.P.R.
11. COALITION WAR IN THE EAST, by Herrymon Maurer.

#### *International Secretariat*

1. THE SOVIET FAR EAST, by William Mandel.
2. POST-WAR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, by Sir George Sansom.
3. SUPPLEMENT TO "POST-WAR WORLDS," by P. E. Corbett.
4. A RECORD OF SOVIET FAR EASTERN RELATIONS, by Harriet Moore.
5. CHINA'S WAR ECONOMY, by Lawrence K. Rosinger, (*F. P. A. Report*)
6. SOME FACTORS IN A FAR EASTERN PEACE SETTLEMENT, by George W. Keeton.
7. MEMORANDUM ON KOREA'S AGRICULTURE AND RESOURCES, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev.
8. CHINESE VIEWS OF WARTIME ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, by Y. Y. Hsu.
9. PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by J. S. Furnivall.
10. \*MEMORANDUM ON POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN KOREA, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev.

### *B. SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS* (distributed in limited numbers only)

THE UNITED STATES IN A NEW WORLD: II. PACIFIC RELATIONS, (*Fortune* reprint).  
CHUNGKING CONSIDERS THE FUTURE, by Guenther Stein, (Reprint from *Far Eastern Survey*, September 7, 1942).  
JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH, by Kate L. Mitchell.  
BASIS FOR PEACE IN THE FAR EAST, by Nathaniel Peffer, (Harpers, New York, 1942).

### *Conference Documents*

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, by Charles O. van der Plas.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THAILAND, by members of the Free Thai Committee.

WAR AIMS AND PEACE AIMS IN THE PACIFIC, by W. L. Holland, (*Pacific Affairs*, December 1942).

LA FRANCE EN INDOCHINE, by Pierre Laurin, (in French).

WARTIME ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN FREE CHINA, (*International Labour Review*, December 1942)

### *C. OTHER PAPERS*

*(distributed in limited numbers only)*

THE UNITED STATES IN A NEW WORLD: I. RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN, (*Fortune* reprint).

THE UNITED STATES IN A NEW WORLD: III. THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY, (*Fortune* reprint).

ASIA IN A NEW WORLD ORDER, by Owen Lattimore, (*F. P. A. Report*).

THE CRIPPS MISSION TO INDIA. (*International Conciliation*, June 1942).

THE NETWORK OF WORLD TRADE, League of Nations Secretariat.

COLOR. THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF DEMOCRACY, (*Survey Graphic*).

BANKING AND FINANCE IN CHINA, by Frank M. Tamagna.

THE DEMOCRATIC FUTURE OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES, by Eelco N. Van Kleffens, (reprinted from *Foreign Affairs*).

FRENCH OCEANIA, by Major E. de Curton.

NEW CALEDONIA, by Governor Henri Sautot.

TAHITI, TERRE FRANÇAISE COMBATTANTE, by E. de Curton, (in French).

THE POST-WAR INDUSTRIALIZATION OF CHINA, by H. D. Fong, (National Planning Association).

JAPAN AS AN ECONOMIC POWER, by L. K. Rosinger, (*F. P. A. Report*).

NEW BOOKS OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, December 1942.

CHINA AFTER FIVE YEARS OF WAR, (Chinese News Service).

LEND-LEASE TO DATE, (*Fortune* reprint).

THE UNITED STATES IN THE FAR EAST: CERTAIN FUNDAMENTALS OF POLICY, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, (World Peace Foundation).

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC REORGANIZATION, by J. B. Condliffe.

*The conference papers listed above may be obtained, at prices ranging from 15 cents to 75 cents, from the International Secretariat of the I.P.R. at 129 East 52nd Street, New York. A price list is obtainable on request. Supplies are limited. Most of the "supplementary" and "other" papers are published by other institutions and will not be distributed by the I.P.R.*

*PART VI.*

CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP

## CONFERENCE MEMBERSHIP

(Years in parentheses after names indicate attendance at previous I.P.R. conferences)

### AUSTRALIA

- R. J. F. BOYER. Member of the Australian Broadcasting Commission since January 1940; Director of the American Division of the Commonwealth Department of Information, 1941. President, Graziers' Federal Council of Australia. *Chairman.*
- P. HASLUCK. Department of External Affairs, Canberra. Lecturer in History, University of Western Australia, 1940.
- MISS ELEANOR M. HINDER (1929, 1931). Former Chief of the Industrial and Social Division, Shanghai Municipal Council.
- LYOYD M. ROSS. State Secretary of the New South Wales Branch of the Australian Railways Union since 1935.

### CANADA

- EDGAR J. TARR (1929, 1933, 1936, 1939). President, Monarch Life Assurance Company. Director, Bank of Canada. Honorary President, Canadian Institute of International Affairs. *Chairman.*
- CAPTAIN R. G. CAVELL. Vice-President and General Manager, Canadian Telephones and Supplies, Ltd. Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
- WARWICK F. CHIPMAN, K.C. Recently appointed first Canadian Minister to Chile. Professor of Civil Law, McGill University.
- BROOKE CLAXTON, K.C. Liberal M.P. for St. Lawrence-St. George. Professor of Commercial Law, McGill University.
- M. J. COLDWELL. M.P. for Rosetown-Bigger, Saskatchewan. National Chairman, Cooperative Commonwealth Federation.
- J. B. COYNE, K.C. President, Canadian Institute of International Affairs.
- H. L. KEENLEYSIDE. Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Member, Permanent Joint Board of Defense, and Joint Economic Committees of the United States and Canada.
- N. A. M. MACKENZIE (1931, 1933, 1936, 1939). President, University of New Brunswick.
- L'ABBE ARTHUR MAHEUX. Professor of History, Laval University, Quebec. Editor: *Le Canada Francais.*
- MAJOR GENERAL V. W. ODLUM. Recently appointed first Canadian Minister to China. Commander 2nd Division of the Canadian Army in England, 1940-41. Canadian High Commissioner in Australia, 1941-42.
- LOUIS RASMINSKY (1939). Assistant Chairman, Foreign Exchange Control Board.
- VICTOR SIFTON. General Manager, Winnipeg Free Press. Master-General of the Ordnance, Ottawa, 1941-42.
- D. A. SKELTON. Director of Research, Bank of Canada. Member, Canadian Committee, Joint Economic Committees of the United States and Canada.
- F. H. SOWARD (1933, 1936). Professor of History, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.

### Conference Membership

R. G. TROTTER. Professor of Canadian and Colonial History and Head of the Department of History, Queen's University, Kingston.

#### *Canadian Secretariat*

JOHN W. HOLMES. Secretary, Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

E. H. NORMAN. Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. Canadian Legation, Tokyo, 1940-42.

MISS EDNA NEALE.

### CHINA

SAO-KE ALFRED SZE. Acting Chairman, China Defense Supplies, Inc., Washington. Formerly Ambassador to London and Washington. Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Washington Conference, 1921-22. Chief Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations, 1931. *Chairman*.

S. R. CHOW (1939). Professor of International Law, Wuhan National University. Member, People's Political Council.

MAJOR GENERAL S. M. CHU. Military Attache, Chinese Embassy, Washington. Formerly Military Attache at Moscow.

H. D. FONG. Director, Nankai Economic Institute. Chungking.

C. L. HSIA (1929, 1931). Member of the Legislative Yuan. Director, Chinese News Service in the United States.

SHUHSI HSU (1929, 1931). Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chungking.

KAO LING-PAI. Formerly Consul-General at Singapore.

KAN LEE (1936). Commercial Counsellor, Chinese Embassy, Washington. Formerly member of the Chinese National Tariff Commission.

K. C. LI (1939). President of the Wah Chang Trading Corporation, New York.

T. L. TSUI. First Secretary, Chinese Embassy, Washington.

#### *Chinese Secretariat*

CHEN YIH. Research Member, Central News Agency, Washington Bureau.

LIN LIN. Research Member, Chinese News Service, New York.

LIN MOUSHENG. Editor: *Contemporary China*, Chinese News Service, New York.

T. C. LIU. Office of Commercial Counsellor, Washington.

T. Y. YANG. Office of the Chinese Military Attache, Washington.

MISS HILDA YEN (1939). Formerly Secretary of Chinese Delegation to the League of Nations.

MRS. ENID CHEN.

MISS MARGARET HILL.

### FIGHTING FRANCE

PAUL RIVET. Formerly Professor at the Paris Museum and Head of the Musée de l'Homme, Paris, 1928-40. Head of the Ethnological Institute of Colombia, Bogota. *Chairman*.

PHILIPPE BAUDET. Assistant Delegate of the Fighting French Delegation in Washington. Formerly Counsellor, French Embassy, Chungking, 1941.

JEAN BURNAY. Formerly legal adviser to the Siamese Government, 1924-40. Member of the Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient.

PIERRE LAURIN. Formerly Professor at the Lycée Français de Hanoi, 1936-41.

## Conference Membership

### INDIA

- SIR A. RAMASWAMI MUDALIAR, K.C.S.I. Indian Delegate, Nine Power Conference, Brussels, 1937. Member, Imperial Economic Committee, London, 1936-39. Commerce Member, Government of India, 1932-42. Member, British War Cabinet and Pacific War Council, London, 1942. *Chairman*.
- SIR MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN, K.C.S.I. Member of the Governor General's Executive Council, 1932, 1935-41. Judge of the Federal Court of India. Lately Agent-General for India in China.
- RAI BAHADUR MEHR CHAND KHANNA, C.I.E. Leader of the Hindu-Sikh Nationalist Party, Legislative Assembly, Northwest Frontier Province. Formerly Finance Minister of that Province. Member, Working Committee, All-India Hindu Mahasaba.
- BEGUM SHAH NAWAZ, M.B.E. Parliamentary Secretary to the Departments of Education, Medical and Public Health. Member, National Defense Council of India. All-India Lady Organizer, National War Front.
- M. PANIKKAR. Vice-President, State Cabinet, Foreign and Political Minister and Minister for Education and Public Health, State of Bikaner. Former Editor of the *Hindustan Times*.
- DIWAN BAHADUR S. E. RUNGANADHAN. Former Vice-Chancellor, Madras University. Member, Madras Legislative Council. Adviser to the Secretary of State for India.
- RAI BAHADUR N. SIVARAJ. Representative of the Depressed Classes in the Indian Legislative Assembly. President of the All-India Scheduled Castes Federation. *Indian Secretariat*
- MAJOR A. S. B. SHAH. Indian Political Service.
- S. BASHIR AHMAD. MISS FLORENCE MACKAY.

### KOREA

- YOUNGHILL KANG. Economic Analyst, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington. Professor, Department of English, New York University.

### NETHERLANDS—NETHERLANDS INDIES

- RADEN LOEKMAN DJAJADININGRAT. Director of the Department of Education and Public Worship. Member of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao in the United States. *Chairman*.
- NICOLAAS A. J. DE VOOGD. Secretary for Japanese Affairs of the Netherlands Economic Mission in the United States. Consul of the Netherlands at Kobe, 1938-41.
- LT. COL. CONRAD GIEBEL. Royal Netherlands Indies Air Force. Royal Netherlands Military Flying School at Jackson, Mississippi.
- GEORGE H. C. HART. Chairman of the Board of Commissioners for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao, in the United States. Director of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands Indies, 1934-37. Director, Economic Division, Department for the Colonies, The Hague and London, 1937-41.
- WILLEM P. HASSELMAN. Manager, International Credit and Trade Society "Rotterdam" in Japan, 1933-41.
- PIETER HONIG. Member of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao, Washington. Former Director of Experimental Station, Java sugar

### *Conference Membership*

- industry at Pasuruan. Director of the Rubber Research Institute at Buitenzorg, Java.
- HERMAN JACOBSON. Royal Dutch-Shell Oil Company. Member, Board of Directors, Royal Netherlands Indies Airways, 1929-42.
- PIET H. W. SITSSEN. Member of the Board for the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao in the United States. Chief of the Netherlands Indies Industrial Service of Economic Affairs, 1934.
- JOHAN VAN BEUSEKOM. Formerly Officer, Netherlands Indies Internal Administration. Adviser, Netherlands Information Bureau, New York.
- JOHANNES H. WARNING. Managing Director, Java-China-Japan Line.
- RADEN HADJI ABDULKADIR WIDJOJOATMODJO. Netherlands Indies Internal Administration. Formerly Vice-Consul in Mecca.
- Netherlands Secretariat.*
- J. F. ENGERS. Acting-Secretary, Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.
- MISS BETTY L. BROWN.

### *NEW ZEALAND*

- WALTER NASH (1927, 1933). New Zealand Minister to the United States, and New Zealand Member of the Pacific War Council, Washington. New Zealand Minister of Finance since December 1935. Deputy Prime Minister since 1940. Vice-President, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs. *Chairman.*
- BRUCE R. TURNER (1936). Secretary, New Zealand Legation, Washington. Former Secretary, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.
- New Zealand Secretariat*
- MISS J. MACKENZIE.

### *PHILIPPINES*

- JOAQUIN M. ELIZALDE. Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the United States. Member, Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs, 1937. Philippine Delegate to the International Sugar Conference. London, 1938-42. Member of the War Cabinet, Commonwealth of the Philippines since 1941. *Chairman.*
- ARTURO B. ROTOR. Secretary to the President of the Philippines.
- SEBASTIAN UGARTE. Legal Adviser to the Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the United States.
- URBANO A. ZAFRA. Commercial Adviser to the Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the United States. *Secretary.*

### *THAILAND*

- M. R. SENI PRAMOJ. Free Thai Minister to the United States.
- CHINTANA NAGAVAJARA. *Secretary.*

### *UNITED KINGDOM*

- THE LORD HAILEY, G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E. Member of the Indian Civil Service, 1895-1935. Governor of the Punjab, 1924-28, and of the United Provinces, 1928-30 and 1931-34. Director of the African Research Survey,

### Conference Membership

- 1935-38. Member of the Permanent Mandates Commission, League of Nations, 1935-39. Head of Economic Mission to the Belgian Congo, 1940. Chairman of governing body of School of Oriental and African Studies (London University). *Chairman*.
- H. B. BUTLER, C.B. Minister and Director-General of the British Information Services, British Embassy, Washington. Warden of Nuffield College, Oxford. Director of International Labour Office, Geneva, 1932-38.
- HUGH BYAS. Former Tokyo Correspondent for the *New York Times* and the *Times* (London).
- SIR JOHN CLAGUE, C.M.G., C.I.E. Indian Civil Service in Burma, 1906-37. Chief Secretary to the Burma Government, 1927-29. Commissioner, Federated Shan States, 1931-35. Sino-British Boundary Commission, 1935-36. Adviser to the Secretary of State for Burma, 1937-42.
- CAPTAIN L. D. GAMMANS, M.P. (Conservative) since 1941. British Colonial Service, 1920, in Malaya. British Embassy, Tokyo, 1926-28. Director of the Land Settlement Association, 1934-39. Attached to the Ministry of Information, 1939-41.
- W. J. HINTON (1927). Director of Speakers and Exhibitions Division, British Information Services. Director of Studies, British Institute of Bankers. Professor of Political Economy, University of Hongkong, 1913-29.
- A. CREECH JONES, M.P. (Labour) since 1935. Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin. Member of Executive of Parliamentary Labour Party. Chairman, Fabian Colonial Bureau and Friends of Africa and Member of the Education Advisory Committee, Colonial Office. Executive Member, British Council, and Former National Secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union.
- AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR ARTHUR LONGMORE, G.C.B., D.S.O. Until recently Inspector-General, Royal Air Force. Commandant Imperial Defense College, 1936-38. Member of British Air Mission to Australia and New Zealand, 1939. Member of United Kingdom Delegation to Pacific Defense Conference, New Zealand, 1939. Air Officer Commanding R.A.F., Middle East, 1940-41.
- IVISON S. MACADAM, C.B.E., M.V.O. (1933, 1936). Secretary, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Assistant Director-General, Ministry of Information, 1939-41.
- D. M. MACDOUGALL. Attached to British Information Services, Washington. Hongkong Civil Service, 1928-39. Secretary to Far Eastern Bureau, Ministry of Information.
- I. MACLENNAN. Senior Secretary, Office of the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Ottawa.
- REDVERS OPIE. Economic Adviser, British Embassy, Washington, 1939-42.
- SIR JOHN PRATT, K.B.E., C.M.G. Chairman, British and Chinese Corporation and the Central Chinese Railways. Consular Service in China, 1898-1925. Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs, Foreign Office, 1925-38. Head of Far Eastern Section, Ministry of Information, 1939-41.
- SIR GEORGE SANSOM, K.C.M.G. Minister advising on Far Eastern Affairs, British Embassy, Washington. Consular service in Japan, 1904-24. Commercial Counsellor, 1926-40. Adviser to Ministry of Economic Warfare Far Eastern Mis-

### *Conference Membership*

- sion, Singapore and later member of Far Eastern War Council, Singapore, 1941-42.
- SIR FREDERICK WHYTE, K.C.S.I. (1927). Convener of Discussion Meetings and Chairman of Far Eastern Group at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. President, Indian Legislative Assembly, 1920-25. Political Adviser to the National Government of China, 1929-32. Director-General, English Speaking Union in London from 1928-39 and Head of the American Division, Ministry of Information from 1939-40.
- MISS MARGARET WRONG. Secretary, International Committee on Christian Literature for Africa. Formerly Lecturer in History, University of Toronto.
- United Kingdom Secretariat*
- GUY WINT  
MRS. JOHN LOCKE
- MRS. IVISON MACADAM  
MRS. ARNOLD WHITTAKER

### *UNITED STATES*

- PHILIP C. JESSUP (1933, 1939). Chairman, Pacific Council, I.P.R. Professor of International Law, Columbia University. Assistant Solicitor, U.S. Department of State, 1924-25. Legal Adviser to American Ambassador to Cuba, 1930. Member, Executive Committee, Harvard Research in International Law. *Chairman.*
- W. NORMAN BROWN. Consultant on India, Office of Strategic Services, Washington. Professor of Sanskrit, University of Pennsylvania. Professor of English, Prince of Wales College, Jammu, India, 1923-24.
- RALPH J. BUNCHE. Senior Social Science Analyst on Colonial Affairs, Office of Strategic Services, Washington. Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science, Howard University, Washington.
- FRANK COE. Assistant to the Executive Director, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington. Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department.
- LAUCLIN CURRIE. Administrative Assistant to the President of the United States.
- LEN DE CAUX. Publicity Director, Congress of Industrial Organizations. Editor: *CIO News*. In charge of Washington Bureau, Federated Press, 1934-35.
- TYLER DENNETT. Formerly Historical Adviser, Department of State. Formerly Professor of International Relations, Princeton University and President, Williams College.
- EDWIN R. EMBREE. President, Julius Rosenwald Fund, Chicago. Vice President and Director, Division of Human Biology, Rockefeller Foundation, 1917-28.
- BROOKS EMENY (1936, 1939). Director of Foreign Affairs Council, Cleveland. Lecturer in International Relations, Yale University, 1927-33. Associate Professor of International Relations, Western Reserve University, 1935-42.
- FREDERICK V. FIELD (1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939). Chairman, Editorial Board, *Amerasia*. Member of staff, Council for Pan American Democracy. Member, editorial staff, *The New Masses*. Member, Executive Committee, American Council, I.P.R.
- MAXWELL M. HAMILTON. Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.

### Conference Membership

- FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON. Special Adviser to the President of the Philippines, 1942. Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, 1913-21.
- STANLEY K. HORNBECK (1927). Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State. Formerly Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State. Member of staff, American delegations to the Paris Peace Conference, Washington Conference, Peking Conference on Chinese Customs Tariff, and the Brussels Conference.
- BENJAMIN H. KIZER (1933, 1936). Member of the law firm of Graves, Kizer & Graves. Chairman, Region No. 9, National Resources Planning Board. Associate Member of the War Labor Board. Vice-Chairman, American Council, I.P.R.
- OWEN LATTIMORE (1933, 1936, 1939). Political Adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, (on leave). Formerly Editor of *Pacific Affairs*, and Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, Johns Hopkins University.
- MAJOR-GENERAL FRANK R. MCCOY, U.S.A., retired (1939). President, Foreign Policy Association. Member of Wood-Forbes special mission to the Philippines, 1921. In charge of American relief activities in Japan following earthquake of 1923. American Member of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry in Manchuria, 1932.
- EDGAR A. MOWRER. Foreign correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, now with the Office of War Information.
- HARRIET L. MOORE (1933, 1936, 1939). Executive Director, American Russian Institute, New York. Member of the International Secretariat, I.P.R.
- LEO PASVOLSKY. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Washington.
- C. F. REMER. Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Office of Strategic Services, Washington. Member of the American Economic Mission to the Far East, 1935. Professor of Economics, University of Michigan.
- JAMES H. SHOEMAKER. Chairman, Board of Review of the Enemy Branch, Board of Economic Warfare, Washington. Formerly, Assistant Professor of Economics, Brown University.
- MICHAEL STRAIGHT. Editor and Washington Correspondent of *The New Republic*.
- ELBERT D. THOMAS. U. S. Senator from Utah (Democrat). Formerly Professor of Political Science, University of Utah. Missionary in Japan, 1907-12.
- JACOB VINER. Professor of Economics, University of Chicago. Visiting Professor of Economics, Yale University, 1942-43. Economic Adviser, Treasury Department. Assistant to Secretary, Treasury Department, 1934.
- BRAYTON WILBUR. President, Wilbur-Ellis Company, importers, San Francisco. President, Connell Brothers, Company, Ltd. Member of Executive Committee, San Francisco Division of the American Council, I.P.R.
- ADMIRAL HARRY E. YARNELL, U.S.N., retired. (1939). Now on active duty in Washington. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, 1936-1939.

## Conference Membership

### *American Secretariat*

- W. W. LOCKWOOD (1936, 1939). Secretary, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations.
- J. O. M. BROEK. Professor of Geography, University of California.
- MISS WILMA FAIRBANK. China Section, Division of Cultural Relations, Department of State.
- MISS MIRIAM S. FARLEY (1936, 1939). Research Staff, American Council, I.P.R.
- MISS KATRINE R. C. GREENE (1939). Assistant Secretary, American Council, I.P.R.
- CHARLES F. LOOMIS (1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939). Chief, Morale Section, Office of the Military Governor, Hawaii. Secretary, Hawaii Group, American Council, I.P.R.
- KARL J. PELZER. Walter Hines Page School, Johns Hopkins University.
- MISS CATHERINE PORTER (1927, 1929, 1931, 1936, 1939). Research Staff, American Council, I.P.R.

### INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS OF THE I.P.R.

- PHILIP C. JESSUP. Chairman, Pacific Council.
- EDGAR J. TARR. Chairman, International Finance Committee.
- J. B. CONDLIFFE (1925, 1927, 1929, 1939). Acting-Chairman, International Research Committee. Professor of Economics, University of California. University Professor of Commerce, London School of Economics, 1937-39. Professor of Economics, Canterbury College, 1920-26. Research Secretary of the IPR, 1926-31.

### OBSERVERS

#### *International Labour Office*

- WILFRED BENSON. Member of Section dealing with colonial questions.
- C. W. JENKS. Legal Adviser.
- R. RAO. Member of Section dealing with Asiatic questions.
- E. J. RICHES. Acting Economic Adviser.
- LINDSAY ROGERS. Assistant Director, I.L.O. Professor of Public Law, Columbia University.
- C. W. H. WEAVER. Chief of the Central Section. Representative of the I.L.O. on the Permanent Mandate Commission.

#### *League of Nations*

- FOLKE HILGERDT. Member, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, Princeton.
- A. LOVEDAY. Director, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, Princeton.

#### *Carnegie Corporation*

- WALTER A. JESSUP. President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Member, Survey Committees of Cleveland and Los Angeles public school systems.

### *Conference Membership*

HENRY JAMES. Trustee of the Carnegie Corporation. Chairman and President of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association.

#### *Rockefeller Foundation*

JOSEPH H. WILLITS. Director for the Social Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation. Dean, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, 1933-39.

ROGER F. EVANS. Assistant Director for the Social Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation. J. H. & C. K. Eagle Company, Inc., Shanghai, 1921-29.

### *INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT*

EDWARD C. CARTER (1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939). Secretary General, I.P.R.

W. L. HOLLAND (1929, 1931, 1933, 1936, 1939). International Research Secretary, I.P.R.

MISS HILDA AUSTERN (1936, 1939). Assistant Treasurer, I.P.R.

ROBERT W. BARNETT (1939)

MISS RUTH D. CARTER (1936, 1939)

ANDREW J. GRAJDANZEV

MISS MARY F. HEALY

BRUNO LASKER (1931, 1933, 1936)

MISS KATRINE W. PARSONS (1939)

HARRY B. PRICE (1939) (Temporary Member)

### *CONFERENCE STAFF*

MISS DOROTHY BORG (1939)

MRS. EDWARD C. CARTER (1929, 1936, 1939)

MISS YVETTE LE CAVALIER

MISS MARGARET CHAMBERS

MISS WINNIFRED CLARK

MRS. DOLLY ELTENTON

MRS. FREDERICK V. FIELD (1931, 1936, 1939)

MRS. W. L. HOLLAND (1933, 1936, 1939)

MISS CAROLYN KIZER (1936)

TREVOR LLOYD (1936)

MRS. W. W. LOCKWOOD (1936, 1939)

M. M. PERRAULT

F. W. POLAND

MISS FAYETTE V. A. SMITH (1939)

R. L. STRINA

MRS. BRUCE R. TURNER

MRS. BETTY UNGER

MISS ROSE YARDUMIAN

### *MEMBERS OF FAMILIES*

MRS. PHILIPPE BAUDET

MRS. HAROLD B. BUTLER

MRS. BROOKS EMENY

MRS. HENRY JAMES

MRS. WALTER A. JESSUP

MRS. B. H. KIZER (1936)

MRS. B. H. KIZER (1933, 1936)

MRS. WALTER NASH

MRS. V. W. ODLUM

MRS. S. E. RUNGANADHAN

MRS. D. A. SKELTON

MRS. MICHAEL STRAIGHT

NEW OFFICERS OF THE  
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS  
*Elected at the Mont Tremblant Conference*

---

*Chairman, Pacific Council*  
EDGAR J. TARR (Canada)

*Vice-chairmen*  
HARRY E. YARNELL (United States), CHIANG MON-LIN (China), GEORGE  
H. C. HART (Netherlands and Netherlands Indies), I. CLUNIES ROSS  
(Australia).

*Pacific Council Members*  
R. J. F. BOYER (Australia), EDGAR J. TARR (Canada), SAO-KE ALFRED  
SZE (China), PHILIPPE BAUDET (France), GEORGE H. C. HART (Nether-  
lands and Netherlands Indies), WALTER NASH (New Zealand), J. M.  
ELIZALDE (Philippines), V. E. MOTYLEV (U. S. S. R.), LORD HAILEY  
(United Kingdom), PHILIP C. JESSUP (United States).

*Chairman, Finance Committee*  
K. C. LI

*Chairman, Research Committee*  
J. B. CONDLIFFE

*Chairman, Program Committee*  
SIR FREDERICK WHYTE

*Secretary-General*  
EDWARD C. CARTER

*Research Secretary*  
W. L. HOLLAND

*Assistant Treasurer*  
HILDA AUSTERN

## THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

The Institute of Pacific Relations is an unofficial and non-political organization, founded in 1925 to facilitate the scientific study of the peoples of the Pacific area. It is composed of autonomous National Councils in the principal countries having important interests in the Pacific area, together with an International Secretariat. It is privately financed by contributions from National Councils, corporations and foundations. The Institute, as such, does not advocate policies or doctrines and is precluded from expressing opinions on national or international affairs. It is governed by a Pacific Council composed of members appointed by each of the National Councils.

In addition to the independent activities of its National Councils, the Institute organizes private international conferences every two or three years. Such conferences have been held at Honolulu (1925 and 1927), Kyoto (1929), Shanghai (1931), Banff, Canada (1933), Yosemite Park, California (1936), Virginia Beach, Virginia (1939), Mont Tremblant, Quebec (1942). It conducts an extensive program of research on the political, economic and social problems of the Pacific area and the Far East. It also publishes the proceedings of its conferences under the title *Problems of the Pacific*, a quarterly journal *Pacific Affairs*, and a large number of scholarly books and pamphlets embodying the results of its studies.

### NATIONAL COUNCILS

*Australian Institute of International Affairs*

*Canadian Institute of International Affairs*

*China Institute of Pacific Relations*

*Netherlands-Netherlands Indies Council, Institute of Pacific Relations*

*New Zealand Institute of International Affairs*

*Philippine Institute of International Affairs*

*Royal Institute of International Affairs*

*U.S.S.R. Council, Institute of Pacific Relations*

*American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations*

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT AND PUBLICATIONS OFFICE

129 East 52nd Street, New York